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Abstract 
 
What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as 
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations receive political rents? 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations are active participants in civil society. Many 
theoretical and empirical studies deal with the macroeconomic and social impact of 
NGOs. This thesis, however, focuses on micro-economic aspects of external western 
aid in terms of political rents, taking Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza) as an 
example.  
 
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (PNGOs) play an important role in 
various social and economic spheres of Palestinian society. In order to understand the 
ongoing changes in the NGO-sector since the end of the 1980ies, I concentrate on 
looking inside the “black box NGO-employees” in PNGOs which are mainly funded 
by external western aid. 1 The personal data of PNGO-employees are analyzed in the 
context of how international aid influences the particular personal situations of 
PNGO-employees and, by extension, how international aid which is transferred to the 
small number of PNGOs favored by the donors, and not to the Palestinian Authority 
(PA), influences the development of Palestinian society as a whole.  
 
This is an empirical analytical study which builds on field research carried out in the 
occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs) between August 2010 and March 2011. It is 
based on both a quantitative and a qualitative study and provides data on personal 
backgrounds, working histories and careers, living standards, including salaries and 
also personal political attitudes in the past and present of a range of typical PNGO-
employees (from service staff to directors) in the West Bank and in Gaza.2 
 
The results of the data indicate a neo-liberal transformation in the PNGO-sector and 
show that this sector is not immune to a globalized restructuring process of the work 
                                               
1 My interest focuses on the behaviour of the "black box". “Black box” is defined as an object 
whose internal structure and function is unknown. Of interest is mainly the black box’s 
behaviour. Normally in cybernetic or system theory, the inside is of no special interest. This 
model is used to reduce the complexity of an object. 
 
2 I was responsible for the study design and implementation. The study was done in 
cooperation with the Democracy and Human Rights Program at Birzeit University from 
November 2010-December 2012. 
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force. This process results in an exploited labour force operating under precarious 
working conditions.  
 
NGO-employees – divided into three groups and characterized as a “precariat”, an 
“aspiring middle class” and a “PNGO-elite”– benefit significantly from the current 
political and economic system. This results in their tacit or explicit support for the PA 
and therefore a stabilization of  the ruling political system with the consequence that 
PNGOs can no longer be considered a part of independent civil society (in the sense of 
acting as a counterpart to government). 
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1. Chapter 1 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
At the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, development aid or 
humanitarian aid from international donors, which I here term political rents 
have undergone a paradigmatic shift. If the agenda in the 1970s and 1980s was 
based on the assumption that aid constituted help for social development, by 
the end of the 1980s the focus moved increasingly to economic development. 
International donors recognized the positive influence of civil society, mainly 
Non-Governmental Organizations, on economic development. Donors started 
to co-finance civil society autonomously parallel to target governments in order 
to support developmental goals. During the same time, critical literature started 
to observe and analyze NGO employees, former political activists, as social 
actors using the attributes middle class, de-politicized and de-radicalized. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to find answers to the central research question What 
changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as NGOs receive 
political rents? 
 
To answer this question, I chose employees of Palestinian Non-Governmental 
Organizations (PNGOs) in the occupied Palestinian territories (OPTs), i.e. 
West Bank and Gaza. The OPTs represent a typical semi-rentier state and in 
focus are PNGOs and their employees as social actors, which are mainly 
funded by western aid. 
 
The theoretical framework of the Rentier State Theory will guide the analysis. 
This theory was developed for the study of political, economic and social 
conditions of states in the Middle East in the nineteen-seventies. A rentier state 
is defined as a state whose budget is made up of at least 20% of oil rents; while 
a semi-rentier state should receive at least 20% of political rents as 
development aid. Rents are defined as state income without investment or 
labor. Characteristically the recipient state is free to use this state income as it 
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wishes; it is not subject to market conditions of reinvestment and it may be 
used to promote the interests of the rentier. Rentier states are marked by mainly 
neopatrimonial and centralized systems. The state as a rentier supports chosen 
social groups to secure its ruling system, as it blocks democratic movements 
and productive economic development.3 
 
In this research, political rents will be also used to describe development and 
humanitarian aid, paid by various international donors not to the state, but to 
PNGOs, as part of civil society. Against the background of classical rentier 
state theory, there are obviously two problems - The OPTs do not constitute a 
sovereign state, and Non-Governmental Organizations are not state actors, but 
rather part of civil society. In the OPTs (like in many other developing states) 
international donors pay political rents not only to the Palestinian Authority as 
a quasi state government, but also to PNGOs. Thus, PNGOs become part of the 
same rentier system as the Palestinian Authority (PA), the Palestinian 
government. The PA depends on the same donors as the PNGO sector, i.e. 
World Bank, European Union, International Monetary Fund (IMF), USA, 
Norway, Japan etc. This poses a major question: how do civil society actors 
function within and as part of a rentier system, especially if they receive 
political rents from the same donors as their government?  
 
The focus of this thesis is empirical, not theoretical. But obviously new 
empirical material can and should help in expanding and modifying rentier 
state theory. I hope to pose relevant questions which should later be taken up 
by theorists in further work on the rentier state theory. The central part of this 
thesis is made up of new data, collected through my own field-work in 
Palestine. This empirical material is then analyzed with the help of rentier state 
theory applied not to the state, but rather to NGOs as social actors within a 
semi-rentier “state”. 
 
                                               
3 My argument here relies heavily on Peter Pawelka, Claudia Schmid, as well as Martin Beck. 
A more detailed analysis will follow in chapter two. 
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The above-mentioned paradigmatic change in development aid towards the end 
of the 1980s brought with it serious consequences for actors in civil society: 
former solidarity-based donor money changed into donor money with pre-
defined conditions and a clear political agenda. By definition, political rents do 
not include nor do they derive from any productive effort. This kind of income, 
however, does require something in return. Donors are only willing to transfer 
political rents to PNGOs, if their agendas are in the fields of “good 
governance”, “human rights”, “democracy” and “education for peace”. 
A rentier system results in a system of rent-seeking which imposes a very 
specific way of acting and behaving. The recipients of rents in this research are 
the PNGOs and I shall try to analyze their specific way of acting and behaving 
under these new conditions. Rent seeking is based on attempts to increase and 
to stabilize income. Rent seeking may involve tremendous efforts. Such efforts 
often involve and are supported by socio-political networks which individuals 
or groups create. 
The following analysis focuses on the negative impacts of rent seeking such as 
the perpetuation of underdevelopment and the undermining of the willingness 
of those who benefit from rents to undertake any critical and creative 
intellectual and economic effort to counter this system. A detailed introduction 
into the theoretical framework, its application in the context of Palestine, and 
last but not least the development of PNGOs will follow in chapter two. There 
I will present my main research hypothesis. 
 
My critical analysis of PNGOs is mainly empirical. It builds on field research 
carried out in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) between August 2010 
and March 2011. It is based on quantitative data (1050 valid questionnaires 
from NGO-employees in 128 NGOs in the West Bank and 75 NGOs in Gaza) 
from NGO-employees in NGOs in the fields of women, youth, health, 
agriculture, human rights and peace training. It also provides qualitative data of 
six focus groups interviews in the West Bank and six in Gaza as well as data on 
personal backgrounds, working histories and careers, living standards, 
including salaries, but also personal political attitudes in the past and present of 
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a range of typical PNGO-employees (from service staff to directors) in the 
West Bank and in Gaza. 
 
These data document the everyday socio-economic impact of political rents 
and analyze the socio-economic, social and political impact of PNGOs on local 
populations in the West Bank and Gaza. This new material enabled me to 
analyze the personal data of PNGO-employees in two steps: 
1. How does international aid influence the particular personal situations 
of PNGO-employees and, by extension, 
2. how does international aid which is transferred to selected PNGOs 
instead of to the PA, influence the development of Palestinian society as a 
whole. 
This provides a solid empirical basis for answering the main research question: 
What changes occur in society when influential social actors such as PNGOs 
receive rents? 
 
This thesis hopes to contribute to research on NGOs with quantitative and 
qualitative data on PNGO-employees. It clearly points to and documents a 
neoliberal transformation of the PNGO-sector. In this process an exploited 
labour force is created, operating under very precarious working conditions. 
Political rents in the PNGO sector divide PNGO employees in groups, very 
much akin to classes. They are characterized and defined in this thesis as a 
“precariat”, an “aspiring middle class” and a “PNGO-elite.” Despite these clear 
divisions, all three groups clearly benefit from the current political and 
economic system. This results in their tacit or even explicit support for the PA 
and contributes therefore to a stabilization of the ruling political system with 
the consequence that PNGOs can no longer be considered a part of an 
independent civil society (in the sense of acting as a counterpart or an 
opposition to the government). 
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1.2 Chapter outline 
 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. 
Chapter one presents the general introduction to the guiding theoretical 
framework of the rentier state theory for analyzing the central research 
question: What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as 
NGOs receive political rents in context of the occupied Palestinian territories 
(OPTs), i.e. West Bank and Gaza as a typical semi-rentier state. Palestinian 
non-governmental organization and their employees which are mainly funded 
by western aid are taking as an example for civil society actors.  
 
Chapter two presents a detailed introduction, beginning with an overview of 
the historical and political development of NGOs in general, and the 
development of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in particular. 
Relevant terms of the rentier state theory such as rent and rent-seeking are 
introduced. At the same time and in particular in the Arab and Palestinian 
context, the neopatrimonialism paradigm will be introduced with the major 
terms of patron, clients and clientelism, as well as elites. 
 
Chapter three introduces the methodology of the quantitative and qualitative 
study. The central part of this chapter is the comprehensive documentation of 
the quantitative and qualitative data material which has been collected in the 
research project that I designed and led at Birzeit University in Palestine 
between November 2009 and December 2011.The database was collected 
between August 2010 and March 2011 in the West Bank and in Gaza. The data 
are documented, and they are followed by detailed interim conclusions about 
personal backgrounds, working histories and careers, living standards, 
including salaries and also personal political attitudes in the past and present of 
a range of typical PNGO-employees (from service staff to directors) in the 
West Bank and in Gaza. 
The interim conclusions show that we are dealing with a predominantly young 
and educated PNGO clientele. Women comprise 57.5% of the work force in 
the NGO sector and most come from urban backgrounds. PNGO employees 
  19 
have a tendency to marry relatively late (compared to Palestinian society in 
general) and therefore to have fewer children. 
The database on working conditions, wages and terms of employment shows a 
clear stratification of PNGO employment in the OPTs. There is a clear 
hierarchy: at the bottom remains a large group of PNGO workers, typically low 
paid, with no job security, having short term contracts or no written contract at 
all; then comes a ‘middle class’ and finally an elite with long-term contracts or 
permanent contracts and a level of income well above the Palestinian average. 
This indicates a neo-liberal transformation in the PNGO sector and shows that 
this sector is not immune to a globalized, neo-liberal restructuring process of 
the work force. Along with this transformation, attitudes towards volunteering 
in PNGOs have changed and a generation gap between the first and the second 
Intifada generation can be observed. The majority of voluntary work has to be 
seen in a neo-liberal context – voluntary work represents a chance for future 
employees to enter “the first job market.” Sometimes, prospective NGO-
employees go through seemingly endless volunteering experiences.  
 
The data and the interim conclusions of chapter three are the basis for the 
analysis in chapter four. The broader socio-economic, social and political 
implications on Palestinian NGO employees and on Palestinian society, caused 
by political rents paid to the PNGO sector, will be analyzed in six successive 
steps:  
1. With professionalization and institutionalization of PNGOs in the1980s and 
1990s, especially after Oslo (1993), PNGO employees formed a new group of 
clients. They transformed themselves into clients of primarily external donors. 
2. A part of this new group of clients joined the middle class and now 
constitutes an elite, i.e. an NGO elite distinct from the NGO precariat. 
3. The NGO sector, first defined and understood as a “third sector”, 
increasingly turned into a neo-liberally restructured working sector 
4. This neoliberal transformation of PNGOs changed the self-perception of 
PNGO and PNGO employees. The PNGO sector as part of civil society turned 
society into an object and "a vehicle" for individual interests, for example for a 
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job or a career. In this sense, many PNGOs have lost touch with society and 
society lost its trust and appreciation of PNGOs. 
5. The creation of jobs in the mainly externally funded PNGO sector is 
possible, if social actors –willingly or unwillingly  – accept, operate and 
position themselves within the existing political system. 
6. In post-Oslo Palestine, this process has also led to the stabilization of the 
ruling system, represented by the PA and has also led to the stabilization of the 
persisting Israeli occupation. 
 
In my final remarks, I conclude that political rents in the externally-funded 
PNGO sector imply a commercialization of this part of civil society. A 
commercialization of civil society however, contradicts the central principles 
of civil society. The thesis describes the contradiction between the self-
proclaimed donor policy of strengthening civil society and the newly 
established reality on the ground. Precisely this contradiction may be creating 
new social actors on the ground, who are heading towards a social and political 
transformation beyond the well adapted neoliberal PNGO sector.  
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2. Chapter 2 
 The role of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations  
 in a semi-rentier state 
 
The following chapter will present the historical and political development of 
NGOs in general, as well as of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations in 
particular. The research question and hypothesis will be introduced along with 
relevant terms of rentier state theory such as rent and rent-seeking. The 
neopatrimonialism paradigm will be explained with the major terms of patron, 
clients and clientelism, as well as the concept of elites which will be developed 
and demonstrated in the Palestinian context. 
 
In the text the acronym PNGOs will be used for Palestinian Non-Governmental 
Organizations. When the focus is on NGOs worldwide, or on the Palestinian 
context including International NGOs, which are active in West Bank and 
Gaza, I use the acronym NGOs. 
 
 
2.1 A short history of NGOs 
 Background: Non-Governmental Organizations – blessing, mixed 
 blessing or bane? 
 
Until the 1960s, Non-Governmental Organizations acted as small agencies to 
support poor people in their needs. Most of these agencies were based in the 
North.4 Agencies with a presence in the South were in general part of broader 
movements and also part of networks. They were based on voluntary work and 
combined charitable work with advocacy.  
 
                                               
4 The terms “northern NGOs” and “southern NGOs” include the geographical aspect of the 
location. "Northern" or "northern non-governmental organizations" are based in industrial 
countries and "southern" or "southern non-governmental organizations" are based in 
developing countries. In reality, southern NGOs are often supported by – or contracts of 
northern NGOs. That may result in dependence of the southern NGOs on the northern NGOs. 
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The state and the capitalist market were targets of criticism. The goal was to 
challenge the existing hegemonic structure or bring about systemic change.5 
 
Throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s, these organizations remained 
relatively small. They received a boost, however, when societies in the North, 
either on the level of Civil Society or on the level of the State started to co-
finance NGO programs. NGOs in the South were well aware of this favorable 
geopolitical, historical moment and took full advantage of it. The number of 
southern NGOs, which were often politically on the left or connected with 
religious institutions, was growing. NGOs and their leaders (NGO activists) 
understood the need for cooperation and integrated activities between the North 
and the South as well as with other non-governmental actors such as political 
or social movements. At this time, the need for a different developmental 
model was realized. The term “alternative development” was created during 
this period.6 
Against the background of cooperation between northern and southern NGOs, 
social and political movements, as well as institutions supporting them, it was 
                                               
5 For example Cooper, Frederik, 1997:"Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans and the 
Development Concept", in: Cooper, Frederik and Packard, Richard (ed), 1997: International 
Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. Also see Bebbington, Anthony J., Hickey, Samuel, 
and Mitlin, Diana C. (ed.), 2008: Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of 
Development Alternatives. London: Zed Books, 3. 
Bebbington, Hickey and Mitlin were the organizers of the fourth ‘Manchester” NGO 
conference. The first NGO conference in Manchester was held in the beginning of the 1990ies. 
Since then, academics, actors on the ground were discussing the topic NGO from all different 
aspect. 
Also see: Brynen, Rex, 1995: "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestine Politics", Journal 
of Palestine Studies 1995, 25, (1), 23-26.; Challand, Benoit, 2005: "The Exclusionary Power of 
Civil Society: International Aid to Palestinian NGOs", European University Institute, Florence, 
http://biblio.iue.it/record=b1322521.;Hammami, Rema, 1995: "NGOs: The Professionalization 
of Politics", Race and Class 1995, 37, (2), 51-63. Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, 
International NGO's and Local NGO's: The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 
Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, Muwatin, The Palestinian Institute for the Study of 
Democracy.; Jad, Islah, 2004:"The "NGOization" of the Arab Women's Movement", in: 
Institute of Women's Studies, Birzeit University (ed), 2004: Institute of Women's Studies, 
Birzeit University: Institute of Women's Studies.; Kuttab, Eileen, 2008: "Palestinian Women's 
Organizations: Global Cooption and Local Contradiction", Cultural Dynamics 2008, 20, (July 
2008), 99-117.; Nakhleh, Khalil, 2004: The Myth of Palestinian Development. Political Aid 
and Sustainable Deceit, Jerusalem: PASSIA Publications.; Nakhleh, Khalil, 2012: Globalized 
Palestine: The National Sell-Out of a Homeland, Trenton, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press. 
 
6 Nerfin, Marc (ed.), 1977: Another Development: Approaches and Strategies. Uppsala: Dag 
Hammarskjöld Foundation. 
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deemed possible by NGOs to join the struggle against oppressive regimes and 
structures such as those in El Salvador, Palestine/Israel, the Philippines, and 
South Africa. Samuel P. Huntington (1991) sets his “third wave of 
democratization" during this time, beginning with the “Carnation Revolution” 
in Portugal 1974, followed by the democratic transitions in South America in 
the 1980s and finally in Eastern Europe after the collapse of former Soviet 
Union.7  
The early 1980s constituted boom years for the NGOs. Their work became 
increasingly recognized and interest in their funding increased. 8 
 
During the 1980s, the International Monetary Found (IMF) and the World 
Bank started to impose structural adjustment programs on many states in the 
South. At the same time, multilateral donors such as the World Bank, the 
United Nations, the European Union as well as individual donor countries 
started to support not only governments but also civil society.9 This double 
policy can be analyzed as part of this structural adjustment. The North focused 
not only on states as agents of change, but also on civil society, and in this 
context obviously on NGOs. Civil society was discovered as a useful 
investment – a convenient instrument for attaining developmental goals which 
                                               
7 Huntington, Samuel P., 1991: The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Critical voices argue countries who 
implement only competitive elections are not per se democracy. Such incomplete democracies 
can develop in different ways. They can complete democratization (accountability of 
governors, rule of law, civil society institutions etc.), or as Rose, Richard and Shin, Dog Chull, 
2001: "Democratization Backwards: The Problem with Third-Wave Democracies", British 
Journal of Political Science 2001, 31, (02, April 2001), 331-354., analyse: “falling into a low-
level equilibrium trap in which the inadequacies of elites are matched by low popular demands 
and expectations”; or at last, turn into an undemocratic alternative. 
 
8 Carapico, Sheila, 2000: "NGOs, INGOs, GO-NGOs, and DO-NGOs: Making Sense of Non-
Governmental Organisatios", Middle East Report 2000, 30, (1), 12-15. 
Also see by: Nakhleh, Khalil, 2004: The Myth of Palestinian Development. Political Aid and 
Sustainable Deceit., Nakhleh, Khalil, 2012: Globalized Palestine: The National Sell-Out of a 
Homeland.; Bahmad, Leyla, 2007: "Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations caught 
between Reality and Challenges", https://kobra.bibliothek.uni-
kassel.de/handle/urn:nbn:de:hebis:34-200709019190.; Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian 
Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, London: Routledge. 
 
9 See for example: World Bank, 1998: "The Bank's relation with NGOs: Issues and 
Directions", Social Development Papers, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/SDP-
28.pdf. 
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were mainly set by donor nations for the “developing countries”. An ever 
larger share of developmental aid was now being channeled through NGOs. In 
recipient countries, as the state’s capacity to act diminished, NGOs often 
stepped into the breach, bringing about the privatization of social and 
developmental policies in these countries. This is analyzed by Anthony J. 
Bebbington, Samuel Hickey and Diana C. Mitlin (2008) when they write on 
“this was the period of the NGO 'boom', a boom that can only be understood in 
terms of its own relationship to transformations in this period in the structures 
of capitalisms North, ,South and globally. Indeed, it remains one of the central 
contradictions concerning NGO alternatives that the huge increase in NGO 
activity during the 1980s was driven to a significant extent by the unfolding 
neoliberal agenda and the new roles it gave to NGOs – the very agenda that 
development alternatives have sought to critically engage.” 10 
                                               
10 Bebbington, Anthony J., Hickey, Samuel, and Mitlin, Diana C., 2008: Can NGOs Make a 
Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives, 13.  
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Donors started to use NGOs as local actors on the ground in order to 
implement special intervention programs aimed at fulfilling their structural 
adjustment programs. On the whole, NGOs didn’t question the aims of such 
donor intervention. Rather, it was precisely during this period that NGOs 
gradually lost interest in searching for or proposing systemic alternatives. 
Meanwhile, however, social movements emerged in some countries, 
suggesting and working on alternative perspectives.11 
To summarize, political democratization took place not only as a response to 
the demands of civil society but perhaps even more so in correlation with 
neoliberalism and the developing neoliberal world system.12 
 
In playing a role in democratization, NGOs faced new realities. Newly 
democratic state institutions took up the alternatives that they suggested and 
promoted – and this process continues until today. This process has compelled 
NGOs to redefine their position towards the state.  
 
 
                                               
11 Latin America, see Alvarez et al., 1998, or South Africa, see Ballard, Richard, Habib, A., 
Valodia, Imraan, and Zuern, E., 2005: "Globalization, Marginalization and Contemporary 
Social Movements in South Africa", African Affairs 2005, 104, (417), 615-634.; Escobar, 
Aturo, 1995: Encountering Development: The making and Unmaking of the Third World, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. and see Dagnino, Evelina, 2008:"Challenges to 
Participation, Citizenship and Democracy: Perverse Confluence and Displacement of 
Meanings", in: Bebbington, Anthony J., Hickey, Samuel, and Mitlin, Diana C. (ed), 2008: Can 
NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Alternatives, London: Zed Books, 55-70. 
 
12 The economist Friedrich Hayek created the term “neoliberalism” along with Wilhelm 
Roepke, Walter Eucken and others at a conference in 1938 in Paris. Neoliberalism is 
understood both as a concept of political economy and as a social-philosophical platform 
which seeks to minimize the influence of the state in the functioning of an economy. At the 
same time, it expects from the state to regulate and secure functional markets. 
Historically there are three different concepts of neoliberalism: in Germany, the Freiburg 
School of Walter Eucken, Franz Boehm, Hans Grossmann-Doerth, Leonhard Miksch; in 
England, the London School of Economics with Edwin Cannan, and in the USA the Chicago 
School with Frank Knight and Milton Friedmann. 
I cannot go here into details about the differences between the Freiburg School and the 
Chicago School around Milton Friedman. Our understanding of neoliberalism today is mainly 
based on the Chicago school. Key concepts include: reduction of the state sector, privatisation 
of former state enterprises and deregulation of capital markets. see Stiglitz, Joseph E., 
2002:"Globalism Discontents", in: Kesellmann, M. and Krieger, J. (ed), 2002: Readings in 
Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  
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One of the consequences is that activists and NGO staff have moved into the 
reformed governments.13 In general, NGOs have always played a role in 
democratization. But if one takes a closer look, this process has often involved 
merely formal political changes which have not transformed the deeply rooted 
and complex relations between state and society or state and the capitalist 
market.14  
 
NGOs didn’t have the power to – or didn’t want to - challenge the current 
neoliberal order, because, as Craig and Porter (2006) described very clearly, 
neoliberalism took over their terminology concerning democracy, 
empowerment, human rights, participation, poverty and livelihoods. At the 
same time, massive financial support of the NGOs brought them into contact 
with national, international and multilateral organizations which had a strong 
impact on their political ideas.15 In contrast to developments in the North, 
NGOs in the South have been transformed into subcontracted service 
providers.16 
 
In the mid 1990s, the former positive image of NGOs gave way to public 
concern about their focus, their practice and the direction in which they were 
heading.  
                                               
13 Dagnino, Evelina, 2008:"Challenges to Participation, Citizenship and Democracy: Perverse 
Confluence and Displacement of Meanings", in: Bebbington, Anthony J., Hickey, Samuel, and 
Mitlin, Diana C. and Racelis, Mary, 2008:"Anxieties and Affirmations: NGO-Donor 
Partnerships for Social Transformation", in: Bebbington, Anthony J., Hickey, Samuel, and 
Mitlin, Diana C. (ed), 2008: Can NGOs Make a Difference? The Challenge of Development 
Alternatives, London: Zed Books, 196-218. 
 
14 See also Schlumberger, Oliver, 2004: "PATRIMONIAL CAPITALISM. Economic Reform 
and Economic Order in the Arab World", Tübingen, http://tobias-lib.uni-
tuebingen.de/volltexte/2005/1947/pdf/complete.pdf. He concludes, opening markets creates 
only a superficial democratization, because existing structures are not touched.  
 
15 See in Edwards, Michael and Hulme, David, 1997: NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for 
Comfort, New York: St. Martin's Press.; they are using the expression "too close for comfort". 
 
16 See Bebbington, Anthony J., Hickey, Samuel, and Mitlin, Diana C., 2008: Can NGOs Make 
a Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives, 14.; and as written in the 
introduction, externally financed NGOs appear as the stopgaps of privatization of social- and 
developmental politics in their countries. 
 
  27 
During this time, an increasing diversification of NGOs took place. So called 
“developmental NGOs” turned into the biggest receivers of funds whereas 
charitable NGOs and NGOs dealing with different concerns became 
marginalized.17 NGOs which did not want to be “professional and 
institutionalized” or which refused to follow the policy of the donors lost the 
attention of donors respectively did not receive any support. This small number 
of NGOs continues, however, to develop alternatives in the shade of the big 
"developmental NGOs". Critical literature and studies –often country or area 
specific –began to appear which questioned the works of NGOs in general, as 
well as their ambivalent relation to donors. They posed such questions as: How 
independent are NGOs really? Who is legitimizing their work? Who do they 
rely on? 
Anthony J. Bebbington, Samuel Hickey and Diana C. Mitlin (2008) argue that 
NGOs were turned into implementers of the reform agenda of the states and 
co-opted as enforcers of mainstream alternatives. They distinguish between 
three clear trends in the NGO sector: “… [the building of] either systematic or 
reformist alternatives: the continued deepening of the democratization-cum-
neoliberalization agenda, the increasingly dominant poverty agenda in 
international aid; and the relatively more recent, hugely pernicious, security 
agenda, itself coupled in strange ways with the poverty agenda.”18  
 
Attention should be drawn to the one-sided view often found among donors, in 
the literature, and even expressed by certain powerful local NGOs that the 
                                               
17 "Developmental NGOs" are defined by donors and their aim is to reduce human suffering, 
overcome injustice and assist people in developing countries to reach their full potential. 
Developmental NGOs are concerned with health, education, agriculture, human rights and 
women. For example, cooperatives, union and youth clubs are excluded from this definition. 
(see Kurt Bangert: http://www.worldvision-
institut.de/_downloads/allgemein/Research%20for%20Development.pdf and see the World 
Bank report: 
World Bank and Bisan Center for Resarch and Development, 2006: "The role and 
performance of Palestinian NGOs in Health, Education and Agriculture", 
http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/10/05/000310607_20
071005163344/Rendered/PDF/410440GZ0NGO0report01PUBLIC1.pdf; 21. 
 
18 In Bebbington, Anthony J., Hickey, Samuel, and Mitlin, Diana C., 2008: Can NGOs Make a 
Difference? The Challenge of Development Alternatives, 15. 
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NGO sector is the embodiment of “the civil society”. This view proposes too 
narrow a definition of civil society and ignores the fact that civil society is not 
structured and defined exclusively by NGOs, even if most external Western aid 
is transferred to the NGO sector.19 Leyla Bahmad (2007) criticizes the narrow 
Western view in debates about civil society and the recognition of other civil 
societies and NGOs only in response to Western norms and ideas. She 
concludes that “… Western influences, which try to bump [sic] into the civil 
societies in the Arab states, may stir a little change but they cannot fully 
transform the Arab societies and with them the existing original systems. Or 
they might even ignite a conflict within society.”20 
 
Different societies and cultures do show different patterns of civil society 
which need to be recognized and analyzed both in their cultural and historical 
contexts.21  
 
In this thesis, NGOs are understood as one part of civil society. I will not dwell 
deeply on the different concepts, aspects and discussions in literature regarding 
the term "civil society", because the main research focus in the thesis is on how 
international aid influences the particular personal situations of PNGO-
employees and, by extension, how international aid which is transferred to the 
small number of PNGOs favored by the donors, and not to the Palestinian 
Authority (PA), influences the development of Palestinian society as a whole.  
The concept civil society has changed over time and has been connected with a 
variety of often ambiguous concepts,22 beginning with the notion of civil 
society found in Aristotle who differentiates between social, political and 
                                               
19 See also Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to 
promote and exclude, 193. 
 
20 Bahmad, Leyla, 2007: "Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations caught between 
Reality and Challenges," 116. See also Ferhard, Ibrahim and Wedel, Heidi, 1995: Probleme der 
Zivilgesellschaft im Vorderen Orient, Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 23-48. 
 
21 For example, see Cooper, Frederik, 1997:"Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans and 
the Development Concept", in: Cooper, Frederik and Packard, Richard.;  
 
22 Gosewinkel, Dieter, "Zivilgesellschaft - eine Erschließung des Themas von seinen Grenzen 
her", Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung GmbH, Discussion Paper Nr. SP IV 
2003-505; 2. 
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economic space. His thinking is dominated by state and civil society as a 
common unit which creates a peaceful living space.23 With his thoughts he 
inspired the ideas of Islamic philosophers like Ibn Rushd, Ibn Khaldoun, al-
Farabi as well as al-Ghazali, about civil society in Islam.24 Thinkers like 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau developed an understanding of civil society 
from the context of natural society with the introduction of civilization and 
civility, including the meaning of a progressive and positive development 
towards civil society, thinking civil society synonymous with the state. In the 
nineteenth century, the idea and the emergence of the modern state, also the 
process of industrialization "and the development of an increasing sphere of 
capitalist activities introduced us to the decisive idea of a clear distinction 
between civil society and the state."25 
Hegel interprets civil society as one part of the state, while de Tocqueville 
distinguishes between civil society and political society, where political society 
complements the state and civil society. These thinkers influenced Marx who 
considers civil society to be a diversion in the context of economic and class 
distinction. He defines civil society as a part of the base which is separated in 
economic factors, manifested in the constitution (superstructure) of ideology 
and judicial power. Gramsci, an Italian Marxist of the early twentieth century, 
differentiates systematically between state and civil society. Gramsci views 
civil society as "... an important element of the superstructure, which becomes 
subordinating (Bobbio 1988:87) and which is necessary to impose and gain 
hegemony within society. Civil society, as the sphere of voluntary acceptance, 
is here opposed to political society (the sphere of coercion), and the oppressive 
state (Gramsci 2003)."26 Since the 1960s, the term civil society has been 
                                               
23 Bahmad, Leyla, 2007: "Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations caught between 
Reality and Challenges," 71. And also see Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: 
Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, 26. 
 
24 Bahmad, Leyla, 2007: "Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations caught between 
Reality and Challenges," 71 and 81-98. 
 
25 Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote 
and exclude, 26. 
 
26 Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote 
and exclude, 27. 
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mainly used to conceptualize state-society relations, sometimes using a 
different expression like Habermas "public sphere". 
 
As mentioned above, "civil society" is a term subject to change. The dominant 
definition is clearly rooted in European history and has developed connotations 
of progress and modernity. Terrier & Wagner (2006) demonstrate in social and 
political theory a widespread assumption that civil society is a metonym for 
modernity, as the sole desirable model for a modern society "to which all 
societies will gradually converge because of the higher rationality of its 
institutional arrangements."27 Eisenstadt (2003) stresses that there is no 
universal definition of modernity and that there are many ways to reach it.28 
 
In my thesis I rely on the normative concept of civil society, in the meaning of 
civil society as a free counterpart to the political and economical sphere. It can 
be described as a social entity located between the state, the economy and the 
private sphere,29 i.e. a sphere where social organizations and social actors 
operate. There is a clear separation between the state (political sphere), the 
economic sector (economical sphere) and civil society. As Cohen and Arato 
point out, actors of the political sphere or economic sphere "are directly 
involved with state power and economic production, which they seek to control 
and manage. They cannot afford to subordinate strategic and instrumental 
criteria to the patterns of normative integration and open- ended 
communication characteristic of civil society."30  
 
                                               
27 Terrier, Jean and Wagner, Peter, 2006:"Civil Society and the Problématique of Political 
Modernity", in: Wagner, Peter (ed), 2006: The Languages of Civil Society, Oxford: Berghahn, 
10. 
 
28 Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., 2002:"Concluding Remarks: Public Sphere, Civil Society, and 
Political Dynamics in Islamic Societies", in: Hoexter, Miriam, Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., and 
Levtzion, Nehemia (ed), 2002: The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies, Albany: State 
University Of New York Press, 139-161. 
 
29 Gosewinkel, Dieter, "Zivilgesellschaft - eine Erschließung des Themas von seinen Grenzen 
her", 3. 
 
30 Cohen, Jean l. and Arato, Andrew, 1992: Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge / 
London: The MIT Press, 74. 
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2.1.1 In focus: Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
In general, Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (PNGOs) do not 
differ in their historical development from NGOs in other parts of the world. 
The major difference is that they “have not emerged against the backdrop of an 
independent political authority and a sovereign state, but rather in conditions of 
confrontation with an occupying power that did not acknowledge the right of 
the Palestinian people to create political and social associations."31 
PNGOs are popular with donors because they are seen as actors of civil society 
and therefore fit their categories of suitable recipients of aid. In Palestine today, 
i.e. since the end of the 1980ies, developmental NGOs are the most highly 
visible. They constitute around 20% of the NGO sector and receive the lion’s 
share of Western international aid. Their work is mainly concentrated in the 
fields of human rights, women’s rights, peace education, good governance, 
civil education, advocacy functions and knowledge production.32 
“Developmental NGOs” are the clear winners in getting support from 
international donors compared to other PNGOs – mainly charitable or Islamic 
organizations or various other organizations of civil society. 
Benoit Challand (2009) drew a distinction between “two Palestines”. The “first 
Palestine” is built up by professional developmental NGOs, mainly advocated 
by a majority of international donors. The “second Palestine” is made up of 
mainly charitable organizations (where international funding is not so 
successful) and also includes the Islamic NGO sector. He highlights the fact 
that excluding PNGOs from the "second Palestine" defeats the purpose of civil 
society, i.e. the struggle for the implementation of democratic transformation. 
He explains clearly why, in the Western discourse, donors fail to recognize the 
achievements of this kind of civil society. It is “for the simplistic reason that is 
precisely ‘traditional’ or too communal in its way of organizing itself, and 
                                               
31 Abu Matar, Abdallah Muhammad, "The Contribution of Palestinian Civil Society 
Organizations toward Achieving Nation Reconciliation in Palestine, 2007-2010," (Doha, Qatar: 
Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2013), 3. 
 
32 Nakhleh, Khalil, 2012: Globalized Palestine: The National Sell-Out of a Homeland, 133-
134.; and compare also Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and 
the power to promote and exclude, 69-71. 
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therefore not yet ripe for ‘modern’ forms of civil society support (namely 
institutional capacity building and the like).”33  
 
The focus in this thesis is on PNGOs belonging to the “first Palestine” and on 
their employees and to consider the previously neglected area of the direct 
impact of financial support or political rents on Palestinian NGO employees.  
 
 
2.1.2 In Focus: Palestinian NGO employees 
 
The NGO sector is often called the Third Sector, because NGOs since the end 
of the 1980ies started to offer attractive and well paid jobs.34 The term Third 
Sector is also used in Palestine to designate the NGO sector. PNGO employees 
name different reasons that led them to work for and engage in PNGOs. They 
include ideological and religious motives or a need to improve socio-economic 
circumstances. It would be a mistake to neglect these factors by assuming a 
common motivation.  
                                               
33 Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote 
and exclude, 17. 
 
34 The term was developed by Amitai Etzioni, an US sociologist in: Etzioni, Amitai, 1973: 
"The Third Sector and Domestic Missions", Public Administration Review 1973, 33, (4, July-
August 1973), 314-323.; and Corry, Olaf, 2010:"Defining and Theorizing the Third Sector", in: 
Taylor, Rupert (ed), 2010: Third Sector Research, New York: Springer. 
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My research in this thesis focuses on employees in externally-funded (mainly 
defined as "developmental") NGOs.35 Concentrating on the income of PNGO 
employees and on the precise income structures, the direct economic, social 
and political influence of Western aid to PNGOs can be analyzed. This 
research approach is new and my study makes data available that allows this 
kind of analysis for the first time. 
In my research approach PNGOs and their employees are understood as rent 
receivers. A rentier economy develops a system of rent-seeking which imposes 
a very specific way of acting by rent receivers. Rent seeking is based on 
attempts to improve and also to hold on to income. Rent seeking may involve 
tremendous efforts. Such efforts often involve and are supported by socio-
political networks which individuals or groups create. Martin Beck (2002) 
refers to Gordon Tullock (1980) and Hartmut Eisenhans (1982; 1984: 288-300) 
and concludes: Rent seekers are actors who must often work extremely hard to 
generate their income: thus they need to maintain good relations in the long 
term with those who control the source of their rents. They set up and maintain 
complex sociopolitical networks which, from a capitalist perspective promotes 
corruption and waste. These networks are, however unavoidable to maintain a 
rent on a long-term basis.36 
This fact, leads to a central question: how and why PNGO employees who see 
themselves as actors for change act in a rentier state environment, as a special 
group of rent-seekers. Additional details and an in-depth analysis follow below. 
 
 
                                               
35 Nowadays NGOs show a mixed funding of multilateral and also bilateral funding. The 
difference between multilateral funding and bilateral funding is their way of money it takes till 
it reaches the NGO. Multilateral funding flows through an international organization (for 
example UNWRA, UNICEF or the World Bank) comparing to bilateral funding where the 
donor country or a donor organization pays directly to the aid recipient. See Challand, Benoit, 
2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude, 74. 
 
36 Beck, Martin, 2002: Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten. Rationalität, Kooperation und 
Politische Rente im Vorderen Orient, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 109.  
"Rent-Seeker sind Akteure, die häufig durchaus hohe Anstrengungen unternehmen müssen, um 
ihre Einkommen zu generieren: so müssen sie dauerhafte gute Beziehungen zu denjenigen 
pflegen, die an den Rentenquellen sitzen. Sie errichten und pflegen komplexe soziopolitische 
Netzwerke, die aus kapitalistischer Sicht der Korruption dienen - und damit Verschwendung 
gleichkommen -, aus rentenpolitischer Logik aber unerlässlich sind um die Rente auf eine 
dauerhafte Basis zu stellen." 
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2.2 Current state of research 
 
Doing research on civil society, focusing on Non-Governmental Organizations 
in Palestine, in the Arab world and beyond the Arab world, I discovered 
considerable current research in various disciplines. In the following section, I 
define the terms used in my thesis. I will also discuss how it is possible and 
why is it useful to transfer rentier state theory from the state level to the level 
of civil society. 
 
 
2.2.1 Rents  
 
The terms rents and rentier state theory are used in the context of states and 
governments. The state may be a receiver of rents. Political rents are defined as 
“budget transfers between states”. Rents represent income that is obtained 
without investment or labor. Rents are free for disposition and are not subject 
to market conditions of reinvestment. By definition, political rents do not 
include nor do they derive from productive effort but that does not mean that 
this kind of income requires nothing in return.37 As written above, the existence 
of a rent system brings about rent-seeking, i.e. the active effort to acquire 
further rents. This effort includes a special way of acting and re-acting of the 
rent receivers in order to receive further rents. 
 
The reality in the OPTs is that donors pay not only political rents to the 
Palestinian Authority, i.e. the “State”, but also to the non- governmental 
organizations’ sector. Therefore PNGOs become part of the same rentier 
system as the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PA, just as the PNGO sector, is 
depending on the same donors like World Bank, European Union, International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), USA etc. In rentier state theory, the behavior of state 
actors is in focus together with the social groups they co-opt. The question 
therefore arises how other parts of society act in a rentier economy: for 
                                               
37 Beck, Martin, 2002: Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten. Rationalität, Kooperation und 
Politische Rente im Vorderen Orient, 107. 
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example those civil society actors who receive autonomously political rents 
from the same donors as their government, and who nevertheless consider 
themselves to be a free counterpart to the government.38  
 
Are they right to consider themselves free from the influence of their sponsors? 
Are they in any way freer in their behavior than the Palestinian Authority? 
I assume that we have "two groups of rent recipients” in one state (the 
occupied Palestinian territories are treated as a single state here), the PA, i.e. 
the “state”, and the non-governmental sector, or civil society, here made up of 
PNGOs. Rents to both groups of rent recipients are delivered with clear pre-
conditions. According to rentier state theory as argued by Beck, the Palestinian 
Authority with its neopatrimonial system supports its "own political clients" to 
stabilize its power in Palestinian society.39 Donor countries pursue a clear 
political goal, namely the stabilization of the region and the maintenance of the 
“peace process” with Israel. This raises the questions. Whose clients are to be 
found in the NGO sector and what agenda do they follow?  
 
 
2.2.2 Short review on rentier state theory, rents and patrimonial 
 capitalism 
 
Rentier state theory was developed in connection with the oil price revolution 
of the nineteen-seventies and became one of the key analytical concepts for the 
 
                                               
38 See for example the mission statement of the Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization 
Network on their homepage (about us): "Empowering and protecting the autonomy of the 
Palestinian society, consolidating its role in the national struggle and democratization process 
bases on the principles of democracy, social justice, rule of law, tolerance, and respect of 
human rights."; Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network, 
http://www.pngo.net/viewdetails.aspx?id=%20133. 
 
39 See Beck, Martin, 2002: Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten. Rationalität, Kooperation und 
Politische Rente im Vorderen Orient, 274-276. 
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 study of the political, economic and social conditions in the Middle East.40 
Rentier states those whose budgets owe at least 20% of their income to external 
rents.41 A rent is defined as income obtained without investment or labor. It is 
free for disposition and it is not subject to market conditions of reinvestment. It 
is subject to the interests of the rentier. 
Rentier states are defined as ‘classic rentier states’ through, for example, oil 
rents or, ‘semi-rentier states’ which receive political rents in the form of 
development aid. These states are typically characterized by considerable 
financial autonomy within their societies and by unrestricted political power 
over their citizens.42 They can be classified as neopatrimonial and centralized 
systems, combined with powerful state bureaucracies, where democratic 
movements and productive economic development are blocked. Support from 
various social groups secures the ruling system. In this process, the ethnic, 
religious and social backgrounds of supporting groups are of secondary 
importance. Primary is their role in securing the ruling system.43 
 
Since the mid-nineteen-eighties, other work in this field assumes that the 
decline of rent income can cause an economic crisis. And indeed, an increased 
vulnerability of rentier states is observed with a decline of rent income of up to 
                                               
40 Mahdavi, Hossein, 1970:"Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier 
States: The Case of Iran", in: Cook, Michael (ed), 1970: Studies in the Economic History of the 
Middle East, London: Oxford University Press. 
Beblawi, Hazem and Luciani, Giacomo, 1987: The Rentier State, London: Croom Helm. 
Schmid, Claudia and Pawelka, Peter, 1990:"Der moderne Rentier-Staat im Vorderen Orient 
und seine Strategien der Krisenbewältigung", in: Pawelka, Peter and Aves, Maho (ed), 1990: 
Arabische Golgstaaten in der Krise, Frankfurt/Main: R.G.Fischer. 
Schmid, Claudia, 1991: Das Konzept des Rentier-Staats. Ein sozialwissenschaftliches 
Paradigma zur Analyse von Entwicklungsgesellschaften und seine Bedeutung für den Vorderen 
Orient, Münster: LIT Verlag; Schmid, Claudia, 1997:"Rente und Rentier-Staat: Ein Beitrag zur 
Theoriegeschichte", in: Böckh, Andreas and Pawelka, Peter (ed), 1997: Staat, Markt und Rente 
in der Internationalen Politik, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
 
41 Beck, Martin, 2007:"Der Rentierstaats-Ansatz. Zum politikwissenschaftlichen Charme eines 
ökonomisch fundierten Konzepts", in: Albrecht, Holger and Köhler, Kevin (ed), 2007: 
Weltreligionen im Wandel. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Vorderen Orient, Baden 
Baden: Nomos, 104. 
 
42 Schmid, Claudia, 1997:"Rente und Rentier-Staat: Ein Beitrag zur Theoriegeschichte", in: 
Böckh, Andreas and Pawelka, Peter (ed) 42-46. 
 
43 Beck, Martin, 2007:"Der Rentierstaats-Ansatz. Zum politikwissenschaftlichen Charme eines 
ökonomisch fundierten Konzepts", in: Albrecht, Holger and Köhler, Kevin (ed) 102. 
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20%.44 These crises often force economic restructuring. Normally these 
circumstances force an opening towards economic and political liberalization 
and should increase the chances of a democratic process. A similar line of 
argument is found in the democratization and transformation debate at the 
beginning of the nineties in the writings of Rex Brynen (1992).45 Work by 
Steven Hydemann (1993) and Holger Albrecht, Peter Pawelka and Oliver 
Schlumberger (1997) on Syria and Egypt, however, modify the parallelism of 
market-economic transformation and political democratization. They argue that 
this approach ignores certain basic social patterns in the Middle East.46 
Oliver Schlumberger (2004) proposed that this variation of the classic Rentier 
state should be recognized as a new system, which he called patrimonial 
capitalism.47 Patrimonial capitalism is understood as a modern economic 
structure based on patrimonialism with patronage and an informal hierarchy. 
Despite liberalization and economic opening, traditional political systems 
remain stable due to the structures of patronage and informal hierarchy. Rents, 
whether they are classic oil rents or equivalent political rents, contribute to the 
modernization of the economy. However, traditional political systems remain, 
in the context of an authoritarian political order, a key factor in maintaining 
non-democratic patronage and clientelism. 
In my research, I deal with the question whether it is reasonable to consider the 
NGO sector and its employees as clients and, if so, whose clients they are and 
how they perform as clients. 
                                               
44 Beck, Martin, 2007:"Der Rentierstaats-Ansatz. Zum politikwissenschaftlichen Charme eines 
ökonomisch fundierten Konzepts", in: Albrecht, Holger and Köhler, Kevin (ed) 104. 
 
45 Brynen, Rex, 1992: "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: 
The Case of Jordan", Canadian Journal of Political Science 1992, 25, (1), 69-97. 
 
46 Hydemann, Steven, 1993:"Taxation without Representation: Authoritarianism and Economic 
Liberalization in Syria", in: Goldberg, Ellis, Kasaba, Resat, and Migdal, Joel (ed), 1993: Rules 
and Rights in the Middle East. Society, Law and Democracy, Seattle: University of 
Washington Press. 
Albrecht, Holger, Pawelka, Peter, and Schlumberger, Oliver, 1997: "Wirtschaftliche 
Liberalisierung und Regimewandel in Ägypten", WeltTrends 1997, (16), 43-63. 
 
47 Schlumberger, Oliver, 2004: "PATRIMONIAL CAPITALISM. Economic Reform and 
Economic Order in the Arab World." and also see Schlumberger, Oliver, 2006: "Rents, reform 
and authoritarism in the Middle East", Internationale Poltik und Gesellschaft 2006, (2/2006), 
43-57. 
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Excursus 
 
A short analysis of the terms clients, clientelism, neopatrimonialism and 
elite  
 
Since Palestine receives up to 68% of its GNP in form of political rents – 
mainly humanitarian and development aid – Palestine has the characteristics of 
a ‘semi-Rentier state’. In this context ‘client’ and ‘elite’ are important and 
inter-related terms which will now be considered. 
 
 
Patron and client 
A client in this sense of the word is always defined as the counterpart to a 
patron and exists only in a patron-client relationship. Ergun Oezbudun (1981) 
stresses three major aspects of a patron-client relations, relying on Alex 
Weingrod (1968), John D. Powell (1970), René Lemarchand and Keith Legg 
(1972), James C. Scott (1972) and Karl H. Landé (1973)48: 
1. Inequality in terms of wealth and influence  
2. Reciprocal exchange of services for “goods” 
3. Face-to-face relationship, without being defined in a more detailed manner.49  
 
René Lemarchand and Keith Legg (1972) define the nature of patron-client 
relationships as “a more or less personalized relationship between actors (i.e., 
patrons and clients), or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth status, or 
                                               
48 Weingrod, Alex, 1968: "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties", Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 1968, X, (2), 376-400. 
Powell, John D., 1970: "Peasant Societies and Clientelist Politics", American Political Science 
Review 1970, (64), 411-425. 
Lemarchand, René and Legg, Keith, 1972: "Political Clientelism and Development", 
Comparative Politics 1972, (4), 149-178. 
Scott, James C., 1972: "Patron-Clients Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", The 
American Political Science Review 1972, 66, (1 (March 1972)). 
Landé, Karl H., 1973: "Networks and groups in Southeast Asia: Some Observations on the 
Group theory of Politics", American Political Scienes Journal 1973, (67), 103-127. 
 
49 This characterization relies on the article of  Oezbudun, Ergun, 1981:"Turkey: The Politics 
of Clientelism", in: Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. and Lemarchand, Rene (ed), 1981: Political 
Clientelism, Patronage and Development, Beverly Hills, London: Sage., see also the article of 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Louis Roniger "The Study of Patron-Client Relations and Recent 
Developments in Social Theory", ibid. 277 
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influence based on conditional loyalties, and involving mutually beneficial 
transactions.”50 This kind of relationship has two forms: first, the traditional 
form of clientelism (for example land ownership, religious status) and second, 
a political (party) form is possible. Peter Pawelka (1985) observes that in 
patrimonial or neopatrimonial systems, client relations are on one hand a short 
running alliance, calculating and manipulative and on the other hand involve 
personal forms of cooperation in the pursuit of political relevance.51  
 
In a political milieu, systems of patron-client-relations are unstable, because 
the elites who have power to allocate authority and job related positions – are 
also in an unstable situation. This is an important aspect for the rent-seeking 
behavior of such elites (see below in more detail). At the end of the 1960s and 
with the beginning of the 1970s new light was shed on this phenomenon. The 
discourse was always affected by debates about patronage and clientelism. 
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1973) in Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neo-
Patrimonialism, and Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980) in Patron-Client Relations 
as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange, stressed the consequences of such 
relationships in the context of modernization and political development.52 Gero 
Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) argue that Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1973) was the 
first who used the term “neo-patrimonialism” in this context.53 
 
 
                                               
50 Lemarchand, René and Legg, Keith, 1972: "Political Clientelism and Development", 69. 
 
51 Pawelka, Peter, 1985: Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ägypten, Heidelberg: 
Müller, 21. 
 
52 These studies from Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., 1973: Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern 
Neopatrimonialism, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. “Patrimonialism and 
“Neopatrimonialism” is related to the writings of Max Weber, mainly on “Economy and 
Society”. See also in 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. and Roniger, Louis, 1980: "Patron-Client Relations as a Model of 
Structuring Social Exchange", Comparative Studies in Society and History 1980, 22, (1), 42-
77. They focused on the African continent, mainly on the Sub-Sahara zone. Ernest Gellner and 
John Waterbury focused on Mediterranean societies in: Gellner, Ernest and Waterbury, John 
(ed.), 1979: Patron and Clients: In Mediterranean Societies. London: Duckworth. 
 
53 In Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf, 2006: "Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-
All Concept", German Institue of Global and Area Studies, GIGA working papers, 
http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/working-papers?field_year_value=8. 
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Neopatrimonialism and political clientelism  
I follow Erdmann and Engel (2006) when they define Neopatrimonialism as 
both a patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic type of domination, with 
both types of domination in an uneasy co-existence. Officially and formally 
there is a differentiation between the private and public realms but in daily 
reality this differentiation is not made. 
These two systems are not really isolated from each other, “….quite to the 
contrary, they permeate each other; or more precisely, the patrimonial 
penetrates the legal-rational system and twists its logic, functions, and effects. 
That is, informal politics invade formal institutions. Informality and formality 
are intimately linked to each other in various ways and by varying degrees; and 
this particular mix becomes institutionalized as suggested by Bratton and van 
de Walle (1997:63)."54 
 
An important characteristic is insecurity regarding the behaviour and role of 
state institutions (and agents). This has the consequence that it is insecurity 
which promotes the reproduction of the system. How does it work? State 
operations are not calculable. To overcome the insecurity, actors operate on the 
formal and on the informal level. This relationship between formal and 
informal creates the cycle of reproduction of the system.55  
Politics and policies are dominated by particularistic interests and orientations. 
This lies in the structure of social and political relations. Gero Erdmann and 
Ulf Engel (2006) see a correspondence between neopatrimonialism and 
authoritarian politics as a rent-seeking culture. Democracy and a market 
economy are dominated by legal-rational correspondence.56 
 
 
                                               
54 Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf, 2006: "Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-All 
Concept", 18. 
 
55 See more details how the mechanism is function in Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf, 2006: 
"Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-All Concept", 18-19.  
 
56 See Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf, 2006: "Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-
All Concept", 31. 
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Political clientelism 
 
Peter Pawelka (1985) defines political clientelism as Herrschaftsbeziehung, a 
power relationship between unequal individuals or groups. It serves as an 
analytical tool for political subsystems in the third world.57 Gero Erdmann and 
Ulf Engel (2006) include in political clientelism the notion of client networks. 
Clientelist networks offer protection in insecure neopatrimonalistic structures. 
On one hand they offer “protection” for its people on the other hand they 
support the reproduction of the system or oppression:  
"Political clientelism in both forms is a child of uncertain prospects. A client 
needs a patron for protection either to avoid something or to assist in gaining 
what otherwise would not be obtainable. In short, developing a clientelist 
network it is a means to gain protection and to achieve goals in a situation of 
societal uncertainty created by public institutions which may behave in ways 
that are not calculable. Clientelism clearly contributes to the reproduction of 
the institutional uncertainty that is designed to overcome ... In other words; 
clientelism is to be understood as an answer to the institutional uncertainty 
created by neopatrimonial rule. However, the situation created by widely used 
clientelist strategy is not necessarily one of chaos because if officials or official 
institutions are confronted with competing clientelistic demands, they can take 
refuge in the formal rules that they are supposed to exercise.”58 
 
 
Clientelism – Neopatrimonialism and consequences 
 
There are differing views about the connection between clientelism and 
neopatrimonialism. René Lemarchand and Keith Legg (1972) assume that 
clientelism and patrimonialism are conflated. In contrast, Jean Francois 
                                               
57 Pawelka, Peter, 1985: Herrschaft und Entwicklung im Nahen Osten: Ägypten, 20.: “Der 
Klientelismus als Herrschaftsbeziehung zwischen sozial ungleichen Individuen oder Gruppen 
dient der Analyse politischer Subsysteme in der Dritten Welt, wird aber auch in Randbereichen 
der entwickelten Industriestaaten verwendet." 
 
58 Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf, 2006: "Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-All 
Concept", 21. 
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Médard (1982) suggests “clientelism and neopatrimonialism are two competing 
models for explaining the “politics of underdevelopment”59 Gero Erdmann and 
Ulf Engel (2006) use clientelism (also nepotism, corruption and tribalism) not 
only as categories for an underdeveloped state, they extend these terms to 
describe the politics of a neopatrimonial state. 
 
Under neopatrimonialism, with the reality of rent and rent-seeking, a rentier 
economy exists de facto. Catherine Boone (1990) defines Rentier activities as 
“politically mediated opportunities for obtaining wealth through non-
productive economic activity”.60 
Rent seeking is based on attempts to improve and also to hold on to income.61 
Rent seeking may involve tremendous efforts. Such efforts often involve and 
are supported by socio-political networks which individuals or groups create. 
Analysis built on the rent seeking approach refers to the negative impacts of 
this activity. Peter Pawelka (1994) concludes, that international rents actually 
maintain underdevelopment and also undermine the willingness of those who 
benefit from rents to undertake an intellectual and economic effort.62 Erich 
Weede (1985) argues that rent and rent-seeking “keeps poor people poor”. To 
acquire rents needs a high standard of professional competence which socially 
weaker people do not necessarily possess. He concludes that, under these 
circumstances, overcoming underdevelopment is not possible.63 
                                               
59 Erdmann, Gero and Engel, Ulf, 2006: "Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-All 
Concept", 13. 
 
60 Boone, Catherine, 1990: "The Makin of a Rentier Class: Wealth Accumulation and Political 
Control in Senegal", Journal of Development Studies 1990, 26, 425-449; 427. 
 
61 The term was first used from Anne Krueger in: Krueger, Anne O., 1974: "The Political 
Economy of the Rent-seeking Society", American Economic Review 1974, 64, (3), 291-303. 
 
62 Pawelka, Peter, 1994: Der Vordere Orient und die Internationale Politik, Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer, 106. And see discussion in Beck, Martin, 2002: Friedensprozess im Nahen 
Osten. Rationalität, Kooperation und Politische Rente im Vorderen Orient, 111. 
 
63 Weede, Erich, 1985: "Warum bleiben arme Leute arm? Rent-Seeking und Dependenz als 
Erklärungsansätze für die Armut in der Dritten Welt", Politische Vierteljahressschrift 1985, 26, 
(3), 270-286; 270. 
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In fact, a rentier economy reinforces neopatrimonial governance.64 The 
difference between rents and rent- seeking lies in the fact that rents can decline 
while rent-seeking is increasing. 
 
 
NGOs – whose clients? 
 
The Palestinian Authority, the PNGO sector and also the private sector 
(financed to some extent by external political rents) receive political rents from 
donors. In the case of Palestine, a rentier economy has long been a reality. As 
mentioned above, the income of rents always produces rent-seeking. 
Is it possible - and can the data of the study verify - to consider PNGOs, just 
like the PA, as a state structure in the context of a rentier state economy? Can 
one conclude further that PNGOs have come to behave like the state and are 
now rent seekers? Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel (2006) include clientelistic 
networks in the meaning of political clientelism. Clientelism and clientelistic 
networks offer protection in insecure structures and at the same time they 
support the reproduction of the system (see in this paper, excursus: political 
clientelism). Can we conclude that clientelism and client networks offer 
protection in insecure structures for NGOs just as for states and that at the same 
time they support the reproduction of the system? Do they also induce rent- 
seeking in the NGO sector? 
 
 
Some reflections about elites 
 
In public perception, in contrast to the terminology of the social sciences, the 
term elite is often understood as an ‘elite of values’ (Wertelite), a minority 
endowed with moral and ethic qualities. Nowadays social sciences consider the 
distinctions between functional elites (Funktionseliten). In modern society, 
                                               
64 See Lewis, Peter M., 1994: "Economic statism, private capital, and the dilemmas of 
accumulation in Nigeria", World Development 1994, 22, 437-451. quoted in Erdmann, Gero 
and Engel, Ulf, 2006: "Neopatrimonialism Revisited - Beyond a Catch-All Concept". 
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functional elites act in various spheres where they act as important decision 
makers.65  
Without going in depth into elite theory reaching back to Gaetano Mosca 
(1950) through Vilfredo Pareto (1955), Charles  Wright Mill (1956), to the 
more modern writings of Pierre Bordieu (1982, 1987, 1998) and Morus 
Markard (2005); we are now accustomed to distinguish between elites and the 
mass of the people they serve while considering the influence of each on the 
other. Elites take upon themselves in contrary to the mass of the population, a 
societal function and they have a higher power potential. This potential allows 
elites to influence structures and development of their society.66 
Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) argue that in the OPTs there exists a 
“globalized elite” in the NGO sector.67 They attribute to the Palestinian 
globalized elite in the NGO sector the following four characteristics: 
1. actors who are informed by global agendas 
2. a particular position on the Middle East peace process 
3. an urban elite, since donor funding is concentrated in 
 Palestinian cities and  
4. a professionalized elite68  
                                               
65 See Fröhlich, Gerhard and Rehbein, Boike (ed.), 2009: Bourdieu Handbuch. Leben - Werk - 
Wirkung. Stuttgart: J.B.Metzler, 90. 
 
66 Mosca, Gaetano, 1950: Die herrschende Klasse - Grundlagen der politischen Wissenschaft, 
München: Leo Lehnen Verlag GmbH. 
Pareto, Vilfredo, 1955: Allgemeine Soziologie, Tübingen: Mohr. 
Wright Mill, Charles 1956: The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Bordieu, Pierre, 1982: Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft, 
Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. 
Bordieu, Pierre, 1987: Sozialer Sinn. Kritik der theoretischen Vernunft, Frankfurt/Main: 
Suhrkamp. 
Markard, Morus, 2005:"Die Eliten und der Rest: Zur Funktion der Elitendiskussion  in einer 
ungleichen Gesellschaft", in: Wernicke, Jens, Brodowski, Michael, and Herwig, Rita (ed), 
2005: Denkanstösse. Wider die neoliberale Zurichtung von Bildung, Hochschule und 
Wissenschaft, Hamburg: LIT Verlag. 
Markard, Morus, 2005: "Elite: Ein anti-egalitaristischer Kampfbegriff", Utopie Kreativ 2005, 
(171), 5-11. 
and see also “Elite” (`elite), herrschende Klasse (class dominante), Staatsadel (noblesse d’Etat) 
in Fröhlich, Gerhard and Rehbein, Boike, 2009: Bourdieu Handbuch. Leben - Werk - Wirkung. 
 
67 Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The 
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 215-216. 
 
68 Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The 
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 248-249. 
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In this thesis, I am in particular interested in the aforementioned possibility of 
NGO elites influencing the structures and the development of a society. My 
major research question therefore is: how and in which fields does the NGO 
elite influence the structure and development of Palestinian society?  
 
 
Changing elites in the Arab world 
 
A discussion about elites in the Arab world implies the above-mentioned facts. 
Such elites may be considered as those people in a particular country who 
wield power and influence insofar as they make strategic decisions on a 
national level, thus taking part in the development and definition of political 
norms and values, or help shape the definition of what counts as the national 
interest or who influence the public debate over strategic matters.69 
 
This discussion also involves being aware and analyzing reciprocity between 
the changing elites and the economic process of adaptation. One must bear in 
mind regional and international relationships and include possible new actors 
of political, economic and social modernization.  
A widely used model for the Arab world is the ‘circle model’, introduced by 
Peter Pawelka (1985), which explains neopatrimonial rule and political elites in 
Egypt during the period of Anwar as-Sadat. 
Volker Perthes (2002) modified it as a heuristic tool for analyzing political 
relevant elites presenting them by means of three circles.70 
                                               
69 Perthes, Volker, 2002: "Elitenwandel in der arabischen Welt und Iran", Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politk, Berlin; 7. „….jene Personen, die in einem bestimmten Land Macht 
und Einfluss ausüben, indem sie strategische Entscheidungen auf nationaler Ebenen treffen, an 
der Entscheidungsfindung darüber teilhaben, die Definition politischer Normen und Werte oder 
die Definition dessen, was als "nationales" Interesse gilt, mitbestimmen oder die öffentliche 
Debatte über strategische Themen maßgeblich beeinflussen.“ 
 
70 Perthes, Volker, 2002: Geheime Gärten. Die neue arabische Welt, Berlin: SiedlerVerlag, 18. 
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The first circle includes the core-elite. The second circle includes 
parliamentarians, businessmen, the military leadership, tribal elites, religious 
elites, civil servants, and the third circle comprises intellectuals, the military 
leadership, tribal elites, unionists, religious elites, civil servants, businessmen 
and civil actors (circles can overlap).71In the case analyzed in this study, using 
this heuristic model, societal actors should be placed in the third circle. 
Obviously it is a very challenging question to find out, when and under which 
conditions an NGO elite will move into the second or first circle. However this 
question will not be taken up in the context of this thesis. For this research, 
PNGO employees, from service personnel to the director were the subjects of 
quantitative and qualitative studies.  
 
As mentioned above, elites have in contrary to the broader public, a societally 
determining function and they have a higher power potential. This potential 
allows elites to influence structures and the development of a society. So, 
bearing in mind, that PNGO personnel are in principle engaged in a form of 
alternative social development, the following questions are addressed in this 
research: 
- What kind of power potential does the PNGO elite possess?  
- What are the consequences for PNGO employees and for Palestinian society 
as a whole?  
- How can PNGO employees be usefully classified?  
- Do PNGO-elites use their power potential to either change or maintain the 
status quo? 
In securing and extending their own power bases, do these elites seek to 
stabilize the dominant political system or do they use their influence to bring 
about progressive economical, cultural and political development / change for 
all members of society?  
 
Excursus finished 
 
                                               
71 Perthes, Volker, 2002: Geheime Gärten. Die neue arabische Welt, 18., translated by Karin A. 
Gerster. 
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2.2.4 A brief history of political rents in Palestine 
 
After the ‘Oslo peace agreement', precise: Declaration of Principles’ in 
September 1993, the World Bank expected that Palestine (Gaza, East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank) would develop into a capitalist system with 
democratic structures. A precondition for this development was a rapid 
implementation of the 2-state solution and close economic cooperation with 
Israel (Paris Protocols of 1994)). The Palestinian Authority received massive 
support from international donors. Muriel Asseburg (2002), saw a fatal 
connection between a lack of progress in the peace process and the marked 
lack of economic development.72 As a result of the political and economic 
stagnation during the Oslo years (1993-2000) and after, the rentier-character of 
the system became more deeply entrenched. After 1993, the Palestinian 
Authority was generously supported by international donors through payments 
which should best be analyzed and understood as political rents, as argued by 
Martin Beck.73  
 
Donors reacted rapidly to the impact of the Second Intifada (since 2000, but  
especially after 2002) with short-term humanitarian assistance programs. These 
are essential for the Palestinian population; they promote, however, a long-term 
dependence on external aid. Anne Le More (2005) analyzed the impact of 
                                               
72 Asseburg, Muriel, 2002: Blockierte Selbstbestimmung. Der palästinensische Staats- und 
Nationenbildungsprozess während der Interimsperiode, Baden Baden: Nomosverlag. Also the 
following authors agree: 
Beck, Martin, 2002: Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten. Rationalität, Kooperation und Politische 
Rente im Vorderen Orient. 
Brynen, Rex, 1996: "Buying Peace? Critical Assessment of International Aid to the West Bank 
and Gaza", Journal of Palestine Studies 1996, 25, (3), 79-92. 
Brynen, Rex, 2000: A Very Political Economy: Peace Building and Foreign Aid in the West 
Bank and Gaza, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Studies. 
Khan, Mushtaq Husain, Giacaman, George, and Amundsen, Inge (ed.), 2004: State Formation 
in Palestine. Viability and governance during a social transformation. London, New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon. 
Also Sara Roy concluded that Gaza had experienced "de-development" .See Roy, Sara, 1995: 
The Gaza Strip. The Political Economy of De-Development, Washington DC: Institute for 
Palestine Studies. and Roy, Sara, 1999: "De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and 
Society since Oslo", Journal of Palestine Studies 1999, 28, (3 (Spring 1999)), 64-82. 
 
73 Net current transfers to the OPT (mainly donor support) were US$ 2.4 billion in 2011. see 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdb59d2_en.pdf 
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international aid on the political level. She argues that international financial 
assistance is often used as a substitute for political action. For the Palestinians, 
the strategy 'Aid for Peace' has extremely negative consequences: "...by 
sustaining such high levels of funds over such a long period, donors also 
bankrolled a poorly run and increasingly disliked Palestinian regime, 
subsidized Israeli military occupation, and indirectly encouraged the 
continuing colonization and fragmentation of the OPTs, as well as the broader 
process of Palestinian dispossession."74 
 
 
2.2.5 Political rents and the Palestinian Authority  
 
Martin Beck (2002) uses rentier state theory to explain key aspects of political 
and economic development in Palestine. He succeeds in showing clearly why 
and how the Palestinian Authority has used external assistance payments for 
their political needs. The PA has developed with the help of a de-politicization 
strategy a dependent monopoly sector and built an extensive client network. 
Oliver Schlumberger (2004) explains the debilitating effect of rents on the 
process of democratization in the Arab world, and shows how they have 
strengthened neopatrimonial ruling structures.  
 
Though Western donors had an interest in tying rents paid to the PA to certain 
political demands, the results wished for or intended for did not come about. 
The reasons are related to the priorities of the donor countries: the maintenance 
of political stability in the Middle East and the promotion of the Israeli / 
Palestinian peace process. This led to a skewing of the terms under which aid 
was to be granted, the origins of which Anne Le More (2008) traces back 
directly to the Oslo accords. The strategy of Israel with its blockade of the 
occupied Palestinian territories has also seriously hindered the development of 
the Palestinian economy. Also, geographical divisions of the occupied 
                                               
74 Le More, Anne, 2005: "Killing with kindness: funding the demise of a Palestinian state", 
International Affairs 2005, 81, (5, Octobre 2005), 981-999; p. 985.; and Le More, Anne, 2008: 
International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo. Political guilt, wasted money, New 
York: Routledge, 173. 
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Palestinian territories have been particularly disruptive. After 1993, the West 
Bank and Gaza were separated in an increasingly strict way, despite the 
provisions of the Oslo treaties. As for the West Bank, Oslo divided the West 
Bank geographically into zones A, B and C. Roadblocks set up in 2002 
between the various zones have greatly hindered the flow of goods and people. 
With the beginning of 2003, Israel constructed a wall, which it called “a 
separation barrier”, along and within the border line of 1967. It separates 
communities from their land, forcing farmers to spend many hours each day in 
waiting for permission to tend their own fields.  
 
The relentless expansion of illegal Israeli settlements deprives the Palestinian 
economy of resources such as water and land. Independent and progressive 
economic development is thus rendered extremely difficult if not impossible.75 
 
 
2.2.6 Political rents in the PNGO sector 
 
Since the start of the Oslo process Western donors have assumed that with their 
massive financial support for the PA and the PNGO sector, Palestinian society 
can be strengthened in building a civil, democratic system. 
The research of Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) focuses on the NGO sector 
supported by Western donors. They agree with Martin Beck (2002) and Rex 
Brynen (1996) that Western financial assistance to the PA is intended in the 
first place for the preservation of political stability in the region and for the 
promotion of the peace process with Israel. In their studies, they have noticed a 
change in the type of financial support of the Western donors towards PNGOs. 
Until 1993, NGOs in the Palestinian territories were supported by 
‘international solidarity funds’. With the Oslo Accord and the establishment of 
                                               
75 See also Le More, Anne, 2008: International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo. 
Political guilt, wasted money, 1-14.; World Bank, 2013: "West Bank and Gaza. Area C and the 
Future of the Palestinian Economy", Poverty, Reduction and Management Department 
Middle East and North Africa Region, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/10/03/000456286_20
131003173450/Rendered/PDF/AUS29220GZ0Are030Box379840B00OUO090.pdf. 
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the Palestinian Authority, donors’ politics have come to be dominated by 
"donor funding with predefined concerns".76 The promotion of democracy, 
human rights, women’s issues, and the health sector are given priority. David 
S. Brown, Christopher J. Brown and Scott W. Deposato (2008) provide an 
overview over the consequences for NGOs which are supported by 
international donors. In their study on the possibility of political change by 
funding NGOs, they conclude that political change through cooperation of 
heterogeneous local NGOs is still possible.77 Sarah L. Henderson (2002), 
Robert D. Putman (2000), Pauline J. Luong and Erika Weintal (1999), Sarah E. 
Mendelson and John K. Glenn (2002) and Ian Smillie (1995) acknowledge 
(with Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) on Palestine) a substantive 
reorientation of NGOs through "donor funding with predefined concerns".78  
The consequences are changes in internal organization and notable impacts on 
their work in the field. Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) see these changes 
as affecting the entire Palestinian NGO structure. Not all NGOs can (or want 
to) meet the required criteria for this emerging “NGO market.” The 
consequences are described in the following way “Selection of donor 
resources, the emergence of large NGOs and ... the circulation of knowledge 
within aid channels and the emergence of a 'development discourse' created 
new terms of legitimacy for local NGOs. Despite the language of participation 
and empowerment, only a narrow, educated elite could effectively participate 
                                               
76 Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The 
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 205. 
 
77 Brown, David S., Brown, Christopher J., and Deposato, Scott W., 2008: "Who Gives, Who 
Receives and Who Wins", Comparative Political Studies 2008, 41, (1), 24-47. 
 
78 Henderson, Sarah L., 2002: "Selling civil society: Western aid and the non-governmental 
organisation sector in Russia", Comparative Political Studies 2002, 35, (2), 139-167. 
Putman, Robert D., 2000: Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of the American 
community, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Luong, Pauline J. and Weintal, Erika, 1999: "The NGO-paradox: Democratic goals and non-
democratic outcomes in Kazakhastan", Europe-Asia Studies 1999, 51, (7), 1267-1284. 
Mendelson, Sarah E. and Glenn, John K. (ed.), 2002: The Power and Limits of NGOs. A 
Critical Look at Building Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Smillie, Ian, 1995: The alms bazaar: altruism under fire - non profit organizations and 
international development. International Development Center Ottowa. 
Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The 
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 55., see also Brynen, Rex, 2000: A Very Political 
Economy: Peace Building and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza, 188. 
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in this discourse and thereby control resources. We refer to this group as a 
‘globalized elite’ and we observe that they dominated the Palestinian NGO 
(PNGO) sector before the collapse of PNA institutions during the Israeli re-
occupation which began in 2000”.79  
 
 
2.3 Research question 
 
I have used the analyses of Martin Beck (2002), Oliver Schlumberger (2004) 
and Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) as the basis for my research. Like Sari 
Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) I examine the PNGO sector, but unlike Sari 
Hanafi and Linda Tabar and other researchers, I focus in my theoretical and 
empirical analyses on the micro-economic impact of political rents.  
Based on a quantitative and qualitative survey of working histories, salaries 
and income structures of PNGO-employees, I try to document the everyday 
socio-economic impact of political rents. These new data enable me to analyze 
the socio-economic, social and political impacts on local populations in the 
West Bank and Gaza. This leads to clear answers to the major research 
question What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as 
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations receive political rents? 
 
As already mentioned above, Palestinian NGOs in general do not differ in their 
development from NGOs in other parts of the world. Nevertheless, some 
aspects of the history of Palestinian NGOs must be highlighted and analyzed 
under the aspect of the continuing Israeli occupation. In the case of Palestine, 
we have to consider three actors which NGOs have to deal with: first Israel as  
the occupying power, second the Palestinian Authority (since 2007 divided into 
one in Gaza led by Hamas and another  in the West Bank led by Fatah – both 
ruling authorities without a state) and third international donors who support a 
peace process on hold and treat the Palestinian territories politically as a “post-
conflict zone” which implies that the political conflict is over – although this 
clearly is not the case. 
                                               
79 Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The 
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 215-216. 
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The results of the quantitative and qualitative study can answer the main 
research question and verify my working hypothesis. 
 
Main questions and working hypothesis: 
1. What changes occur in society, when influential social actors such as 
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations receive political rents? 
The study will clarify the influence of Western aid, which is transferred to 
certain PNGOs, not to the PA, and aims to analyze the impact on the 
individual level of PNGO employees, but also the more general changes 
taking place in Palestinian society.  
 
2. Do external political rents establish and support a “globalized elite”?  
My new quantitative data can corroborate the thesis of Sari Hanafi and 
Linda Tabar (2005) of an emerging, globalized elite which has developed 
out of the PNGO sector and detached itself from the base of the Palestinian 
population.  
 
3. What kind of NGO employee landscape does exist in Palestine?  
NGO employees have already been observed and analyzed in the literature 
as middle class, de-politicized and de-radicalized, forming a globalized 
NGO elite.80  
                                               
80 See the critical literature of Brynen, Rex, 1995: "The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite 
Formation", Journal of Palestine Studies 1995, XXIV, (no.3 (Spring 1995)), 31-43. and 
Brynen, Rex, 1996: "Buying Peace? Critical Assessment of International Aid to the West Bank 
and Gaza".; Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local 
NGO's: The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite.; Khalidi, Raja and Samour, Sobhi, 
2011: "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the 
Palestinian National Movement", Journal of Palestine Studies 2011, 40, (no. 2, Winter 2011), 
6-25.; Kuttab, Eileen, 2008: "Palestinian Women's Organizations: Global Cooption and Local 
Contradiction".; Hammami, Rema, 1995: "NGOs: The Professionalization of Politics". and  
Rema Hammami 1995, Nakhleh, Khalil, 2004: The Myth of Palestinian Development. Political 
Aid and Sustainable Deceit. and Nakhleh, Khalil, 2012: Globalized Palestine: The National 
Sell-Out of a Homeland.; Taraki, Lisa, 2008: "Urban Modernity on the Periphery. A New 
Middle Class Reinvents the Palestinian City", Social Text 95 2008, 26, (2), 61-81.; Jad, Islah, 
2004:"The "NGOization" of the Arab Women's Movement", in: Institute of Women's Studies, 
Birzeit University.; Bahmad, Leyla, 2007: "Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations 
caught between Reality and Challenges." 
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My new quantitative and qualitative data can show if this characteristic is 
valid for all PNGO employees and can document all varieties of working 
realities, not only of an elite, in the PNGO sector. 
 
4. Do subsidies in the PNGO sector engender a pro-western client group 
which supports PLO / Mahmoud Abbas politics?  
Externally funded PNGOs who receive western money are seen in public as 
influenced by western cultures and policies. My analyses based on the new 
data collection sheds light on this fact and considers whether PNGOs may 
still be seen as a free counterpart to the government of the PA. 
 
5. Are externally-funded NGOs reducing the brain drain of people with 
higher education by financing suitable jobs in the occupied territories?  
NGOs (international and Palestinian) in general offer jobs with good 
salaries, especially for fresh university graduates, compared to other 
working sectors. The data will document the reasons why people are 
working in the NGO sector and can show, if being able to find work in a 
NGO reduces emigration. 
 
6. Does the thesis of Anne Le More (2005, 2008) regarding impacts in the 
political sector also hold true for the NGO sector? Does this imply that 
external western donors’ decision to support the NGO sector extensively 
does not strengthen but rather debilitates civil society?  
My data analyzes, along with references to other research results can 
answer this question. 
 
 
2.4 Sources and methodology 
 
NGOs have drawn a lot of attention and much (a huge amount of literature) has 
been written about them. Most studies and evaluations are qualitative and 
concentrate on PNGOs themselves and the results of their changing internal 
processes of organization (Rema Hammami (1995), Sari Hanafi and Linda 
  54 
Tabar (2005)), on PNGOs’ relationship with their donors (Benoit Challand 
(2005, 2009), and finally on the donors’ influence on the agendas of NGOs . 
I take this previous work as a starting point.81. This research is thus based in 
the first stage on a quantitative study and in the second on a qualitative study. It 
provides data on personal backgrounds, working histories and careers, living 
standards, including salaries, and also personal political attitudes in the past 
and present of a range of typical PNGO-employees (from service staff to 
directors) both in the West Bank and in Gaza. The field research was carried 
out in the occupied Palestinian territories, between August 2010 and March 
2011. A detailed introduction to the methodology of the quantitative and 
qualitative study follows in chapter 3, in the report of the study results.  
This analysis also builds on secondary literature and available comparative data 
from other researchers and research centers. 
As noted above, Benoit Challand (2009) has drawn a distinction between “two 
Palestines”. The “first Palestine” is built up by professional developmental 
NGOs, mainly supported financially by a majority of international donors. The 
“second Palestine”, covers mainly charitable organizations (where international 
funding is not so big, or relevant or successful) and also includes the Islamic 
NGO sector.82 Islamic NGOs are not included in this study. They show 
different structures concerning external funding, and also in terms of voluntary 
work in their organizations. Sara Roy (2011) provides a detailed insight into 
the Islamic NGO sector with its religious background and orientation.83 As a 
matter of fact, a comparison between these two types of NGO worlds would be 
very helpful in analyzing their different standing in society and thus their 
different input in transformation of society. But this would be beyond the limits 
of this dissertation. 
 
                                               
81 Concerning my research, it is important to note that this study explicitly does not deal with 
the objective and measurable results of NGO projects since there has been done much research 
on this issue 
82 Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: Foreign donors and the power to promote 
and exclude, 15. 
 
83 Roy, Sara, 2011: Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza. Engaging The Islamist Social Sector, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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The field study was done in cooperation with the Birzeit University Human 
Rights and Democracy Program. I designed the research and was responsible 
from November 2009 until December 2011 for the complete process of the 
study. The project was financed by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 
Ramallah.  
 
In the following chapter three the methodology of the study will be introduced 
and the newly collected data will be documented and analyzed in interim 
conclusions. In chapter four, the interim conclusions will be developed to a full 
analysis. 
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3. Chapter 3 
 
Study report: Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations - 
Their Socio-Economic, Social and Political Impact on 
Palestinian Society. 
 
 
Mindful of the need to avoid unfounded generalizations, an important aim of 
this study is to support any assertions with quantitative data.  
Parts of the study and analyzes written in chapter three and four have already 
been published by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Ramallah.  
See electronic version: Palestinian NGOs and their cultural, economic and 
political impact in Palestinian society. Online Publikation Karin A. Gerster, 
Helga Baumgarten, 30.12.2011: http://palestine.rosalux.org/;  
and printed version: 
اا 	
 :  	
ا 
ا  ت
ا ا هأو / 
يدا 
 او / 	
ا 
ا  س
ا   ار2013  
خر ازور  
 
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations. Their socio-economic, social 
and political impact on Palestinian society, Ramallah, Rosa Luxemburg 
Foundation, 2013; 
(Publication in Arabic, abridged English work 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of chapter one, when Palestinian NGOs are 
discussed in context as international NGOs the acronym NGOs is used. 
 
 
In this chapter, I will do something unconventional in academic writing and 
change from the first person singular, "I" to the plural, "we". Although I am the 
only person who is responsible for the idea, the design, results and writing of 
this study, the outcome of a quantitative and qualitative study always relies on 
a research team and the academic environment in which it is embedded and 
without which it would not have been possible.  
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3.1 Methodology / research standards for the quantitative 
 and qualitative field research  
 
 
3.1.2 Operational definition of NGO 
 
We used 3 main characteristics to define a Non-governmental Organization. 
An NGO must be: 
 
1. independent, being institutionally separate from the government. 
2. a non-profit-organization 
3. officially recognized and have an administrative and financial system. 
 
The methodology of this study is multi-staged, combining quantitative data 
followed by qualitative data obtained during field research using focus group 
interviews and involving different statistical data resources for comparison. 
Data collection took place in four stages. 
 
 
3.1.3 Quantitative research 
 
Stage 1: Background preparation for quantitative field research 
 
1. Reviewing local, Arabic and international literature on surveying 
PNGOs.  
 
2. Preparation of the quantitative research questionnaire:  
As the questionnaire is the basic tool of our quantitative study, we took 
time to develop the questionnaire to formulate the questions 
appropriately. The questionnaire was discussed in a workshop at Birzeit 
University.  
 
The questionnaire was divided in 4 parts:  
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1. information about the PNGO the person is working in and private 
 information,  
2. working history,  
3. living standard and salary and  
4. personal and political attitude in present, past and future. 
 
A cross-reading by three experts in quantitative field research and familiar 
with research on NGOs in Palestine followed, also a test-run in five 
different PNGOs. The test run was important to check the contents of the 
questionnaire and to ensure that the language would be understandable to 
participants. The expert feedback was discussed and modified accordingly. 
The test run was also helpful in identifying problems a field worker might 
face.  
 
Training of researchers at Birzeit University: Five fieldwork researchers for 
the West Bank were trained in workshops: contacting PNGOs, conducting 
fieldwork, coding and data entry. Two fieldwork researchers from Gaza 
were unable to participate because of the closure. 
 
 
Stage 2: Organizing the field work 
 
In July 2010 the PNGOs were selected. First PNGOs were contacted by 
telephone, followed by a written invitation introducing the survey and asking 
for their support in the research.  
 
Outline: 
 
1. Target group: PNGO employees mainly in external, western funded 
NGOs. 
 
2. The governorates in West Bank and Gaza were treated equally. West 
Bank is divided in North West Bank with Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem 
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(Tubas), Salfit, Qalqilia, Central West Bank with Ramallah, Al-Bireh, 
Jericho and Jerusalem, South West Bank with Bethlehem and Hebron. 
Gaza is divided in North Gaza, Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Yunis 
and Rafah. 
 
3. Coverage: Five NGO fields – health, agriculture, women,  
 human rights  / peace education and youth. 
 
4. Location of the NGO: urban, rural and refugee camps 
 
5. Size of NGO: we classify NGOs with up to three employees as small, 
NGOs having from four to ten employees as middle-sized and NGOs 
with above 11 employees as large. 
 
6. Taken into account: gender considerations 
 
The questionnaires were delivered personal by a research team, consisted of a 
woman and a man. This method makes possible a personal contact between the 
people of the institution and the researchers. If necessary, open questions 
concerning the study could then be answered. 
 
To maintain anonymity, each questionnaire was packed in an envelope with a 
stamp from Birzeit University on the back. If after answering the questions the 
envelope was properly closed, nobody could subsequently open the envelope 
without our noticing. The single envelopes were collected in a big envelope. 
After two days, or sometimes later, the completed questionnaires were 
collected by a research team.  
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Sample 
 
A total of 203 PNGOs were surveyed. 1099 questionnaires were received from 
128 PNGOs in the West Bank and from 75 PNGOs in Gaza.  
 
49 questionnaires had to be excluded for several reasons:  
- some came from non-salaried volunteers   
- some were returned unfilled without explanation.  
- some were returned unfilled with an explanation. In this case,  
  non-respondents gave the following reasons:  
“no time to fill out the questionnaire”,  
“the questions are too personal”,  
“the subject is uninteresting”,  
“the questionnaire helps the world spy on Palestinian people”, 
and  
“lack of work experience makes answering the questions 
difficult”. 
 
We sought to choose PNGOs equally in the sectors of health, agriculture, 
women, human rights / peace education and youth. In some districts it was not 
possible to find PNGOs meeting the requested criteria either because they did 
not exist or because suitable PNGOs were unwilling to participate in the study. 
In this case, we tried to fill up the numbers of PNGOs randomly until 15 
PNGOs per district were reached. Nevertheless, in some districts of the West 
Bank, the number of 15 PNGOs could not be reached. 
 
The following NGO fields were represented: Women 40%, Youth 32%, Health 
30%, Agriculture 18%, Human Rights 6% and Peace Training 5%. The total is 
more than 100% since some NGOs work in more than one field. 
 
Size of NGO / Number of employees: 
1-3 employees: 7%, 4-7 employees: 25%, 8-20 employees: 32% and 21 and 
above employees: 30%, 6%: data missing. 
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PNGO quantitative survey 
 
Six fieldworkers, four in the West Bank and two in Gaza distributed and 
collected questionnaires. 
West Bank: from August 4. – September 15. 2010 
Gaza: from August 18. – August 30. 2010 
 
 
Summary of field work preparation  
 
The issue of a unique PNGO list:  
With all official PNGO lists, for example lists from the Ministry of Interior or 
PNGO-network, we faced the problem that they were not up-to-date or were 
incomplete. 
 
Getting a documentation of supported PNGOs by the EU from the Technical 
Assistance Office in Jerusalem was a long procedure which led nowhere. The 
EU itself officially committed (in their documents) to transparency seemed to 
be either unable or unwilling to pass on lists of supported PNGOs in the period 
2004-2010.  
In 2006/2007, the United Nations published a two-volume Directory of Non- 
Governmental Organizations in the West Bank 2006 and in Gaza 2007. Even if 
the publication is now somewhat out-of-date, it is very helpful and detailed. 
Having being informed about the existence of this publication, however, it was 
impossible to get a printed version or an electronic copy from the United 
Nations Office in Jerusalem.  
 
Easy to get and helpful in finding addresses of PNGOs is the Palestinian 
Yellow Pages. The problem in this case was that the PNGOs listed had often 
ceased to exist or their telephone number was out of order. 
 
 
  62 
Summary of field work experience: 
 
In general the research teams in West Bank and Gaza found an open and 
friendly atmosphere in working with the PNGOs. The fact (mentioned by 
PNGO-employees) that the University of Birzeit is a well respected institution, 
opened many doors. To sum up the experience of working in various districts, 
the district of Ramallah / Al-Bireh, Jericho and East Jerusalem presented the 
greatest difficulties: PNGOs agreed at first to participate in the research and 
then decided against doing so or they returned questionnaires late (research 
assistants had to go two or three times to collect the questionnaires.) 
 
 
Stage 3: Data coding and data entry 
 
Data coding and data entry was done for the West Bank between September 20 
and November 13, 2010 and for Gaza November between 3 And 15 December 
2010. 
The process of data coding and data entry was supervised by an expert in 
SPSS. 
 
 
Data viewing 
 
The first data analysis revealed a clear dataset without the need of a rerun. It 
showed the expected differences between the West Bank and Gaza, female and 
male and between age groups in connection with stable or unstable contracts. 
To deepen the analysis, we decided to follow up the quantitative research with 
a phase of qualitative research based on focus groups (FGs). Building from an 
analysis of the quantitative data – main demographic and employment 
distinctions were uncovered that formed the framework for forming the various 
focus groups in which deeper and more targeted understanding of the dynamics 
and issues uncovered in the quantitative survey could be assessed. 
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3.1.4. Qualitative research 
 
Stage 4: Preparation of Focus Group Interviews 
 
In a qualitative research workshop at Birzeit University held on February 10, 
2011 we discussed the results of the data. The data revealed obvious 
differences between respondents from the West Bank and Gaza, between 
female and male. There were differences based on the age (generation) of 
employees and differences in the types of contracts, in terms of job security 
and salary levels. The qualitative research consisted of six focus groups in the 
West Bank and six in Gaza.  
 
For the West Bank: 
 
1. female, age: 40 years and above in Birzeit (central WB) 
2. male, age: 40 years and above, in Birzeit (central WB) 
3. female, age 30 years and below, “bad contracts” in Nablus (North 
WB) 
4. male, age 30 years and below, “bad contracts”, in Nablus 
(North WB) 
5. female, age 30 years and below, “good contracts”, Bethlehem 
(South WB) 
6. mal, age 30 years and below, “good contracts”,  
Bethlehem (South WB) 
 
For Gaza: 
 
1. female, age: 40 years and above in Gaza City 
2. male, age: 40 years and above, in Gaza City 
3. female, age 30 years and below, “bad contracts” Khan Yunis 
4. male, age 30 years and below, “bad contracts”, Khan Yunis 
5. female, age 30 years and below, “good contracts”, Rafah 
6. male, age 30 years and below, “good contracts”, Rafah 
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“good contracts”: no part time job, contract more than 1 year, permanent 
contract 
“bad contracts”: part time job, contract less than 1 year, or no written 
contract 
 
 
Organization of the field work: 
 
PNGOs were telephoned and asked to participate and to send employees fitting 
the different categories to the focus groups (FGs). 
 
In Gaza the focus groups were held from 19.-21 February 2011 and in the West 
Bank from 21 February - 3 March 2011. 
 
In the West Bank we faced more difficulties in organizing the focus groups 
than in Gaza. For example, in our focus group female, 40 years and above, 
scheduled on 23 February 2011 in Ramallah, 6 women agreed to attend the 
meeting. An obligatory reminder by telephone followed the day before, but no 
women showed up for the focus group. This also happened with our focus 
group entitled male, 30 years and below with “good contracts” in Bethlehem. 
Only one man attended. In this case we changed our concept to in-depth, 
individual interviews and scheduled additional meetings for the two focus 
groups who failed to attend. It is interesting that participants in focus groups 
who had bad or poor contracts were more motivated to attend our sessions. 
 
All focus groups were recorded; a transcription and an English translation were 
prepared. 
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Secondary Data Collection 
 
The impact of external aid, which is transferred directly as wages or salaries, 
can be analyzed comparatively, where existing data concerning Palestinian 
society are available. Whenever necessary, the data sources to be used for 
comparison are referenced through the text. Pure sources were the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the Ministry of Planning and the 
Administrative Development database (MOP), major studies from Palestinian 
Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), World Bank and other material in 
the form of the annual reports of other organizations. 
 
 
3.2  Available cash – impact of international aid on the daily 
lives of NGO employees and on Palestinian society itself 
 
3.2.1 Background information about the Palestinian Labor Market 
 
The study was carried out between August 4, 2010 and March 3, 2011.  
PCBS, Labor Force Survey Report Series, April-June 2010 estimated the labor 
force participation rate to be 41.5%.84 In other words, 980,400 people of 15 
years and above from a working age population of 2,365,000 comprised the 
Palestinian labor force. 58.5% or 1.384.600 people of working age remained 
outside the labor force. Reasons for being outside the labor force are mainly 
housekeeping (47.7%), studying or training (36.5%) and age or illness (10.1%). 
 
Women’s labor force participation in the formal labor force at 15.2% (WB 
17.6%, GS 11%) is one of the lowest rates in the world. Women with higher 
education are represented at 43%. According to PCBS, 25% of the female labor 
force was unemployed in June 2010. 
                                               
84 (PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010: "Labour Force Survey (April-June 
2010)", PCBS, Ramallah, http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/ The documentation about rate of 
unemployment differs. Also there is a normal quarterly changing unemployment rate through 
seasonal reasons between 23-28%. 
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The rate of unemployment stood, according to PCBS, in June 2010 at 22.9%. 
The West Bank rate was 15.2% and that of Gaza 39.3%. According to this 
study, the rate of unemployment in the age group 15-24 was the highest, 
especially among females at 47%. Paradoxically among women, the rate of 
unemployment increases with higher education, but decreases among men. 
Compared with the rate of unemployment in 2008, the rate in 2010 was 
significantly higher both for males and females.85 See Tables and Graphs 1, 
below. 
                                               
85 See also data analysis in: World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for 
Livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse", The 
World Bank. Sustainable Development Department. Middle East and North Africa Region, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/GenderStudy-
EnglishFeb2010.pdf. 
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Tables and Graphs 1: source: PCBS labor force survey, annual report 2010 
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3.3. Basic facts about Palestinian NGO employees 
 
3.3.1 Personal background 
 
PNGO employees can be characterized as follows:  
57.5% are female and 42.5% male; 71% are aged 17-37 years. The age group 
26-37 years has the highest representation with 48% of employees, followed by 
the age group 17-25 years with 23% employees. 88% were born in Palestine 
and 82% (WB 74% GS 96%) have a Palestinian passport. The permanent 
residence of employees in the NGO sector mirrors the Palestinian population 
almost exactly: 76.5% urban, 16.5% rural and 7% refugee camp.86 An higher 
education background is shared by 90% of PNGO employees (59% BA, 19% 
Diploma, 12% MA and 1% PhD; primary, preparatory and secondary school 
education 10%) and 41% of NGO employees do take part in improving their 
education and in training courses. For their attendance in training programs, 
47% of the employees are funded by the PNGOs and 46% pay for themselves. 
National and international foundations pay for 7% of PNGO employees to 
attend such programs. 
 
In private life there is a tendency to postpone marriage and there is a tendency 
to have fewer children. Comparing the West Bank with Gaza, PNGO 
employees in the West Bank tend to send their children to private schools. In 
the West Bank 42% (including 8% who send some to private and some to 
governmental schools) and in Gaza 14% (also including 8% who send some to 
private and some to governmental schools). 
 
59% (WB 68% GS 47%) of NGO employees have a partner who is working. 
The majority of PNGO employees perceive their living standard and their 
wages to be above average. 
 
The following chapter presents this information in more detail. 
                                               
86 PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2011, Jerusalem: PASSIA, Palestinian Academic Society for the 
Study of International Affairs, 329.: urban 73.7%, rural 17% and camps 9.3%, page 329. 
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3.3.2  Gender participation in the PNGO sector  
 
In the PNGO sector most employees are women: 57.5% female (WB 58%, GS 
56%) and 42.5% male (WB 42%, GS 44%) employees.87 
 
 
3.3.3 PNGO employment rate by age groups 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 2: PNGO employment rate by age groups 
 
 
The age group 26-37 years has the highest representation with 48% (WB 46%, 
GS 50%) of employees, followed by age group 17-25 years with 23% (WB 
19%, GS 28%) of employees. These two age groups are often described in the 
                                               
87 Also see comparison with the study of MAS, 2007: Mapping Palestinian Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Ramallah: MAS, Palestine Economic 
Policy Research Institute, 43.: 54.8% female and 45.2%male. 
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literature as the Second Intifada generation, born in the eighties. Members of 
the age group 38-45 years with 16% (WB 19%, GS 13%) and 46-55 years with 
10% (WB 12%, GS 7%) and known as the First Intifada generation were born 
in the sixties and seventies.  
 
We compared the age-group data of the West Bank and Gaza. In Gaza, the age 
group 17-25 years shows a clearly higher percentage with 28% than 19% in the 
West Bank. This difference can be explained through the special 
implementation of job creation programs through donors and also through the 
Hamas PA, mainly funneled through the NGO sector. 50% in Gaza and 46% in 
West Bank are in the age group 26-37 years. The age group 38-45 years may 
be considered a “transitional age group”; here the West Bank leads with 19% 
compared to 13% in Gaza. Those in the age group 46-55 years in the West 
Bank stood at 12% compared with 7% in Gaza. Membership of the age group 
55-74 years is similar in the West Bank and Gaza with 4% in the West Bank 
and 2% in Gaza. 
 
 
3.3.4 Place of birth / Nationality/ Passport 
 
Popular perceptions in Palestinian society say that the majority of Palestinian 
NGO employees are born abroad or have a foreign passport. This assumption is 
not justifiable. 88.5% Palestinian NGO employees were born in the OPTs. 9% 
were born in other Arab countries and 3% were born in USA/Europe. 82% 
(WB 74%, GS 96%) of Palestinian NGO employees have a Palestinian 
passport and 12% have a passport from “another country”. “Another country” 
is divided into: other Arab countries (including Jordanian) 92%, Southern 
Africa (countries below the Sahara) 3%, North America 2% and Israeli 
document 3%. 
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3.3.5 Urban / Rural / Refugee Camp 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 3: population distribution/ NGO employees/ Palestinians 
(Source of Passia data in Passia 2011, p.329, Palestinian population distribution by 
place of living) 
 
 
The population distribution by place of residence in Palestine in 2010 was: 
73.3% urban, 17% rural and 9.3% in refugee camps.88 The permanent place of 
residence of employees in the NGO sector is practically identical with the 
Palestinian population at large: 76.5% urban, 16.5% rural and 7.1% refugee 
camp. 
 
 
3.3.6 Level of Education 
 
The majority of 59% PNGO employees have a Bachelor’s degree. 19% of 
NGO employees have a two year Diploma and 12% a Master’s degree. 
Primary, Preparatory and Secondary school education are represented with 
10% and 1 % have a PhD. 90% of PNGO employees have had a higher 
education. The highest Bachelor’s rate is found in the age group 17-25 at 70% 
and age group 26-37 at 65% compared to other age groups.  
 
The place of birth has an influence on the level of education, see table no.4 
below. The highest percent for a Bachelor’s degree at 74% is among those who 
                                               
88 PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2011., PCBS Population Census and Press Release on 
International Population Day, July 2010 
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were born abroad, followed by Gaza 61%, West Bank 55% and East Jerusalem 
50%. 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 4: level of education / place of birth 
 
Students with academic degrees from abroad have better chances to get a job 
immediately after studying than students with a degree from Palestinian 
universities or from other Arab countries.89 Being the owner of a Jerusalem 
Identity Card or another non-Palestinian passport means better job 
opportunities for an administrative position. 
 
                                               
89 PCBS 2005, table 121/p.171 
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The major field of study is dominated by humanities, economics and education 
with differences between the West Bank and Gaza (see Table and Graphs: 5, 
below).  
A major study field does not necessarily determine the actual work of an 
PNGO employee. 
 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 5: major field of study / West Bank 
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Tables and Graphs 6: major field of study / Gaza 
 
 
Concerning the West Bank and Gaza: women (64%) men (62%) in Gaza are 
higher presented with Bachelor degrees than their West Bank counterparts with 
female 57% and male 53%. In Diploma certificates women (22%, WB 23%, 
GS 21%) rank before men (14%, WB 15%, GS 13%). Men show a much 
higher percentage with Master’s degrees (17%, WB 20%, GS 13%) than 
women (7%, WB 10%, GS 4%). There are no great differences between 
Primary / Preparatory or Secondary in the two regions. PhDs are dominated by 
men. Women lead in the Bachelor’s category and in diploma degrees, while 
men preponderate among those with further academic education. 
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NGO employees / training courses / further education  
 
Living and working in a fast changing world demands flexibility, advanced 
vocational training and familiarization with new methods and techniques. 41% 
of PNGO employees (WB male: 48%, female 39%, Gaza male 46%, female: 
39%) do take part in further education and training courses, 57% have so far 
not taken part in a training course. 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 7: participation in training / educational programs 
 
 
The highest participation rate is in the age group 26-37 years at 44%, followed 
by age group 17-25 years at 27%, decreasing in the age group 38-45 years to 
15 % and 12% in the age group 46-55 years. 
 
Gender aspect:  
Female employees show the same high interest in taking training courses if 
they have an academic degree or school education secondary and below. For 
males, as the level of education increases, the participation in courses 
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increases. Looking at the type of work, administrators are in first place with 
34% taking training courses, then office employees 17%, trainer, supervisor 
16%, coordinator 15%, researcher 6%, service employees 6% and others 6%. 
Training courses are mainly taken to improve computer skills 19%, education 
in health 18%, capacity building 13% and political awareness 12%. 
 
The PNGO as an institution itself pays in 47% of cases for training programs of 
their employees. 46% of the PNGO employees pay for training courses 
themselves and 7% of PNGO employees are funded by foundations. 
 
 
3.3.7 Family status / Marital status 
 
In Palestinian society 92% of females are married in the age between 15-29 
years. 29% of women are married under 18 years.90 The median age at first 
marriage for females is 19.5 years and for males 25.4 years.91 The fertility rate 
in 2010 was 4.2 births (WB: 3.8, GS 4.9 births) 
Palestinian families have an average household size of 5.8 persons (WB 5.5, 
GS 6.4 persons) in 2010.  
 
Concerning PNGOs, 59% of NGO employees are married, 35% of PNGO 
employees are single, 1% are separated, 2% divorced, and 1% widowed. (2% 
did not answer the question) For further analysis a recode was done of ‘not 
married’ and ‘ever married’: 64% of PNGO employees were ever married 
(male 75%, female 56%) and 36% of PNGO employees were not married 
(male 25%, female 44%).  
 
 
                                               
90 MAS, 2010: "Economic and Social Monitor 22", MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research 
Institute, Ramallah, 
http://www.mas.ps/2012/search/node/Economic%20and%20social%20monitor%2022. 
 
91 PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2012, Jerusalem: PASSIA, Palestinian Academic Society for the 
Study of International Affairs, 385. 
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Tables and Graphs 8: marital status: single / ever married 
 
 
“Being single” under the aspect of gender / female 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 9: marital status: age groups / single /gender 
 
In our study we have slightly different age categories as shown above, 17-25 
years and not 15-29 years. Comparisons have to be drawn carefully. If we 
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compare these categories we find in the age group female 17-25 years, 69% are 
single and 31% are married. In the age group female 26-37 years, 40% are 
single and 60% are married. 
In the age group 55-74 years: 25%, in the age group 38-45 years: 23% and in 
the age group 46-55 years: 13% are single. This indicates for female PNGO 
employees a trend towards later marriage and / or the free choice to stay single. 
Being aware, that this result can be viewed either positively or negatively. 
Highly educated women with working experience are often above the average 
marriage age and this fact can also be a “burden” for women in Palestinian 
society who seek a partner. Studies show that, in general – and not only in 
Palestine, men tend to marry younger women who are less well educated as 
themselves.  
 
Results of our focus groups show that young men (30 years and below) prefer 
that their sisters and wives work in the public and private sectors, because 
NGO work for women is not yet judged respectable at every level of society. 
By contrast, Rema Hammami and Amal Syam (2011) discovered in their study 
Who answers to Gazan women. An economic security and rights research. 
(2010), for which they undertook female focus groups in Gaza, that women 
working in NGOs are becoming more attractive on the ‘marriage market’, 
because they earn good wages in a desolate economical situation.92  
 
Conclusion: The PNGO sector can be also seen as a working sector for highly 
educated, unmarried women  
A more detailed analysis of gender roles and relations follows in chapter 3.3 
‘PNGO sector- a female gendered working field?’ 
 
                                               
92 Hammami, Rema and Syam, Amal, 2011: "Who answers to Gazan women? An economic 
security and rights research": Headquarter, UN Women. 
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3.3.8 Working partner 
 
Our data above showed, 64% of PNGO employees are married and 36% are 
single. Married PNGO employees were asked, if their partner was working or 
not and if the partner was working, in which sector? 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 10: working partner 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 11: working place of partner 
 
 
In Gaza: 35% of men and 13% of women answered that their partner was 
working in the NGO sector. 40% male and 61% female employees had a 
partner working in the governmental sector. 25% male and 26% female 
employees had a partner working in the private sector. In Gaza, PNGO men are 
more likely to have wives working in NGOs than their West Bank 
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counterparts. Female NGO workers in Gaza tend to have husbands working in 
the government sector (the largest single employer in Gaza) compared with the 
West Bank where women tend to have spouses working in the private sector 
(the private sector in the West bank is larger than in Gaza). 
 
61% of male partners are working in the governmental sector in Gaza. This is a 
fairly high percentage in comparison with 37% in the West Bank. In July 2007, 
Gaza fell under the control of Hamas whereas the West Bank continued to be 
administered by Fatah. The fact that employees of the “old Fatah governmental 
sector” in Gaza still get paid from the Fatah PA in the West Bank has to be 
taken into account. Also relevant here is that the public sector in Gaza is the 
largest employer. These factors help explain the high percentage of male 
partners working in the governmental sector.  
 
Also to be considered is the possibility that, after the complete closure of 
Gaza,93 the Hamas administration expanded working opportunities in the 
governmental sector to absorb unemployed men and women who had 
previously worked in Israel. 
The research shows that it is relatively uncommon for both partners to be 
working in the NGO sector (bearing in mind that the NGO sector covers 
around 10% of the Palestinian labor force). The majority of partners work in 
the governmental or private sectors. As mentioned in the FGs in the West Bank 
and Gaza, the governmental sector seems to guarantee longer working 
contracts and therefore more job stability.  
 
Results of focus group interviews concerning women show on one hand, the 
majority of women prefer to work in NGOs because the employment is 
interesting, diversified, and professional with an open working atmosphere and 
the possibility of a career. On the other hand, women mentioned preferences 
for the governmental sector because it seems to offer job security and more 
                                               
93 See also World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the 
West Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse", 31. 
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compatibility with family life (FGs, female < 30 years). The governmental 
sector offers working hours from 8am-3pm, a vacation, and a pension among 
other benefits.  
Young men (FGs, male till 30 years) prefer their wives and sisters to work in 
the governmental sector, arguing that “in the NGO sector women are exposed 
to work which is in society not so well respected, for example fieldwork or 
working with men in one room.”94 In FGs male > 40 years didn’t mention a 
preference, “Each woman should decide what she wants.” 
 
 
3.3.9 Children 
 
41.3% (WB 39.4%, GS 44.4%) of the Palestinian population is younger than 
14 years.95 86% of NGO employees have children. 35% have one or two 
children, 39% have three or four children and 26% have more than four 
children. The birth rate in Palestine is closely connected to the marital status of 
women. The trend among women to marry later mirrors a tendency to bear 
children later in life. This often implies not having so many children.96 
Another string of argumentation heard was the modern notion of a nuclear 
family – a couple might have just one or two children who then would have a 
better chance of a good education. 
 
                                               
94 Hammami, Rema and Syam, Amal, 2011: "Who answers to Gazan women? An economic 
security and rights research"., chapter 6.3. Gender Norms and Job Searches 
 
95 Age 15-29: 29.4%, Persons with the age 60 and above make 3 % of the total population; see 
(PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010: "PCBS Migration Survey in the 
Palestinian Territory 2010", PCBS, Ramallah, 
http://82.213.38.42/PCBS_NADA3.1/index.php/catalog/112.; Main results  
 
96 An average a Palestinian woman gives birth to 4.6 children and women in the age between 
15-29 years have the highest contributing rate. See MAS, 2010: "Economic and Social Monitor 
22".; see also slightly  
different numbers in the (PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2012: Statistical 
Yearbook 2011, Ramallah: PCBS.: total feritlity rate lies by 4.2 births (WB 3.8, GS 4.9) 
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3.3.10 Education of children 
 
The Palestinian education system is based on Grades 1-10, followed by two 
years of secondary school. The first ten grades are divided into Preparation 
Stage (grades 1-4) and Empowerment Stage from grade (grades 5-10). After 
the tenth grade, an optional secondary education covers grades 11-12 with the 
school-leaving examination, Tawjihi. Only those who take the Tawjihi have the 
option of a general higher education. 
 
Children in Palestine can go to governmental and private schools and if they 
are registered as refugees, they may attend UNWRA schools for the elementary 
cycle. Governmental and UNWRA schools are free; in private schools, fees are 
charged. 
People send their children to private schools for several reasons: 
-private schools have a better reputation for offering a quality education than 
do governmental schools 
-religious aspect: an Islamic or Christian-orientated education is valued by 
some parents 
-teachers rarely strike 
-private schools offer foreign languages and trips abroad 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 12: education of children / type of school 
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In the West Bank and Gaza, 86% of PNGO employees have children, 60% of 
them having school age children. Of those with school age children, 44% of 
PNGO employees send their children to governmental and UNWRA schools 
and 22% to private schools. 8% send their children to both (mixed). There is a 
big difference between the West Bank and Gaza concerning “paid” and “free” 
schools. PNGO employees from the West Bank are six times more likely to 
send their children to fee-paying schools than PNGO employees in Gaza. 
This difference depends on: 1. affordability and 2. infrastructure (the 
infrastructure of private schools in Gaza is less developed). In the West Bank: 
34% of PNGO employees send their children to private (paid) schools, 35% to 
unpaid (UNWRA schools 3%, governmental schools 32%) and 8% to both 
types of school.  
In Gaza: 6% of PNGO employees send their children to private schools, 55% 
to unpaid schools (UNWRA schools 40%, governmental schools 15%) and 8% 
to both types of school.  
 
 
Education – University 
 
A small percentage of PNGO employees with children who are attending 
university educate them outside Palestine, mainly in other Arab countries.  
While this field-work did not succeed in generating relevant data, future field 
work might concentrate on the question, if there is a difference between 
average Palestinians and elite-NGO leaders concerning where their children 
study. 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 13: percent of monthly wage spent on children’s education 
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35% of PNGO employees spend money on school education. 16% spend 10% 
of their monthly wage on education, 9% acknowledged 20%, 5% spend 30% 
and 5% above 30% of their monthly wage on education. PCBS reported 2010 
(April-June) that the average Palestinian monthly household’s expenditure on 
education (including personal care and recreational activities) is 27 JD / 147 
NIS (general), 21 JD / 114 NIS (WB) , 16 JD / 87 NIS (Gaza). Our study result 
indicates that 35% of PNGO employees invest more money into the education 
of their children than average Palestinians. 
 
 
3.3.11 Interim conclusion 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, if general, when Palestinians talk about NGO 
employees, it is well known – or at least the popular conception is – that NGO 
employees are better paid then others, that they are born abroad, that they are 
young, professionalized and career-orientated, that they have a lot of key 
benefits compared to the average Palestinian, that they don’t think politically 
anymore and work only in their own interest etc. 
 
The research has shown so far:  
- 71% of PNGO employees are in the age between 17-37 years. PCBS stated 
2010 that the highest unemployment rate was in the age group from 20-24 
years at 39.4% (WB 24.9%, GS 66.6%).97 In this sense, the PNGO sector can 
be viewed as a job market for the young and highly educated: 90 % of the 
PNGO employees have a higher education degree. 
- The majority of 88% were born in Palestine and 82% of PNGO employees 
hold a Palestinian passport. The concept that the majority were born abroad is 
thus incorrect. However it should be noted, being the owner of a Jerusalem ID 
or additional another non-Palestinian passport implies better job opportunities 
for those working in an administrative position.98 
                                               
97 PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2011, 349. 
 
98 Note: if Palestinians have only a foreign passport and no residency status, they are less likely 
to be hired because employers fear that they might be unable to remain in the country. 
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- women at 57.5% form a substantial part of the work force in the PNGO 
sector.  
- the majority are urban, but this reflects Palestinian society as a whole 
- seeking education (improving skills, taking training courses) was popular  
- there is a tendency to later marriage 
- there is a tendency to have fewer children 
- in the West Bank as opposed to Gaza, there is a trend to educate children in 
private schools  
- 59% of PNGO employees have a working partner (WB: 68%, Gaza: 47 %,) 
 
 
3.4 Palestinian NGO sector: neo-liberal restructured working 
 sector: Working reality of Palestinian NGO employees 
 
In June, 2010, the official unemployment rate was 23% (WB 15%, GS 39%), 
according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). 
 
The West Bank and Gaza are still occupied territories and suffer under the 
general closure and separation policy of Israel. The reality is a never ending 
economic crisis in the occupied territories with underdeveloped industry, an 
agriculture sector without development because of the reasons mentioned 
above and restricted access to natural resources. The Palestinian economy is 
dominated by services. The West Bank and Gaza depend totally on external 
help. Having a job in uncertain political and economic times means “having a 
future” (FG, male <30 years, GS and see also World Bank (2010)). 
 
Where do Palestinian women and men find work?  
PCBS undertakes regular labor force surveys (LFS) according to the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) methodology. Data on key labor 
market indicators: age, education, wage levels, sector and occupation of work 
are documented. 
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The NGO working sector, with approximately 10% of jobs for the Palestinian 
labor market, is categorized under ‘services and other branches’ (see table 
below).  
 
 
Tables and Graphs 14: economic activity and gender 
 
The following chapter analyzes the working realities of the PNGO sector. 
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3.4.1 Personal working history 
 
PNGO employees are mainly in the age group 26-37 years (48%) and between 
17-25 years (23%), born at the beginning of the ’eighties and known as the 
second Intifada generation.99 The first Intifada generation, born in the ’sixties 
and seventies’ – nowadays between 38-45 years – amounts to 16% and the age 
group between 46 and 55 years stands at 10%.  
 
PNGO employees between 38 and 55 years were often involved in establishing 
PNGOs. Employees belonging to the second Intifada generation and with 
higher education generally find work after volunteering, going to interviews 
and /or by exploiting personal relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
99 The group 15-24 years is the age group with the highest unemployment rate: 42.5%. Age 
group 25-34 years: 28%, 35-44 years: 16.6% and 45-54 years: 18.2%. See MAS, 2011: 
"Economic and Social Monitor 23", MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 
Ramallah, http://www.mas.ps/2012/node/266#.Ulu10lOa5So.,7. 
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3.4.1.2 Moving in the NGO sector 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 15: moving in the NGO sector 
 
 
For 41% of PNGO employees, the PNGO in which they are currently working 
is their first place of work. 23% of employees have worked previously in 
NGOs. 22% of employees have moved from the private sector and 7% from the 
governmental sector into the PNGO sector. 7% of employees have experience 
in more than one sector. 
 
In Gaza, for 44% of PNGO employees, their current workplace is their first, 
compared with 39% in the West Bank. Considered by gender: Among female 
PNGO employees in Gaza, 48% are working in their very first job. Among the 
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same group in the West Bank, the figure is 41%. For 38% of male PNGO 
employees in Gaza, their current job is their very first. 35% of male PNGO 
employees in the West Bank are in their first job. 
 
 
3.4.1.3 Ways to find a Job in the NGO sector 
 
The governmental sector must publish their job offers in the public media. By 
contrast, NGOs, like the private sector, may publish their job offers in 
newspapers and/ or in the internet, but they are not obliged to do so.100  
 
 
Tables and Graphs 16: possibilities to find a job in the NGO sector  
 
                                               
100 See MAS, 2011: "Economic and Social Monitor 23"., 2.4. Vacancy announcement. 
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Finding a job in the NGO sector 
 
42% of PNGO employees land a job through the help of friends (31.1%) and 
relatives (10.4%). This high percentage diminishes if PNGO employees have 
already held one or two positions in the NGO sector. 23% of PNGO employees 
make use of relationships formed in previous employment. Finding a job in this 
way increases with a longer previous employment history. 14% of PNGO 
employees say they found work through public advertisements and 11% 
through a personal interview. 6% of PNGO employee’s found work through 
doing voluntary work. There is a contradiction in the results of the focus group 
interviews where the majority (< 30 years) claimed they found their job 
through voluntary work. Many (GS, female and male <30 years) felt that a 
good education was not enough to secure a job, “[both] high education and 
wasta are needed to get a job.” The Arabic word wasta means using 
connections to get what you want. 
 
 
3.4.1.4 Interim conclusion 
 
In 2010, a typical PNGO employee: has a higher education (90%), has 
volunteer experience in several institutions or NGOs and often uses 
connections to land a job in an NGO. For 41% of PNGO employees, their 
current PNGO is their first place of work. 23% of PNGO employees have 
previously worked in an NGO.  
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3.4.2   Working facts 
3.4.2.1  Type of job – full time / part time 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 17: type of job, full time / part time 
 
 
The data show full time employment of 68% and part time employment of 32% 
in the occupied Palestinian territories. We need to differentiate between full 
time and part-time jobs. In the West Bank full time employment is 84%; part 
time employment is 16%. In Gaza, there is a remarkable difference between 
full time employment at 47% and part time employment at 53%.  
 
 
3.4.2.2 Working contracts and level of income 
 
NGOs must face the reality of short term projects, limited in time by donors 
and also specially developed short term employment programs for the OPTs. 
For example, between 2007 and 2009, the NGO development center received 6 
million Euros to fund job creation projects in the West Bank and Gaza from the 
French Development Agency.  
 
“The Job Creation Project in the West Bank and Gaza aims to alleviate 
the financial burdens of the poorest and most marginalized Palestinian 
families by financing temporary employment opportunities through the 
execution of infrastructure micro-projects and improving public assets 
operated by NGOs. Through this project, NDC expects to offer 
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assistance to over 50 NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza, and create 
approximately 140,000 working man-days.”101  
 
Since 2006, international donors and agencies, as well the Hamas government 
increased the level of funding for social support, channeling these through 
NGOs and the public sector in order to relieve an ongoing humanitarian crisis. 
After the 2008-2009 Gaza war, both needs and funding intensified.  
 
The majority of these part-timers or short termers in Gaza are beneficiaries of 
these job creation programs without having a long term perspective.102 Most 
jobs can be characterized as training or semi-voluntary. The pro and contra of 
implementing such short term or part time contracts in the special situation of 
the Gazans will be not discussed at this point. 
 
Part time contracts are considered in Palestinian society to be “bad contracts”. 
In focus groups in the West Bank and in Gaza, employees explained “having a 
part-time contract means working full time for half of the salary”. The 
impression of many PNGO employees with part time work is of “having no 
rights”. Employers are said to be in a position “to force you to work more 
hours than part time, because you don’t want to lose your work” (FGs in 
WB&GS <30 years with ‘bad contracts’).  
 
Working part time is mainly not a free choice. In the majority of cases, it is 
what job applicants get offered. Of employees questioned in Gaza, 84% are 
working according to their written or verbal contract part time because they 
have “no choice” (FGs male and female below 30 years, WB&GS). The 
economic situation in Gaza is forcing people to take any job that is 
available. Young employees are looking for work experience and better job 
                                               
101 See the homepage of the NGO Development Center: NGO Development Center, 
http://www.ndc.ps/main.php?id=45. 
 
102 See also UNWRA, 2010: "Labour Market Briefing. Gaza Strip. Second Half 2010", 
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/201106083557.pdf. 
and see "Job Creation Programme for Unemployed Graduates and Workers" : 
http://www.irpal.ps/irpal/news-120 
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conditions. For that a variety of different certificates of experience is needed. 
(GS, female < 30 years, ‘bad contracts’) In this sense, working part time can 
offer the opportunity to have more than one job and collect different and more 
working experience, which in the long run can make it easier to find a job with 
better conditions (also mentioned in FGs in GS <30 years with ‘bad contracts’).  
 
PNGO workers have adapted to the difficult reality that most contracts on offer 
are part time or temporary. Their proactive response has been to be continually 
on the look-out for employment with better conditions and taking what is on 
offer as soon as it is available – sometimes meaning they are working in one 
NGO before their contract with their previous employer has ended.  
 
In contrast, women in the focus group female >40 in Gaza describe ‘working 
experience’ as an empty term, saying “we all go through an experience 
nightmare”. They mean that long term work experience in a job, for example 
for 6-8 years, no longer has any value. Job applicants with many and varied 
certificates are preferred, even if the working or volunteer experience period 
amounts to no more than one month. Also mentioned was having to sign a 
contract offering a salary of US$ 800 and receiving US$ 150, without knowing 
where the rest of the money would go. This was mentioned more than once.103  
 
Also in focus groups, men and women reported working without a written 
contract and below 500 NIS a month (FG, female and male below 30 years). 
“Working without a written contract” is, according to Palestinian labor law, 
possible and according to the law people would have the same protection as 
with a written contract. The reality is rather different. 
 
                                               
103 Only employees from one single NGO said that their NGO has a transparent policy of job 
sharing. One person signs a contract but two do the work and share of the salary. The others 
said they knew nothing about such schemes. 
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Two internal contradictions in retrospect:  
 
1. Part time work in Gaza – “We don’t have any part time contracts in 
Gaza.  
I am sure.” (FG GS male >40 years) 
The topic of part time or temporary jobs was discussed in 12 focus groups. 
Eleven focus groups discussed the negative impact of part time jobs very 
enthusiastically. Focus groups below 30 years with “bad contracts” mentioned 
their hope, that through being able to talk about their bad working situations 
and conditions, these might be improved.  
 
The results of one focus group (male > 40 years in GS) was in a complete 
contradiction to the quantitative results and to the results of the other 11 focus 
groups in the West Bank and in Gaza. All participants of this focus group (who 
were mostly PNGO directors) denied that part time contracts existed in Gaza.  
 
2. 40% of PNGO employees have “no written contract” 
In this research, over 60% of the PNGOs rely on external funding by the EC or 
other European countries. In general, external funded PNGOs have to write a 
financial report, supported by a financial audit for their donors. In financial 
reports it is assumed that all employees working for a project and paid from its 
budget have a written contract. This formal, correct procedure is, however, not 
always followed.  
As mentioned above through the ongoing humanitarian crisis, the NGO 
environment in Gaza differs from its West Bank counterpart. International 
donors and agencies, set up huge “job creation programs” which have been run 
and managed through NGOs in Gaza. NGOs are explicitly funded from donors 
to hire young people on short part time trainings schemes with no contracts, no 
guarantees and low salaries. This may explain the 43% of PNGO employees 
“with no written” contract in Gaza comparing to 38% in the West Bank. In the 
West Bank 38% without a written contract under “normal” aid conditions is a 
very high percentage. In some cases in the West Bank and in Gaza PNGOs 
may benefit from grants without being responsible for financial reports. 
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One might expect that these irregular working arrangements and precarious 
conditions should motivate trades unions to take active counter-measures. 
 
 
3.4.2.3 Type of work 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 18: type of work 
 
We classify as administrator those responsible for: 
 
1. helping define the objectives, build a strategic plan and general 
policies for the institution, and participating in decision making 
2. supervising the implementation of programs and following up the 
operational plan 
3. working on proposals for the development of the administration and 
structure of the institution 
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4. supervising the preparation and the agenda, identifying annual 
vacancies in coordination with the appropriate authorities 
5. overseeing the implementation of all procedures concerning 
employees’ affairs 
6. supervising the preparation and updating of job descriptions for all 
functions of the institution 
7. overseeing the preparation of a training plan in all its aspects 
8. supervising and reviewing preparation of the budget  
9. supervision and auditing of annual reports 
10. participating in management of knowledge 
 
 
Gender aspect of job distribution: 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 19: gender aspect of job distribution 
 
 
Being aware that Women’s PNGOs (those with a main focus on women’s 
matters) are represented in the study at 40% and female participation in 
PNGOs is 57.5%, the sex ratio of administrative positions shows (at 37% male 
and 27% female) no gender equality. (For a more detailed discussion of this see 
chapter 3.3, NGO sector- a female gendered working field?) 
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20% of office employees work in PNGOs, 24% in the West Bank and 13% in 
Gaza. The rate in the West Bank is 11% higher than in Gaza. In the West Bank 
being an office employee is a domain for women (30% female, 17% male). In 
Gaza it is nearly equal (14% female, 13% male). 
 
 
3.4.2.4 Types of contract / duration of contracts 
 
In a globally-oriented world short term contracts for one year or less are 
fashionable in various working sectors. PNGO employees have mainly short 
term contracts with a possibility of extension. This does not guarantee, 
however, the same working conditions (type of work, type of job, level of 
income etc.). 
 
In the OPTs 37% of PNGO employees have a contract of 1 year or less. 10% of 
employees have a contract for more than 1 year and 13% have a permanent 
contract. 40% of PNGO employees have no written contract at all. 
See the differences between West Bank and Gaza in the table below. 
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Tables and Graphs 20: duration of contracts (including ‘no written contract’) 
 
 
(=<1 means having a contract for 1 year or less, >1 means having a working 
contract more than 1 year in duration) 
 
Tables and Graphs 21: duration of contract / age groups  
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Duration of continuous contracts 
Short term contracts in PNGOs can be extended. Looking at table and graphs 
22, below; we see how long an PNGO employee stays in the current PNGO. 
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Tables and Graphs 22: duration of contracts in years in current PNGO 
 
 
As mentioned above, short term contracts may be extended. 31% of PNGO 
employees have contracts lasting 1 year or less. 36% work in the same PNGO 
for up to 5 years, 17% up to 10 years and 17% for more than 10 years. The 
31% with contracts of 1 year and less are identical with so called new comers, 
employees who start work after finishing their education or who come from 
other working sectors. For differences between the West Bank and Gaza see 
Table and Graphs 23, below. 
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Tables and Graphs 23: duration of contracts in years 
 
 
This graphic shows clearly the difference between the West Bank and Gaza. 
Here we see the consequences of the donor policy of “job creation programs” 
in Gaza – the implementation of short term jobs with a working time of one 
year or less which leads to many workers dropping subsequently out of the 
NGO sector. 
 
Short term contracts, even when extension is possible, do not provide job 
security. Human beings differ in their needs for stability in life. Some need 
more job security, some less. The factors of age and being responsible for a 
family also play a role. 
In focus groups it was clearly mentioned that an unstable political situation and 
job insecurity lead to emigration especially among young people (FGs male 
<30 years). This is a phenomenon that has been increasing since the second 
Intifada. 
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The PCBS Migration Survey in the occupied Palestinian territory found out, 
that in the period 2007-2009, 22,000 people emigrated. Not included are the 
families who emigrated together. The main reasons behind the desire to 
emigrate were: 39.3% wished to improve their living conditions, 15.2% found 
no job opportunities and 18.7% sought education and a chance to study. The 
significant difference in the distribution of main reasons behind the desire to 
emigrate between those in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip was the lack of 
security (13.8% in the Gaza Strip compared to 5.6% in the West Bank).”104 
 
 
3.4.2.5 NGO tracking  
 
 
Tables and Graphs 24: working in different NGOs 
 
 
For 46% of PNGO employees the current employer was the first NGO they had 
worked for. If we compare Table & Graphs: 24 above, we conclude that, 31% 
with contracts of 1 year and less were newcomers: employees who started 
working after having finished their education or having come from other 
sectors. 15% had already been longer than 1 year in the same PNGO. 54% had 
                                               
104 (PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010: "PCBS Migration Survey in the 
Palestinian Territory 2010"., Main Results. 
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moved by force or by chance internally in the NGO sector. 20% of employees 
had worked in one other NGO. 17% already worked in two other NGOs and 
17% of NGO employees had already worked in more than two other NGOs 
(some in up to five). With more working experience in NGOs hopes for “a 
better chance” (better position, long term or permanent contract, higher salary 
etc.) increased. 
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3.4.2.6 NGO tracking by force or by chance105 
Objective and personal reasons to leave or change former NGO 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 25: reasons to leave or change former NGO 
 
                                               
105 The word ‘tracking’ is used in the sense of ‘following a track’ ~ having a goal in mind, 
which you want to reach. 
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Objective and personal reasons to leave former NGO by gender / region: 
(Results quantitative survey)  
 
 
Tables and Graphs 26: reasons to leave former NGO by region / gender 
 
 
The reasons why NGO employees leave (or have to leave) their jobs, were 
clarified in various focus groups and are presented below in regard to: 
(1) the NGO employees, 
(2) the employers – the NGOs who describe why they offer part time contracts, 
short term projects, low paid jobs etc., and  
(3) the donors - whose investment decisions lead to this situation 
 
1. Employees’ reasons   
An NGO employee faces one or more of the following situations (FG in WB & 
GS) 
 
- The contract or project is finished; 
- working conditions are bad; 
- a better opportunity with a long term contract presents itself; 
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- an opportunity with a better position and income providing pension and 
insurance coverage becomes available; 
- an opportunity occurs offering more experience in different fields;  
- the employee finds a different job because he/she does not accept new 
working and payment conditions in the offer of a renewed contract; (typically, 
the current project finishes and another job is offered in a different project but 
with different working conditions) 
- the employee seeks a job offering a better chance of improving personal skills 
and self development;  
- changing for personal reasons “I want to change”; 
- changing because of not accepting the policy of the NGO 
- gender aspect: familial and financial security may allow the employee to 
change (FG >40 years, GS) 
- changing as a result of being harassed at work 
 
2. Employers’ attitudes 
NGO employer’s actions may be considered under the following aspects: 
 
- policy of the organization: to employ more people in the light of the high 
unemployment rate; 
- employers create a competitive atmosphere, “to squeeze more out of people” 
(FGs, female and male < 30 years, GS); 
- employers are sometimes corrupt (employees sign contracts with a salary of 
US$ 450 but receive only US$ 250 without an explanation. Nobody knows 
what happens to the rest of the money. (FGs, GS female and male, <30 years); 
 
 
3. The donors - whose investment decisions lead to this situation 
 
- Employees tend to look for new jobs while working on their current 
project. 
- Employees leave the project before it ends. 
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- The two above mentioned points influence the success of a project. If a 
worker leaves before the project ends, somebody else must take the job 
over. Knowledge, time, and effectiveness are lost – and this influences 
the project outcome negatively. 
 
Legitimate questions arise: If donors wish to support the building up of a 
functioning, viable and independent state, if they want “to take the jobless off 
the streets”, why do they implement short term projects which bring little 
benefit rather than long-term projects to develop sustainability? Why do 
PNGOs accept such conditions? 
 
 
Tracking in an NGO-community 
 
NGO tracking – the fact that contracts are mainly short (without job security) 
creates a community. Moving from one job to another, NGO workers are 
always on the run to find another or a better job. Formal, professional working 
networks as well as informal networks strengthen this development. The 
admission ticket for the community is post secondary education / a university 
degree and/or wasta. Requirements to stay in the NGO community with short 
term contracts are flexibility and further training.  
 
Flexibility and training enable NGO employees to extend their contracts or to 
find another job if they are required to leave their current employment (59%) 
or because they have received a better job offer – “by chance” (33%). 
 
Tables and Graphs: 22 above shows the duration of contracts in the current 
working PNGO. It reveals that 25% of employees stay between 6 and 15 years 
in the same PNGO. Staying long term in an PNGO or practicing NGO-tracking 
by necessity or because of a better opportunity, leads to a better knowledge of 
the aid business and the ability to use this know-how. Having the knowledge 
and ability to operate in the aid sector includes the power to create jobs 
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(sometimes well- paid jobs) in a country with an unemployment rate between 
23% and 28% in a desolate economy. 
 
 
3.4.2.7 Motivation to work in an NGO 
 
Responses by PNGO employees to questions about their motivation for 
working in an NGO can be broadly sorted under the headings economic, 
individual and political background. 
 
Economic (personal) is acknowledged by 27% of PNGO employees because 
of “better income” 13%; “better position” (connected with a better income) 
12% and “better benefits” 2%. 
 
Economic (political): for 25% PNGO employees, the offered work in the 
PNGO was the only job available (WB 17% male, 18% women; GS 30% male, 
34% female) “It is not a question of choice, you take what you get” (FGI Gaza, 
male <30). 
28% of PNGO employees with BC, Diploma and PhD would only find work 
abroad (14%) or in the NGO sector (14%). That indicates that external funded 
NGOs seem to prevent a drain of qualified employees and academic educated 
people. 
 
Individual: 23% of PNGO employees gave their reasons as “wishing to 
contribute something to society” and 18% felt “more independent at work” as 
well as “preferring to work in an open atmosphere between men and women” 
In focus groups, a strong argument was working on a professional level. NGOs 
offer different work experience and the chance to acquire skills through 
training courses and the diversity of work experience. All these factors support 
self-development and provide professional stability. Professional stability 
increases the chance of achieving job security such as long-term contracts or 
permanent contracts not necessarily in the NGO sector. 
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Also mentioned were the importance of the geographical aspect: a working 
place near to home (7%) and the political personal aspect: working in an NGO 
does not imply or require support of the Palestinian Authority.  
 
Individual working goals 
PNGO employees were asked to emphasis their individual goals. Most cited 
“supporting civil society” and “gaining money” in first position with 31%, 
“gaining skills and experiences” in second position and “helping to change 
society” in third position. 
82% said they had achieved their individual goals, 18% suggested that, to 
achieve their goals, the NGOs needed to be improved. This would involve 
changing institutional strategy (35%) and the improvement of political (25%) 
and job security (19%). 
 
 
3.4.2.8 Disadvantages of working in a PNGO 
 
As disadvantages of working in a PNGO was mentioned by 52%: “not having a 
permanent job” (WB 43%, female 44%, male 40%; GS 64%, female 68%,male 
60%) “working in short projects” by 33% (WB 29%, female 30%, male 28%; 
GS 38%, male 41%, female 30%), “not helping the people on the ground” 9% 
(WB 10%, female 11%, male 9%; GS 8%, male 10%, female 7%) and 6% 
others. 
 
“Not having a permanent job” was cited by over half of PNGO employees. 
Comparing the West Bank with Gaza: the Gaza’s PNGO employees with 64%, 
(female 68% and male 60%) reflect the donors’ policy in Gaza of short term 
job creation programs without offering a long-term perspective (FG <30 years, 
male and female). Gaza’s women at 68% suffer from this situation the most 
compared to their West Bank female counterparts at 44%.  
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3.4.2.9 Interim conclusion  
 
In the West Bank, 84% of jobs are full-time and 16% are part-time, in contrast 
with Gaza, where just 47% of jobs are full-time jobs and 53% part-time.  
In the OPTs 37% of PNGO employees have contracts lasting 1 year or less. 
10% have contracts more than 1 year and 13% have a permanent contract. 40% 
of PNGO employees have no written contract at all. Attention must be drawn 
to the fact that for over 43% PNGO employees in Gaza and 38% PNGO 
employees in the West Bank, their PNGO job is their first employment at all. 
40% of PNGO employees in the West Bank and Gaza are working without a 
written contract. Short term contracts in an PNGO may be extended in the 
same PNGO in another project. If this is not possible, employees often practice 
NGO tracking to get another job or to improve their job prospects. If finding 
another job in the NGO community is not possible, unemployment often 
follows. 
 
Looking at wages and terms of employment, we notice a clear stratification of 
PNGO employment in the OPTs. We see a clear hierarchy: at the bottom 
remains a large group of PNGO workers, typically low paid, with no job 
security, having short term contract or no written contract at all; then comes a 
‘middle class’ and finally an elite with long-term contracts or permanent 
contracts and a level of income well above the Palestinian average.  
 
This indicates a neo-liberal transformation in the PNGO sector and shows that 
this sector is not immune to a globalized, neo-liberal restructuring process of 
the work force. This process is bringing about deleterious and precarious 
working conditions. Short term projects (WB 51% and GS 72%), PNGO 
employees are forced to leave their jobs because their contracts end or for other 
reasons, low paid jobs (<500US$ in WB 28%, GS 62%) etc. are increasing 
insecurity which demoralizes PNGO workers who must work in such an 
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environment and renders them too weak or docile to challenge their 
conditions.106 
 
 
3.4.3 Living standard – wages and lifestyle 
 
Basic information about household size, monthly expenditure and monthly 
income.
107
 
In 2010 the average Palestinian household size comprised 5.8 persons (WB: 
5.6 persons, GS: 6.3 persons).108 An average monthly wage amounted to 2.300 
NIS (WB 2.600 NIS, GS 1.500) and for monthly household expenditures 4.700 
NIS were needed in the WB and 3.420 NIS in the Gaza Strip (including 
rent).109 
 
 
3.4.3.1 Monthly salaries of Palestinian NGO employees 
 
Being aware, how sensitive it is to talk about personal income and how 
difficult it would be to get an answer – we didn’t offer in our questionnaire a 
blank space to fill in the monthly income. We took the advice of experienced 
Palestinian researchers and chose the classifications US$ 500 or less, US$ 501-
US$ 1000, US$ 1001-US$ 1500 etc.  
 
                                               
106 I would like to thank Rema Hammami and Linda Tabar for stressing this point in discussion 
with me. 
 
107 Resources for comparative analysis use different currencies: JOD, NIS and USD. In this 
research the currency used is NIS. Only monthly salaries of NGO employees are noted in USD. 
The exchange rate of OANDA on June 30, 2010 has been used throughout: 1 JD = 5.44 NIS, 1 
JD = 1.40 USD, 1USD= 3.88NIS source: http://www.oanda.com/lang/de/currency/converter/ 
 
108 Source PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2011, 366. 
 
109 Source: (PCBS), Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2010: "Labour Force Survey 
(April-June 2010)".Average monthly wage is defined as the average of monthly wages from 
professionals and service. 
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Tables and Graphs 27: monthly wages of PNGO employees 
 
US$ 500=1950 NIS, US$ 1000=3900 NIS, US$ 1500=5850 NIS, US$ 
2000=7800NIS 
 
57.5 % of PNGO employees with an income of US$ 600 (US$ 501-US$ 1000 
and up) earn more than the average Palestinian income. Analyzing the level of 
income, we have to consider the differentiation of a full time versus a part-time 
job and the differential rates of pay for each. The data show full time 
employment of 68% and part time employment of 32% in the occupied 
Palestinian territories. In the West Bank, full time employment is 84%; part 
time employment is 16%. In Gaza, there is a tremendous difference between 
full time employment at 47% and part time employment at 53%. 
 
 
Gender aspect of monthly wages (without full time and part time division) 
 
62% of PNGO employees in Gaza earn US$ 500 or less compared with 28% in 
the West Bank. Women in Gaza have the lowest wages. 73% of them earn an 
income below US$ 500 compared to 48% of their male counterparts. In the 
West Bank, only 34% of women PNGO employees earn below US$ 500 (a 
more detailed discussion will follow in chapter ‘Gendered Working Field’). 
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46% of PNGO employees in the West Bank earn between US$ 500 and US$ 
1000 compared with 28% in Gaza. In the West Bank, male and female are 
represented at 47% and 46%. In Gaza, there is difference of 15% between 
males (36%) and females (21%) who earn between US$501 and US$1000. 
16% in the West Bank earn US$ 1001-US$ 1500 in comparison to 6% of 
PNGO employees in Gaza. Just 3% are women are at this income level in 
comparison to 11% for men. In the West Bank 21% are male and 11.5% 
female.  
 
 
Salaries and satisfaction  
 
Asking PNGO employees if they are satisfied with their salaries, incentives and 
privileges which they get in return for their work: 27% were in agreement (5% 
strongly agreed, 22% agreed), 39% answered with ‘to some extent’ and 34% 
expressed dissatisfaction (10% strongly dissatisfied and 24% dissatisfied). 
 
51% of PNGO employees agreed with the opinion, that people who are 
working in NGOs “are getting good salaries” (45% agreed, 6% strongly 
agreed), 29% don’t know and 21% disagreed (18% disagreed, 3% strongly 
disagreed) If we look at the percentages above, we find the income percentages 
are reflected. 57.5% earn above US$ 500. With US$ 600 and above an NGO 
employees lies above the average Palestinian monthly wage. As we also know 
from above, if one breadwinner is in the family and he or she is earning the 
average Palestinian monthly wage, that means the family is in reality living 
under the relative poverty line (59% have a working partner, WB 68%, GS 
47%).  
 
Although many junior PNGO workers live at or even below the relative 
poverty line, many view their income quite positively, perhaps comparing it 
with those who are in a worse situation. Why is this happening? Our study can 
not provide answers to this question – only further questions. Are people happy 
to have a job at all? Perhaps, even if a wage is average and close to the relative 
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poverty line – it may nonetheless amount to more than in other sectors and can 
help keep the employee’s head above water.  
 
 
3.4.3.2 Interim conclusion 
If we follow PCBS standards for the Palestinian average monthly wage, NGO 
fulltime and part time employees with an income of US$ 600 and more are 
above the Palestinian average of US$ 600 = 2340 NIS. 66% of NGO 
employees are ‘satisfied’ or ‘kind of satisfied’ about their wages. 
 
Note the differences between the West Bank and Gaza in this regard. 
62% of Gazan PNGO employees earn below the national monthly average in 
the OPTs. Female Gazan PNGO employees are losing out specifically, with 
73% earning below US$ 500 a month compared to 34% of female workers in 
the West Bank. Overall, West Bank PNGO workers make more than the 
national salary average. 
 
A striking contradiction: PCBS defines poverty using the ‘deep poverty line’ 
and the ‘relative poverty line’. The poverty definition is based on using the 
budget of a standard household of two adults and four children.  
The deep poverty line is defined for a standard household as having a monthly 
budget below 1870 NIS to cover food, clothing and housing costs. 
The relative poverty line is defined for a standard household as having a 
monthly budget below 2278 NIS to cover food, clothing, housing, health care, 
transport and housekeeping supplies.110 
 
This implies that, if an PNGO employee is the only family breadwinner and 
earns below US$ 500, that family is classified as living below the deep poverty 
                                               
110 MAS, 2011: "Food security Bulletin", MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 
Ramallah, http://www.mas.ps/2012/node/301#.Ulu3nFOa5So., p. 6. 
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line. An PNGO employee earning US$ 600 who is the only breadwinner of the 
family is classified as living under the relative poverty line.111 
 
For comparison see below  
 
 
Tables and Graphs 28: poverty levels in the OPT (Source: MAS (2011))112 
 
 
3.4.3.3 Living standard - Personal evaluation of NGO employees 
 
Of PNGO employees invited to evaluate their own living standard, 51% (WB 
57%, GS 45%) described their living standard as good (very good and good), 
38% (WB 46%, GS 42%) as medium and 10% (WB 9%, GS 13%) as bad (bad 
and very bad). 
This result reflects more or less the 50% of PNGO employees who are above 
the relative poverty line. 
                                               
111 Thanks to Linda Tabar for the discussion to stress the point between income and poverty 
line. 
 
112 It is very interesting to compare the poverty rates of the UN and PCBS. A personal 
impression is, it seems PCBS is routinely trying to underestimate poverty, using a comparative 
methodology. The new methodology introduced from PCBS in 2009 reduced poverty even 
further (see Tables and Graphs 28: poverty levels in the OPTS). The reason can be assumed 
that the UN and also the World Bank are trying to convince donor 'to give money to the poor 
Palestinians'. The PCBS, belonging to the PA, is trying to say that the Palestinians already have 
a functioning economy. 
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Tables and Graphs 29: personal evaluation of living standard 
 
 
PNGO employees in the West Bank are more satisfied with their living 
standard compared with their colleagues in Gaza. In Gaza, 46% of more male 
PNGO employees consider their living standard to be medium than female 
PNGO employees (39%). In Gaza 17% women and 7% men consider they 
have a bad standard of living. In comparison with the West Bank, 12% men 
and 7% women consider they have a bad standard of living. 
 
 
Living standards above the Palestinian average 
Asking PNGO employees if they think working in a PNGO, their living 
standard is above average: 53% agreed, 28% did not know and 19% disagreed. 
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Tables and Graphs 30: living standard above the average? 
 
 
3.4.3.4 Interim conclusion 
Living standard – actual living standard and ‘perceived living standard’ 
 
53% of Palestinian PNGO employees have the impression, based on their work 
in an PNGO, that their living standard is better than it is. Basically the 
definition of living standards includes “a level of material comfort as measured 
by the goods, services, and luxuries available to an individual, group or 
nation.”113 Nowadays living standard is not only measured by international or 
specific country codes, it is also measured by the life-styles of individuals or of 
a group they represent. The expression ‘life-style’ appeared in literature a 
                                               
113 in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Houghtoun Mifflin 
Company, 2010). 
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generation ago and explains social values and behavior such as ways of living, 
attitudes towards education, mobility (traveling), cultural activities such as 
theatre and concerts, clothing, driving certain kinds of cars etc. 
People are often willing to take loans to live a certain life-style. 
 
One should note, however, that people in Palestine take out loans for several 
reasons: building work, wedding, education, cars etc. or because they are out of 
work and need funds to survive. They are not only used to achieve a particular 
life style. 
 
It is notable that 32% of PNGO employees are in the process of paying back 
personal loans and in addition 12% are paying back car loans. This must be 
also seen in the context of the neo-liberal policy of the World Bank and other 
donors, to implement special credit programs all over the OPTs.114 These 
special credit programs make the availability of credit, especially for young 
people much easier than it used to be. Also there have been especially good 
credit conditions for those who wish to invest in a new car in the West Bank. In 
the West Bank, 17% of PNGO employees are paying back car loans in 
comparison to 4 % in Gaza. 
 
It is too early to draw conclusions about any differences between PNGO 
employees in other sectors regarding real and perceived living standards. There 
was no attempt to quantify information on additional benefits from working 
with an NGO. These can include: private use of an NGO car, special 
checkpoint passes, use of a mobile telephone, etc. It is also unclear if such 
privileges differ very much from those available in the private or public 
sectors. It is not yet clear if there an objective or merely a subjective difference 
between NGO employees and employees in other working sectors in this 
regard. 
 
                                               
114 See background and interesting political details in Khalidi, Raja and Samour, Sobhi, 2011: 
"Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian 
National Movement". 
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3.4.4  Controversial settings of voluntary work in the 
 NGO sector: Volunteering in the light of changing times 
 
Before Oslo in 1993, voluntary work was an essential part of PNGOs, 
charitable organizations and popular committees as a meaning of fighting 
Israeli occupation and as contribution to support Palestinian society. Voluntary 
work began with the organization of various political parties. People did this 
work unpaid in addition to their work as pupils, students, employees, 
housewives etc. Because voluntary work was and remains an essential part of 
PNGO-work, the study tries to shed light on the attitudes of PNGO employees 
towards personal voluntary work.  
 
 
3.4.4.1 Who is volunteering? 
 
31% of PNGO employees (40% male, 20% female) do volunteer work in 
addition to their official work, 69% do not. Most of those (31%) who volunteer 
do so as administrators, followed by coordinators 19%, supervisors 13%, 
service employees 12%, office employees 5%, researchers 4% and others 4%. 
59% of PNGO employees who wanted “to contribute something to my society” 
do voluntary work. In addition, 54% of PNGO employees who declared their 
personal goal in working for an PNGO as “feeling independent” do voluntary 
work. 
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3.4.4.2 Volunteering and age 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 31: volunteering in another institution / age groups 
 
 
Some 53% of 46-54 year olds do voluntary work. Participation decreases to 
38% in the age groups 55-74 and 38-45. Some 32% of PNGO employees in the 
age group 17-25 do voluntary work but in the age group 26-37, the 
participation rate drops to 24%. 
 
 
3.4.4.3 Character of voluntary work 
 
Most do their voluntary work in educational and cultural activities (52%). 
Others are involved in training activities (39%) or supporting charitable 
organizations and providing technical assistance (14%).115  
 
Because the categories “training activities” or “providing technical assistance” 
do not specify for whom the work is done, we are careful in drawing 
conclusions here. We can assume that these categories are closely connected 
with an NGO worker’s profession. It can be taken to mean either “it is sharing 
my own personal knowledge with Palestinian society” or “training activities 
and providing technical assistance in NGOs for NGO employees.” This could 
                                               
115 The possibility of answering “being a member of a board of trustees” was excluded 
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also be aimed at improving the PNGO community, improving the network and 
improving personal job prospects. 
 
 
3.4.4.4 Professional Palestinian NGOs and the impact of a generation gap 
 
“Do any of you volunteer in addition to work?”  
“No, now we are employees.” 
 
The results of focus groups, revealed different attitudes towards volunteering 
between the first Intifada generation (38 years or more) and second Intifada 
generation (17-37 years).  
 
First Intifada Generation 
  
In focus groups (WB&GS, female and male, 40 years and above) the topic was 
enthusiastically discussed.  
• Being aware that times have changed; changes in attitudes towards 
voluntary work came with the Oslo agreements and the changing 
policies of external donors.  
• Voluntary work was and remains patriotic and it is done for the people 
in addition to labor and without payment 
• Voluntary work was and remains patriotic in the sense of fighting 
against Israeli occupation 
• Voluntary work was mainly initiated and organized through political 
parties – today it is no longer a party matter. 
• Today, voluntary work is mainly done in the expectation of getting 
something in return: experience and employment.  
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Second Intifada Generation 
 
Generalizations are seldom useful and they sometimes miss the voice of 
minorities in the group described. Voluntary work was rarely considered to be 
unpaid work in and for the benefit of society.  
 
The majority saw voluntary work as a means of: 
• gaining experience, especially immediately after graduation from 
university 
• improving job prospects 
• acquiring experience in different fields which improves one’s chances 
of achieving a long term or permanent contract. Having job security and 
not having to contend with permanent short term contracts means 
stability in life and that implies “having a future” (FGs <30 male and 
female, WB&GS ). 
• providing travel opportunities and money to pay for study. 
 
Contrasting the younger generation with the argument of the older generation, 
the argument of the younger generation was: “today the economic situation is 
much worse”, “the general unemployment rate in the OPTs is higher than back 
in the eighties”, “the political situation is different, even worse”, – these 
statements are reflecting on one hand that most of the younger generation have 
no good contracts and on the other hand, being worried about their future 
comparing to the older generations which is established in their jobs and in 
society. 
 
 
3.4.4.5 Interim conclusion 
 
31% of PNGO employees do voluntary work outside their jobs. A greater 
percentage of the first Intifada Generation see themselves as doing something 
as a part of society for society, which was originated in the historical context of 
PNGOs in fighting against occupation (FG >40 years). They admit, however, 
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that this context has changed. Following the argument of a changed context, 
some questions need to be raised, especially set against the background of how 
Islamic oriented organizations and NGOs include voluntary work in their self 
image: 
What does the act of volunteering consist of? Is it a self-legitimating form of 
self-justification? Has it become depoliticized; is it merely civic in nature, 
stripped of broader national-political significance? Is it a way of vicariously 
reliving the principles of the first Intifada which the NGOs were partially 
responsible for destroying? Could it be that NGO workers are attempting here 
to resist the broader transformations that have taken place and to uphold ideals 
such as sacrifice, voluntarism, and national responsibility?  
 
Comparing voluntary work between religious and secular, Islamic orientated 
organizations and NGOs might reveal that people have different philosophies 
and concepts of themselves and of society; but this will be touched upon only 
shortly in this paper. Nevertheless, we should bear in mind that nobody has to 
do voluntary work as a contribution to society and age is irrelevant in this 
respect.  
 
Sara Roy writes in her new book Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza. Engaging 
the Islamist Social Sector, about islamist social institutions and their attitude to 
voluntary work and comes to the conclusion: Islamist Social Institutions (ISI) 
base their self understanding on Islam as a comprehensive system including 
material, spiritual, societal, individual, political and personal matters in life. By 
building up a continuous framework for powerless and excluded people and 
also giving them the possibility of participation, individuals become 
empowered. The approach is simple: if you or your child is taking part in a 
program – you are at the same time also a volunteer in the organization. This 
implies that the organization gets supported with your manpower according to 
your skills and at the same time, you as an individual person are elevated in a 
context where understanding and appreciation of human beings is based on 
common cultural values.  
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“indeed, the elements of choice and participation were important parts 
in an ongoing effort among ISIs to (re)-create a sense of the ordinary in 
an environment – characterized by Israeli occupation and PNA control 
– that was anything but. In this sense, I believe, many ISIs implicitly 
understood that what unites people is far more powerful than what 
divides them. This meant focusing on people’s everyday concerns by 
embedding programs in local norms and understandings.”116 
Voluntary work is seen as being a part of a functioning society where people 
give and take for themselves and as part of the community. 
 
It is generally assumed, and it has been noted in the literature that the majority 
of western funded PNGOs have lost ground compared with Islamic NGOs. The 
environment characterized by Israeli occupation – which dominates the daily 
lives of most of the people – and the reality that attempts to build up state 
structures in an ongoing occupation are extremely difficult if not doomed to 
failure (see Salam Fayyad, Ending the occupation, establishing the state, 
program of the thirteenth government, August 2009 ). Even a territory with 
“independent state structures” remains under occupation – a marionette 
controlled by the occupiers. A minority, certain elites, might profit from this 
situation: business elites, the PA-elite, the academic-elite and the NGO elite. 
All these enjoy privileges that are not available to the average Palestinian.  
 
The majority of voluntary work in international funded NGOs should be seen 
in a neo-liberal context – voluntary work is the chance for future employees to 
enter “the first job market”. Sometimes, prospective NGO-employees go 
through seemingly endless volunteering experiences. This explains why the 
answer to our question “do any of you volunteer in addition to work?” was 
“No, now we are an employee.” (FG WB < 30 years). The concept of voluntary 
work as social and political activism, as seen through the eyes of the first 
Intifada generation needs to be considered in different socio-political contexts. 
 
                                               
116 Roy, Sara, 2011: Hamas and Civil Society in Gaza. Engaging The Islamist Social Sector, 
172. 
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PNGO employees do not form an entirely homogeneous group. The study 
shows interesting contradictions and revealingly different orientations. The aid 
business is not a uni-directional process, and those who work in this sector are 
not merely actors consumed with finding work and maintaining a middle class 
existence. NGO employees are on the one hand being pushed – on the other 
hand they pull in different directions. Under different circumstances, people 
might choose to act in very different ways. NGO employees are required to 
adapt to the current political situation in Palestine and to the Palestinian labor 
market. Some PNGOs and PNGO employees resist neoliberal ideology and 
create alternatives while others adapt themselves to it.  
 
 
3.4.5 Types of Palestinian NGO employees 
 
PNGO employees who remain a long time in the PNGO sector are able, 
through international networking to work abroad. In the study research, PNGO 
employees who have left the country, either for experience of living abroad or 
for a better position, are not included.  
 
PNGO employees who remain for the long term or have permanent jobs enjoy 
better chances of careers and of achieving executive positions compared with 
persons with short term contracts and earning below US$ 500. The majority of 
PNGO employees are confronted with short term contracts (1year or less) 
because PNGO work is mainly project-based. Projects by definition are limited 
in time. ‘Short term contracts’ can be found in all different age categories and 
also at all level of career status. However, one can succeed in winning one 
project after another. This means that a skillful player is able to remain in 
employment through means of successive engagements but the contracts 
themselves remain limited in time.  
 
PNGO employees offer a differentiated picture depending on:  
Working conditions, contract level: short term employees, long term 
employees/permanent employees, project-based employees, income 
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We characterize the NGO community as follows:  
 
The characteristics of precariat, aspiring middle class and NGO-elite can be 
found in (1) different age categories and (2) at different levels of career status. 
 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 32: types of PNGO employees 
 
 
3.4.5.1  Precariat (casual workers, insecure and exploited) 
Young Urban and professional – and being among the precarious 
 
This group is young (between 17 and 37 years), urban (76.5%) and 
professional (90% have a higher education and 41% have undertaken further 
training courses / improving skills). But this does not guarantee good jobs in 
the labor market. Often it means being low paid (under the Palestinian average, 
close to the poverty line), having a short term contract or no written contract at 
all.  
The ‘Precariat’ are PNGO employees who take virtually any job on offer, 
because they have no freedom to choose the sector in which they want to earn a 
living. 14% (WB 12%, female 15%, male 9%; GS 17%, female 17%, male 
17%) stated that the NGO sector is the only possibility to find work apart from 
finding work abroad (14%, WB 13%, male 17%, female 11%: GS 15%, male 
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17%, female 13%). Others stated, in a desolate economic situation and high 
unemployment “It is not a question of choice, you take what you get” (FGs 
Gaza, male <30). 
 
 
3.4.5.2  Aspiring middle class - 
Young, urban and professionals – as NGO careerists 
30% can be characterized as ‘young careerists’  
 
Young careerists or the aspiring middle class (30%) have the chance to find a 
better job in the NGO sector and generally enjoy a better career status, a higher 
salary and long term contracts (WB 40%, male 38%, female 38%; GS 24%, 
male 31%, female 17%) of NGO employees. They have achieved a middle 
class lifestyle or are aspiring to it, i.e. through debt, status markers, and as 
mentioned above they have more job security than those on a 1-2 year contract.  
 
 
3.4.5.3  NGO elite 
NGO careerists or NGO actors 
 
In the Palestinian NGO elite we have on one hand PNGO careerists and on the 
other hand PNGO-actors. PNGO-actors come mainly from the generation of 
the First Intifada which set up the PNGOs. They have the most privileges and 
retain progressive self images and maybe even progressive values despite the 
stratification and realities inside the PNGOs. 
 
Verified through quantitative research young careerists are in the sense of 
Hanafi and Tabar a part of the professionalized elite, which has undergone a 
shift at the level of language, categories, discourse, projects and interventions 
in Palestinian society. They became somewhat detached from the national 
movement and became shaped by donors’ concepts of power, knowledge and 
discipline.  
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For a young careerist, personal and economical advantage matters, ‘gaining 
money”, “and gaining skills and experiences”, “self-development”. 
“Supporting civil society” becomes a vehicle for the realization of one’s own 
interests. “Supporting civil society” is often taken to mean using society as a 
target in need of instruction. And a commonly-heard approach is “all problems 
can be solved” by undertaking social engineering work. In these kinds of 
interventions a process of individualization is embedded and a collective 
agency is undermined. As a consequence, the national movement, the struggle 
against colonialism and against gender domination is weakened.117  
 
 
PNGO actors 
 
These are NGO employees, mostly from the First Intifada generation who 
continue to engage in voluntary work outside their jobs ‘to support Palestinian 
society’, or have taken up such work again. As described above, before Oslo in 
1993, voluntary work was an essential part of the activities of PNGOs, 
charitable organizations and popular committees as a means of fighting against 
Israeli occupation and / or as an effort to support Palestinian society. This 
analysis has to been seen in the context of the history of Palestinian NGOs and 
their withdrawal from the grass roots movements. We need to consider the 
impact of institutionalization and professionalization and their consequences in 
changing the self perceptions of PNGOs.  
 
This part of the PNGO elite went through this institutionalization process and 
often actively supported it. Now well established in society – and now 
survivors of a more political generation in the PNGO sector. They stand out 
among other NGO employees, with a radically different background of past 
political activism and ideas. As stated in FGs, (female and male above 40 
                                               
117
 See also existing literature of Kuttab, Eileen, 2008: "Palestinian Women's Organizations: 
Global Cooption and Local Contradiction"., Jad, Islah, 2004:"The "NGOization" of the Arab 
Women's Movement", in: Institute of Women's Studies, Birzeit University. They have analyzed 
‘institutionalization’ and ‘professionalization’ in this context. 
 
  129 
years) “times have changed.” This group also accepts this fact: “Our generation 
believed in voluntary concepts, community serving, civil society, democracy 
and human rights. Meanwhile there is a generation now, which looks at the 
issue from financial and job aspects only.”  
 
The landscape of PNGOs is divided. Some PNGOs resist the ideology of neo-
liberalism and developed or are developing alternatives to break out of the 
roles imposed on them by international donors. They seek to return to models 
of self- reliance. Others, (for example in the agriculture sector, or ‘Stop the 
wall’, ‘Badil’, etc.) clearly work to advocate Palestinian national rights, and 
struggle against Israeli colonial and apartheid oppression.  
 
In general, the goal of the most PNGOs today is not to change Israeli politics of 
apartheid and to stop the continuing Israeli occupation of the West Bank, 
Jerusalem and the blockade of the Gaza Strip. The majorities of NGOs are no 
longer political actors, and take no part of a liberation struggle. They are 
“political actors” alongside the PA in the sense of building up state 
structures.118 
Transforming itself from a broad grass-roots movement into a group of 
professionals, this cadre, which once took a leading role in the political class, 
dissolved itself through individualization with the consequences of de-
politicization, de-radicalization and demobilization of a formerly powerful 
political opposition. 
 
                                               
118 See also introduction, page 14 in: World Bank and Bisan Center for Resarch and 
Development, 2006: "The role and performance of Palestinian NGOs in Health, Education and 
Agriculture". 
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3.5  NGO sector – a female gendered working field? 
 
As we know from other studies, the gender gap in education is closing at all 
levels. Women and men have reached parity, but this improvement has not 
reached the formal labor market yet. Women’s participation in the formal labor 
market in Palestine is at 16% one of the lowest in the region and in the 
world.119  
 
The study shows that the participation of female employees in the PNGO 
sector stands at 57.5% (WB 58%, GS 56%) compared with male employees at 
42.5% (WB 42%, GS 44%).120 Having their very first job, women in Gaza are 
better represented at 48%, compared to women in the West Bank at 41%.  
 
 
3.5.1 Women –presence in the Palestinian NGO working sector by age 
 
Women dominate in the age groups 17-25 years (female 65%, male 35%), 26-
37 years (female 60%, male 40%) and 38-45 years (female 55%, male 45%). 
Men dominate in the age group 46-55 years (male 58%, female 42%) and 55-
74 years (male 73%, female 27%). 
 
                                               
119 It has been steadily rising since 1995 at 11.2%, 2002 at 10.4% and 2008 at 16%. 
 
120 Also compare with the study of MAS, 2007: Mapping Palestinian Non-Governmental 
Organizations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 43.: 54.8% female and 45.2% male. 
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3.5.2 Female and the aspect of job distribution: 
 
Being female or male does not demonstrate any effect on whether the 
employee has a full-time or a part-time job. It does, however affect an 
employee’s chances of getting a higher position such as that of administrator. 
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 33: type of work: male/female 
 
 
37% of men have a job as an administrator compared to 27% of women.121 
This result conforms to the results of a recent World Bank study which 
estimates that women in the service sector tend to hold lower-status jobs.122  
 
20% (WB 24%, GS 13%) of office employees work in NGOs. The rate in the 
West Bank is 11% higher than in Gaza. In the West Bank, being an office 
employee is a domain for women (30% female, 17% male), in Gaza the 
percentage is nearly equal (14% female, 13% male). This result can be 
explained by the higher unemployment rate in Gaza and by the fact that Gazan 
                                               
121 In our questionnaire was offered: administrator, office employee, trainer/supervisor, 
services, coordinator, researcher, others/specify. Employees didn’t use “others/ specify” for 
differentiation for jobs in higher level. According to an average job description, an 
administrator is a person with responsibilities in different matters. 
 
122 World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank 
and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse". 
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men are forced to take any job on offer, even if secretarial employment is 
generally considered suitable only for women. Being aware that PNGOs which 
focus on women are represented in the study at 40% and also that female 
employment in NGOs stands at 57.5%, the administrator category, with 37% of 
posts held by men as against 27% by women demonstrates no gender equality.  
 
 
3.5.3 Female and higher education
123
  
 
Our research shows that the PNGO sector is a working sector for highly 
educated, young women.  
 
Women’s participation in the labor force is concentrated both “at the top end of 
the scale – professionals, technical staff and clerks (service sector)” – but also 
“toward the lower end of the scale – namely un-skilled agriculture.” 124 An 
entry requirement for women into the service sector is a high level of 
education, and as shown in numerous studies, women without a university 
education in the OPTs have a much harder time getting access to the labor 
force at all.125 At the same time, the lack of growth of job opportunities in the 
economy as a whole means that very many women (especially young 
university graduates) are unable to access work in the service sector – thus 
women with a university education also make up the largest number of 
unemployed women in both West Bank and Gaza. In the past, women would 
enter the labor force then, after a few years, drop out because of domestic 
responsibilities and thus create an opening for new entrants into the labor force. 
With the decline in the economic situation, however, married women are 
staying in the labor force rather than dropping out. Female graduates are 
                                               
123 See in World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the West 
Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse"., “General assumption” and 
“Basic facts about women and labor market trends in the  WB and GS” 
 
124 World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank 
and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse", 22. 
 
125 World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank 
and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse", 23. 
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entering the labor force but many of the jobs they seek are taken.126 It can also 
be observed that the trend of married women to work is increasing. This trend 
is taking place not only because more women want to work. One major reason 
is the massive rise in male unemployment since 2006. 
 
Summing up the results of our study: the public sector is occupied by women 
who have been in the labor market; for some time; so the NGO sector could be 
seen as a chance for young women with a higher education to enter the labor 
market. This goes along with the findings of a UN study on women in Gaza 
which shows that, for many young new labor entrants in Gaza, the PNGO 
sector is easier to access than the public sector, even though some of the young 
women would prefer to work in the latter. 
The policy of donors of seeking to empower women seems to be a positive sign 
for women in the labor market.127 The attempt to empower women for higher 
and therefore better paid positions has made little or no progress. 
Overall, it looks like that a different role understanding, a shifting in traditional 
gender roles is touching the ground. We may be witnessing the beginning of a 
shift in perceptions gender roles. Increasingly, today investment in education 
for girls is seen as bringing either a good job or a “good marriage”.128  
 
It should be noted that the positive aspect of more opportunities for women to 
find work in the labor market, society, family structures remain mostly 
traditional and patriarchal gender norms remain salient. These mandate that 
only women are responsible for house and children. Working outside the house 
thus places a double burden on women. The participation of women in the 
                                               
126 See Hammami, Rema and Syam, Amal, 2011: "Who answers to Gazan women? An 
economic security and rights research"., chapter 6.1. and chapter 6.5. 
 
127 Because male unemployment rates have remained fairly constant since 1996, the women's 
unemployment rate rose until 2007, see in World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: 
Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic 
Collapse".,table at p. 29. 
 
128 See also World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: Searching for Livelihoods in the 
West Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic Collapse".executive summary p. XIV 
and in Hammami, Rema and Syam, Amal, 2011: "Who answers to Gazan women? An 
economic security and rights research"., chapter 6.1. Background, p.4, p. 68-69 and also 
chapter 10, p.2. 
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labor market does mark a degree of empowerment but it is not per se an 
indication of a progressive change from patriarchal norms and gender based 
inequalities 
 
 
3.5.4 Women and marital status 
 
In Palestinian society, 92% of women marry between 15 and 29 years, 29% of 
women before their eighteenth birthday.129 The median age at first marriage for 
females is 19.5 years and for males 25.4 years.130 The fertility rate in 2010 was 
4.2 births (WB: 3.8, GS 4.9 births). The average household size of a Palestinian 
family is 5.8 persons (WB 5.5 and GS 6.4 persons) in 2010.  
 
59% of NGO employees are married, 35% of NGO employees have the marital 
status single, 1% are separated, 2%  divorced and 1%  widowed (2% did not 
answer the question). For further analysis, a recode was done in ‘not married’ 
and ‘ever married’, see Tables and Graphs: 33, below.  
 
 
                                               
129 MAS, 2010: "Economic and Social Monitor 22". 
 
130 PASSIA, PASSIA DIARY 2012, 385. 
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Tables and Graphs 34: marital status, ever married / single / gender 
 
 
64% of NGO employees are or have been married (male 75%, female 56%) 
and 36% of NGO employees are not married (male 25%, female 44%).  
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Gender: age groups and single status 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 35: marital status single / age groups / gender 
 
 
In our study we do have slightly different age categories as mentioned above, 
17-25 years and not 15-29 years. Comparisons have to be drawn carefully. If 
we compare these categories we find in the age group female 17-25 years, 69% 
are single and 31% married. In the age group female 26-37 years 40% are 
single and 60% are married. In the age group 38-45 years: 23%, aged 46-55 
years: 13% and aged 55-74 years: 25% are single. This indicates a trend to later 
marriage among female PNGO employees and / or the free choice to remain 
single. Highly educated women with working experience are often above the 
average marriage age and this fact can also be a “burden” for women in 
Palestinian society who are seeking a partner. Studies done at an international 
level show in general, men tend to marry younger women and that their 
spouses have a lower level of academic achievements. Results of our focus 
groups also show that young men (WB&GS 30 years and below) prefer their 
sisters and wives to work in the public and private sectors, because NGO work 
for women is still not considered respectable in all sections of society. The 
study Who answers to Gazan women? An economic security and rights 
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research. (2010) were talking with women in women focus group interviews 
and found out, that women working in NGOs are getting more attractive on the 
‘marriage market’, because they earn good wages in a desolate economical 
situation.  
 
 
3.5.5 Women's salaries (full time and part time together) 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 27: Monthly wage  
 
 
62% of PNGO employees in Gaza earn less than US$ 500 in comparison to 
28% in the West Bank. Women in Gaza have the lowest wages. 73% of them 
earn less than US$500 compared to 48% of their male counterparts. In the 
West Bank only 34% of female NGO employees earn below US$ 500. 
Concerning women in Gaza: according to the report “Checkpoints and 
Barriers” young educated women with a university degree show much more 
flexibility and openness “to a variety of poorly paid and temporary work 
opportunities (especially within the aid economy) than young men with higher 
education. Normative gender roles probably account for this; young men still 
perceive themselves as principle breadwinners with aspirations for jobs in the 
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formal labor market. They are therefore more selective about the type of work 
that best meets their needs. Young women’s employment, on the other hand, is 
still perceived as secondary, and ultimately not their primary gender role. This 
illustrates how deeper patriarchal gender norms remain salient, even when they 
are being challenged by new needs and patterns of behavior. Thus, women’s 
participation in the labor market does not automatically result in changing 
deeply seated gender-based inequalities.”131 
 
 
3.5.6 Gender and aspects of being not successful in Palestinian NGO 
work 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 36: gender / factors hindering their success of NGO work  
 
Gender aspect:  
‘There was not enough time’. Women find that the time allotted to projects or 
the time they are given to complete their own tasks within them is too short. In 
the West Bank, 20%, in Gaza 35.5% of women complained about “not having 
                                               
131 See Hammami, Rema and Syam, Amal, 2011: "Who answers to Gazan women? An 
economic security and rights research", 71. 
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enough time”. This is notably higher than their male counterparts (WB 14%, 
GS 7%). 
The high percentage among Gaza’s women could be explained by the fact that 
women in Gaza have to contend with more part time or short term contracts 
than women in the West Bank. 26% of male employees in Gaza judged the 
policy of donors to be ‘negative’; 20% of their female colleagues in the West 
Bank agreed. 
The argument that institutional policy or strategy has a negative impact is 
mentioned by 37% of women in the West Bank compared to Gaza males at 
18.5%; their male counterparts in the West Bank followed with 17%. Finally, 
10% of women in Gaza shared this negative evaluation.  
 
West Bank women think too a much higher degree, that the institution policy is 
working against changes comparing to Gaza’s women. More (19%) of Gazan 
women think that the ‘political situation hinders’ compared to their female 
counterparts in the West Bank at 11%. Male NGO employees in the West Bank 
(38%) and Gaza (41%) do not show this big gap. 
 
These surprisingly different results raise some questions about the different life 
situations of women in the West Bank and Gaza. Gaza’s women state with 
19% the negative impact of the ‘political situation’, living under occupation, 
living under siege, living under international boycott, still coping with the 
internal struggle of Fatah and Hamas – ending in an ongoing humanitarian 
crises and with a high unemployment rate. To survive in such conditions means 
‘having a job’, taking any job you can find to be the breadwinner or to support 
your family. ‘Institutional strategy’ and other aspects of life at work are in this 
respect irrelevant because what counts is to survive on a daily basis. Criticizing 
‘ideological structures’ would be a luxury and may undermine the privileged 
status of having a job.  
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3.5.7 Interim conclusion 
 
The PNGO sector can be seen as a working sector for highly educated 
unmarried women. As we heard in focus groups, women and men can act 
‘normally’ and egalitarian relations inside the PNGO world are possible (see 
more details in the next chapter). This open working atmosphere could be an 
important reason why the NGO working sector is more attractive for unmarried 
women. The fact that donors force the implementation of gender equality is 
important in this regard. 
 
The study shows clearly that, even if women's presence in the PNGO sector is 
higher than their male counterparts, they are under represented in higher 
positions and over represented in the West Bank in PNGO office work. They 
remain at the bottom end of the wage scale especially in Gaza. 
 
Female participation decreases with age. The question arises: are older women, 
supported by the income of a partner, choosing to reject the double burden of 
work and family/household or are they being denied access to senior positions 
in a patriarchal system? Another important influence on women’s' lives is 
increasing access to maternity leave. Many take full advantage of this and often 
drop out of the labor market, taking up a job again later. Such career 
interruptions are evident world wide. Some possible causes for women's under-
representation at higher professional levels have been outlined here but further 
research with focus groups is needed to shed more light on this phenomenon. 
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3.6 Palestinian NGOs as political actor  
 
PNGOs – What kind of background do they have? How do they evaluate 
themselves? 
 
3.6.1  Historical background  
 
 
Tables and Graphs 37: relation: organization/party 
 
 
Palestinian NGOs have encountered several turning points in their long history. 
What all the different periods have in common is that Palestinian NGOs are 
operating in an occupied country. Charitable societies began to emerge during 
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the British mandate. They can be described as elite based, representing the 
values and politics of the older ruling classes, with a welfare approach. In the 
late 'seventies (Camp David Accords 1977) and the beginning of the 'eighties 
(Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 1982) the national movement was growing again 
in the light of widespread resistance to the situation engendered by the accords 
and to implementation of the accords and to the occupation of Israel. PNGOs 
which had their roots in political mass mobilization, flourished. Theoretically 
and actively organized by the left, in the beginning PNGOs were originally 
cross fractionally organized but after a view years became increasingly 
factional. For those PNGOs which were allied with the PLO, their factional 
stance brought with it financial support. At this time, PNGOs began to engage 
with foreign donors. In the beginning of the first Intifada in 1987, the voluntary 
and non-factional spirit of the late 'seventies returned. With the experience and 
skills of PNGOs, popular committees were able to form the successful frontline 
of the uprising.  
 
Rema Hammami reinterprets the “nostalgic view” of this period, describing a 
backlash of grass roots movements in 1990 when the process of 
institutionalization re-emerged and PNGOs turned into professionally based 
and foreign funded institutions again. A positive aspect of foreign funding was 
that it made PNGOs independent of political factions; a negative aspect 
remains the dominant agenda of the donors. 
 
Meanwhile a growing demobilization of the population became evident as, 
through the PLO stance towards the Gulf war, it lost much of its financial 
support mainly from Arab countries and thus for all the institution that 
depended on them – political factions and mass organizations. 
 
After Oslo, foreign donor money increased with NGOs acting and promoting 
themselves as “the civil society”. ‘Professionalized NGOs’ headed by figures 
from leftist factions became a vocal lobby for criticism of the PA. In the mid-
nineties the World Bank created a Palestinian NGO trust fund, a project that 
clearly had a major impact on the way the PA began to perceive NGOs as 
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competitors that it had either to co-opt, control or undermine.132 By the end of 
1997, the PA became more and more intrusive into NGO affairs and took 
repressive measures. The NGO law which was signed 2000 remained, 
however, a victory for the NGOs. 133 
 
In retrospect, the shift in the political economy of western aid to the PNGOs 
marked a major external intervention. This produced new internal forms of 
social and political capital but therefore also new forms of exclusion. 
Charitable societies and popular committees lost out and were subsequently 
marginalized. As a consequence Hanafi & Tabar analyze the entry of local 
NGOs into aid channels as “a process of new subject formation as well as 
changes in the conceptual and institutional foundations of NGOs.”134 This 
includes adopting neo-liberal development paradigms and international 
standards – which were not developed in the local context. These new 
paradigms influence the local context, however, and, along with the emerging 
relations between state and society. Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour analyze the 
role of NGOs in their article ‘Neoliberalism as Liberation’ very clearly: “From 
the start of the Oslo process, they were among the first sectors in Palestinian 
society to embrace neoliberalism, and they have acted as an important conduit 
of its development paradigm. [55]. Moreover, the "development industry" (and 
its local partners) have acted – wittingly or otherwise – as an "anti-politics 
machine" that has depoliticized Palestinian society, sustained the occupation, 
and initiated a long march toward neoliberal hegemony that has found its most 
elaborate manifestation to date in the PA statehood plan [56].”135 The majority 
                                               
132 See Hammami, Rema, 1996:"Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo. From NGO Politics to Social 
Movements?", in: Beinin, Joel and Stein, Rebecca L. (ed), 1996: The Struggle for 
Sovereignity: Palestine and Israel, 1993-2005, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 87-88. 
 
133 This short historical review is mainly based on the article Hammami, Rema, 
1996:"Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo. From NGO Politics to Social Movements?", in: Beinin, 
Joel and Stein, Rebecca L. (ed), 84-93.  
 
134 Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The 
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 26. 
 
135 Khalidi, Raja and Samour, Sobhi, 2011: "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood 
Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement", 7-8. 
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of NGOs incorporate these neo-liberal development goals in order to survive in 
the competition for donor money. Some PNGOs do not resist this neo-liberal 
agenda at all and some do. 
 
 
NGOs today 
 
If PNGO employees think politically about NGOs and their work within them 
and if they consider that they and their leaders should play a political role in 
society, questions for further research present themselves. These concerns: 
 
1. Opinion about democratic structures inside PNGOs 
2. Opinion about the role of PNGOs in society  
3. Personal political background 
 
 
3.6.2 Democratic structures inside Palestinian NGOs 
 
80% of PNGO employees attest their PNGO affords basic democratic 
structures within the limits of a working hierarchy, in words such as: “we can 
freely express our opinions, but we cannot change the policy of the 
organization.” (FGs GS male <30 years with “good contracts”). Working 
atmosphere and working relations are predominantly characterized as open 
between employees. In FGs 30 years and below we may read between the lines 
that, along with good working relations there appear a natural, aggressive form 
of competition - regarding who gets the next job in the following project. 
Women above 40 in Gaza mentioned this tension exists not only between 
young people (30 years and below) but also between the generations. Those in 
the generation of 40 years and above, fear losing their jobs to younger 
employees.  
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3.6.3 Gender aspect: the world of work versus the world of society 
 
Focus group results in the West Bank and Gaza, female and male 30 years and 
below mentioned very strongly, specially in Gaza that women and men can act 
“normally”. This implies that the sexes work together on an equal footing. This 
situation starts on entering the PNGO offices and stops on leaving. Women 
found their working conditions in this respect to be “an excellent fraternity 
relationship. Let me tell you why. Because your boss imposes on you a 
relationship of integrity, understanding and equality.” 
 
Men: “Our relationship with our female colleagues is excellent.” 
 
“There are limitations that rule the relationship. Outside the organization, 
there is a great caution because the community does not have mercy.” 
 
“The relationship is over at the entrance of the organization.” 
 
 
3.6.4 Institutions versus programs in support of political liberation 
 
We asked two questions concerning PNGOs and their possible impact on 
supporting Palestinian society in its effort to free itself from occupation. First, 
we asked PNGO employees if the PNGO itself, and if their working in an 
PNGO supports the process  of liberation from occupation 37% disagree, 32% 
don’t know and 31% agree. 
In comparison, we asked if the programs and services offered by PNGOs 
positively support the liberation process. 52% agreed, 28% did not know and 
20% disagreed.  
Gaza and the West Bank show differences between male and female in the 
results concerning training programs and courses. More Gaza male’s feel that 
they do, followed by females in both the West Bank and Gaza. West Bank 
males at 54% are least likely to feel that training programs contribute to the 
liberation process (Tables and Graphs 37, below). 
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Tables and Graphs 38: do PNGO training programs promote the liberation process? 
 
 
An interesting division appears between the overall role of the institution in the 
liberation process. The institution itself is rather limited regarding a 
revolutionary orientation but the activities of the NGO, educational in 
particular, do make a contribution. 52% believe that education in the form of 
training courses, and courses offered to bolster empowerment and 
consciousness building support the liberation process. This result agrees with 
the 61% (22% don’t know, 17% disagree) of NGO employees who believe that 
programs and workshops impact positively in building a more democratic 
society. The variation between West Bank and Gaza is not statistically 
significant. 
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3.6.5 Palestinian NGOs – playing a political role 
Opinion of Palestinian NGO employees about whether Palestinian NGOs 
are political  
 
In all focus groups, the direct question, whether PNGOs should play a political 
role or should be a political actor in Palestinian society was answered with yes 
or no, a position “I don’t know” didn’t appear. 
 
Why and how they are playing a political role: 
 
• Yes – they do play a political role. 
− PNGOs represent Palestine internationally  
− PNGOs are part of the community – working in and for the community 
helping to change unequal laws affecting women, handicapped people, 
etc. in the direction of equality. 
− PNGOs are the counterpart of the government – and through acting on 
the ground, are necessarily political 
 
• No – they should not play a political role because: 
− PNGOs should be neutral 
− PNGOs should be social and not political 
• PNGOs, in playing a political role, weaken political parties. 
• Some PNGOs have lost their connections to their social base. Their 
interest is principally to stay in existence. 
 
 
3.6.6 Opinion of Palestinian NGO employees about Palestinian NGOs' 
playing a political role in the public sphere 
 
 
PNGO employees / leaders role in public sphere (quantitative results) 
• 53 %: PNGO leader should play a political role 
• 70 %:  PNGO leaders' being represented in parliament is positive 
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• 53 %:  PNGO leaders are in a better position to reach important 
political or  parliamentary positions 
• 52 %:  PNGO leaders have succeeded in this respect 
 
In general, PNGO employees think PNGO leaders have through their 
profession and working experience a better understanding of the reality of 
Palestinian people and a better understanding and practice of democracy than 
the average Palestinian. 
There is a difference in this argumentation between region, female and male. 
West Bank male 38%, female 23%; Gaza female 32%, male 26%. More West 
Bank males and Gaza females feel PNGO leaders have an important role to 
play in public sphere while Gaza males and West Bank females support this 
notion less. 
 
It seems that the attitude towards being a member of parliament is seen more 
positively (70%) than merely being politically active (53%). 
 
 
3.6.7 Palestinian NGO employees – and their membership in political 
parties 
 
Being a member of a political party is not as common as it was during the 
1970s and 1980s. 37% of PNGO employees have been members of a political 
party. Strongest is the age group 46-55 years at 48%, with a decreasing trend 
38-45 years 47%, 26-37 years 38% and 17-25 years at 28%. Currently 24% 
(WB 23%, GS 24%) are members of a political party and 16% (WB 15%, GS 
18%) are active members.  
37% of PNGO employees still feel loyalty to a party which they have left.136 
 
 
                                               
136 All these questions were valid with 991 answers, 59 missing. 
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Tables and Graphs 39: affiliation to political party 
 
 
This graphic shows the distribution of 24% PNGO employees in different 
political parties. 76% PNGO employees which are not members in a political 
party are not included.  
 
PNGO employees were also asked for their opinion, if they were currently not 
members of a political party, which party would best work for liberation of 
Palestine.137 53% stated ‘no party’, 25% Fatah, 7% PFLP and 6% Hamas.   
9% other parties (parties which received support from fewer than 5% of 
respondents).  
In the West Bank the National Initiative party was better represented than in 
Gaza.  
 
 
                                               
137 888 answers are valid (85%), 162 are missing (15%) 
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Tables and Graphs 40: party most likely to achieve liberation of Palestine 
500 answers to a question concerning participants’ votes in the 2006 election 
were valid but another 550 answers were missing. We must therefore interpret 
the result with caution.  
 
 
 
Tables and Graphs 41: vote in the election 2006 
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3.6.8 Palestinian NGO employees and their votes in the 2006 election 
The strongest vote with 55% of PNGO employees was for Fatah followed by 
the PFLP at 12% then Hamas at 11%. 7% of PNGO employees voted for the 
People’s Party, 6% for the National Initiative and 9% for others. 
 
According to polls from the Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research 
(15 February 2006) taking care about education: “support for Fatah drops 
considerably among the illiterates (34%) and increases to 43% among those 
with 6-12 years of education, and remains at the same level (42%) among those 
with two or more years of college education. Support for Hamas increases 
among the illiterates (50%), and drops to 43% among those with 6-12 years of 
education, and remains at the same level (44%) among those with two or more 
years of college education.”138  
 
Concerning profession, “support for Fatah decreases considerably among 
merchants (28%) and increases among professionals (36%), laborers (37%), 
housewives (42%), students and employees (44% each) and the unemployed 
(51%). Support for Fatah is weaker among employees in the private sector 
(37%) compared to employees in the public sector (43%). 
 
Concerning working sectors, support for Hamas increases among merchants 
(49%) followed by housewives (47%), professionals (46%), laborers (45%), 
students (42%) and employees and the unemployed (41% each).” Support for 
Hamas is slightly higher in the private sector (45%) than in the public sector 
(42%). 
Support for the other parties’ increases among merchants (23%), laborers and 
professionals (18% each), students and employees (14% each), housewives 
(12%) and the unemployed (9%). Support is slightly higher in the private 
sector (18%) compared to 16% in the public sector. 
                                               
138 Results of Palestine Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH, 2006: Results of 
PSR's PLC Exit Poll: On the Election Day for the Second Palestinian Parliament: A Crumpling 
Peace Process and a Greater Public Complaint of Corruption and Chaos Gave Hamas a limited 
Advantage Over Fateh, but Fragmentation within Fateh Turned that Advantage into an 
Overwhelming Victory, Ramallah: Palestine Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH, 
4. 
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3.6.9 Support for a two-state or one-state solution 
 
56% of PNGO employees support a 2-state solution, 44% don’t. 
There is no significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza. 
A One-State solution (one state for Palestinians and Israelis) is supported by 
12% while 88% reject this. There is no significant difference in this regard 
between the West Bank and Gaza. 
 
 
3.6.10 Interim Conclusion 
 
Two aspects should be borne in mind regarding this chapter. With the pre-
selection of western funded PNGOs in this study, Islamic NGOs and their 
employees were not in focus and secondly the environment is affected 
internally by the Palestinian Authority and externally by donors.  
Considering votes in the election of 2006 (55% Fatah, 12% PFLP, 11% Hamas, 
7% Peoples Party, 6% National Initiative and 9% others) and also looking at 
political affiliations of party members (53% Fatah, 18% PFLP, 11% Peoples 
Party, 7% National Initiative, 4% Hamas, 7% others) I assess how far donor 
organizations were able to influence the NGO employees' political 
environment and therefore promote the political aims of the NGOs. Western-
initiated restrictions regarding the dispensation of aid were introduced in 2002 
and were intensified in 2006 when Hamas won the election). USAID and the 
EC implemented new, tougher guidelines which affected both the PNGOs 
themselves and their employees. Typical was a requirement to sign a document 
condemning terror (the so-called Anti-Terror-Clause) as a pre-condition for 
employment or for the receipt of donor funding.139  
In Palestine today, talking about politics or political opinions demands 
considerable trust in advance. “Paper is patience, why should I trust 
interviewers from a research team I don’t know? Is there any reason to be 
honest?"  
                                               
139 See more details in: Ma'an Development Center, http://www.maan-
ctr.org/pdfs/FSReport/PositionPaper.pdf and see also ATC: United Nations Information 
System  on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL). 
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Why were only half of the PNGO employees willing to answer a question 
about their political affiliation? Is it because politics are a private matter 
nowadays, or are employees afraid to be open about this subject?  
 
A majority of 76% of PNGO employees have no formal political affiliation. Of 
these, those who answered the question ‘which party is best for a progressive 
liberation process’ a majority of 53% answered: no party; followed by Fatah 
25%, PFLP 7% and Hamas 6% and 9% others. 
 
24% of PNGO employees are party members. Fatah is dominant at 53%, PFLP 
18%, Peoples Party 11%, National Initiative 7%, Hamas 4% and others 9%. 
Concerning party membership, there are no comparative studies with other 
working sectors.  
If, however, we look at the study of voting patterns by education, profession 
and work sector done by Khalil Shikaki of the Palestine Center for Policy and 
Survey Research concerning the election for the second Palestinian Parliament 
in 2006, the NGO employees which were willing to answer are following the 
trend of 2006.140 
 
                                               
140 Palestine Center for POLICY and SURVEY RESEARCH, "Results of PSR's PLC Exit 
Poll," http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2006/exitplcfulljan06e.html. 
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4. Chapter 4 
 The role of Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations who 
 consider themselves agents of social change: the social and political 
 consequences of PNGOs' engaging in neoliberal reality, especially 
 regarding the working conditions of their employees 
 
Chapter four concludes my thesis with a compact data analysis – What changes 
occur in society, when influential social actors such as NGOs receive political 
rents – in six steps. The analysis builds on the literature debate in chapter one 
and two and the data and interim conclusions in chapter three. 
The following analysis will not go deeply into the literature debate again. The 
focus lies on arguments 1-6 and I will demonstrate how these arguments rely 
on one other. If, for the understanding of a following argument, a more detailed 
review of the literature debate is desirable it will be shortly recapitulated 
otherwise it will merely be mentioned in argumentation. If data from other 
sources are used, this will be noted. 
 
External political rents which have been paid to social actors in Palestine for 
some twenty years, have affected the ways in which these actors work and their 
understanding of their work. I will summarize a number of major disruptions to 
Palestinian political life and therefore to civil society before I highlight my 
proposed mechanism of six steps and describe the impact of these actors on 
Palestinian society and how they influence power structures in Palestine.  
 
 
4.1 The political reality of Palestinians 
 
Lisa Taraki (2006) reminds us “… that the political reality must be the basic 
backdrop against which we examine the routines of life and the small drama of 
daily life; it thus foregrounds the salient aspects of the enduring and ubiquitous 
conditions of war, near-war, threat, instability, and vulnerability experienced 
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by the Palestinians for over five decades, especially in the latest phase of the 
confrontation with the Israeli occupation.”141 
 
Some aspects of political reality, starting in the early 20th century, which 
caused major disruptions for Palestinians, are: 
- the Balfour Declaration of 1917. After the end of the Ottoman Empire 
1918, the British civil administration started in 1920 and de facto 
British rule which was transformed by the League of Nations into a 
British mandate in 1922. After the Second World War, the United 
Nations reauthorized the mandate. 
- the revolt and general strike of 1936-39 by Palestinians against Jewish 
immigration and the British mandate, with the consequence that leading 
figures of the strike were expelled from Palestine by the British 
mandate authorities;  
- the establishment of the State of Israel on 14th May, 1948 followed in 
the same year by the first Arab-Israeli war. Before, during and after this 
war 531 villages and 11 districts were emptied of their Arab 
populations and many destroyed. Some 750,000 Palestinian refugees 
were thus created.142 
- the June War of 1967 leading to the occupation of East Jerusalem, the 
West Bank and Gaza; 
- the First Intifada in 1987, followed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 
and, in 1993, the Oslo Accords with the Paris Protocols 1995 which 
stipulated binding agreements for the parties; following an interim 
period, the final status was meant to be agreed; 
- the Second Intifada in 2000 led to the re-occupation by Israel of 
 Palestinian towns (Areas A) which lasted from June 2002 till April 
 2003. In 2003 Israel started building a separation wall which severely 
                                               
141 Taraki, Lisa (ed.), 2006: Living Palestine, Family Survival, Resistance and Mobility under 
Occupation. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press., see introduction XII 
 
142 See Morris, Benny, 1987: The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-1949, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; and see  Pappe, Ilan, 2007: Die ethnische Säuberung 
Palästinas, Wallerstein: Zweitausendeins, 11. 
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restricts Palestinian movement and economic activity. When the separation 
wall is completed, "some 85% of the route will run inside the West Bank, 
rather than along the Green Line, isolating 9, 4% of the West Bank, including 
East Jerusalem." 143 
 
The Oslo Accords, as mentioned above, were meant to finalize a negotiated 
agreement between Israelis and the Palestinians within 5 years. Decisions 
about political issues such as Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the 
rights of Palestinian refugees, international borders and security arrangements 
should have been solved during this interim period. By 2013 the agreed 
negotiation period had passed without any decisions concerning these issues 
having been made. Palestinians are now confronted with a fragmentation of the 
OPTs into Gaza, East-Jerusalem and the West-Bank. The West Bank is itself 
divided into Areas A (under full civil and security control of the PA), B (the 
PA nominally maintains civil order while security is controlled by Israel) and C 
(covering over 60% of the West Bank, which remains under the complete civil 
and security control of Israel).  
During the entire Oslo period, Israel has never stopped building new 
settlements. Israeli settlements are cover more than 69% of the land (of which 
42% represents settlements while a further 27% of the West Bank has been 
declared by Israel to be public or “state land” and allocated for settlements). 
Since 1993 the number of Israeli settlers has nearly doubled (from 262.500 in 
1993 to over 520.00 in 2013). As B'Tselem reported in 2013: "There are an 
estimated 515,000 settlers in the West Bank. This figure is derived from two 
sources: According to data provided by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), at the end of 2011, 325,456 people were living in the settlements of the 
West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem. According to data provided by the 
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, the population of the Israeli 
neighborhoods in East Jerusalem numbered 190,423 people at the end of 
                                               
143 United Nations Office for the Coordinationof Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian 
territories, 2012: "The humanitarian impact of the barrier", East Jerusalem: OCHA, 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_barrier_factsheet_july_2012_english.pdf. 
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2011."144 Palestinians in East Jerusalem have to struggle to live in their own 
homes.  
In 2013, OXFAM reported: "Approximately 540 internal checkpoints, 
roadblocks and other physical obstacles impede Palestinian movement within 
the West Bank; these obstacles exist primarily to protect settlers and facilitate 
their movement, including to and from Israel."145  
Since 2006, Gaza has been under siege, largely cut off from the outside world. 
The fast-growing population has nowhere to go. Unemployment has soared 
from less than 10% at the beginning of the 1990s to over 32% in 2013. Israel 
controls all Palestinian water resources.  As Israel's per capita GNP is booms, 
in Palestine it is stagnating.146  
 
Following Lisa Taraki (2006) I want to stress here that Palestinian society, as 
any other society, continues to react towards external and internal challenges, 
as well as to political, economical and cultural change. PNGOs are one part of 
this dynamic. In general, different interest groups of society, which evolve 
continuously, react to these challenges, according to their roles and positions 
within society. 
                                               
144 B'Tselem, 2013: "Statistics on Settlements and Settler Population", 
http://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics. 
145 Concerning Israeli illegal settlements and illegal outposts in the West Bank see Annex ? and 
OXFAM, 2013: "20 Facts: 20 years since the Oslo Accords": OXFAM, 
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oxfam-oslo-20-factsheet.pdf and  
United Nations  Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian 
territory, 2012: "Humanitarian Atlas. December 2012", East Jerusalem, 
http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/OCHA_HumanitarianAtlas.pdf; 36.; see also World Bank, 2013: 
"West Bank and Gaza. Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy". 
 
146 Concerning data about water facts, see: World Bank, 2009: "Assessment of restrictions on 
Palestinian water sector development", 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/WaterRestrictionsRepor
t18Apr2009.pdf. and  
Amnesty International, 2009: "Troubled Waters – Palestinians denied fair access to water ", 
https://www.amnesty.org/ar/library/asset/MDE15/027/2009/ar/e9892ce4-7fba-469b-96b9-
c1e1084c620c/mde150272009en.pdf. 
concerning economic development: B'Tselem, By Hook and By Crook, 2010: "Israeli 
Settlement Policy in the West Bank", 
http://www.btselem.org/publications/summaries/201007_by_hook_and_by_crook. 
further details see Messerschmid, Clemens, 2011:  
The last drop - The water crisis in Palestine (Publication in Arabic), Ramallah: Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation, Ramallah.  
More information about the water memorandum, singed in December 2013 see 
http://electronicintifada.net/content/how-historic-israel-jordan-water-deal-leaves-palestinians-
high-and-dry/13139 
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Many influential social groups, such as former actors in grassroots movements 
or in political parties, are today active in NGOs. When such groups reconsider 
and change their positions profoundly, they move away from the former spirit 
of collectivism and from their previous overt opposition to the continuing 
occupation and to the PA. When these actors accept the donors’ neo-liberal 
narratives of a “post-conflict zone” and actively implement the donor agenda, 
this has the effect of weakening the resolve of society as a whole to bring about 
meaningful political change and to oppose the occupation effectively. The 
process of transformation in PNGOs can be clarified in six steps as follows.147  
                                               
147 I am talking about the majority of external funded PNGOs. There are some external funded 
PNGOs on the ground they do resist the neoliberal agenda and their self understanding is 
political. 
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4.2 Structural changes in the PNGO sector and their impact on 
Palestinian  society 
 
4.2.1. With professionalization and institutionalization of PNGOs in the 
1980s and 1990s, especially after the Oslo Accords, PNGO employees have 
become new clients of the North.  
 
Basic facts on the ground that allowed this development to took place: 
 
4.2.1.1  PNGOs and the leader generation of PNGOs, starting in the 
pre-Oslo period, formed a new, politically active educated elite 
Political circumstances on the national level as well as on the international 
level shape individuals’ biographies as well as the life-history of a whole 
generation – their movements, their ideas and their goals. This process is, of 
course, ongoing. When considering PNGO employees, we must take into 
account their heterogeneity and differences in their political biographies.148 
It is important to acknowledge that the "older generation" in this study (where 
the classification “older” starts at 40 years) constituted the founder generation 
for many PNGOs. The political background of people in this group was 
established in grassroots movements or political parties and in their 
participation in the First Intifada. If they have an affiliation with political 
parties this dates from that period and often continues to this day.149 
Former leaders of leftist organizations, as well as many activists of the First 
Intifada, benefited from a university education. They earned their degrees 
abroad or in Palestinian universities in very difficult political circumstances 
and under the extreme conditions of an oppressive Israeli military rule. This 
group can be considered a new educated elite. Their higher education 
                                               
148 What the majority of the NGO-generations since the 1980s have in common is their 
educational background of higher education, with college or universities degrees. 
 
149 See short review about NGOs and their history in the introduction part and also the fact, 
that 37% have been members of a party, 24% are currently members of a party and the 
members who left their party are still loyal to the party they have left.  
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contributed to the institutionalization and professionalization of PNGOs and of 
PNGO work. 
 
It is important also to acknowledge that many of this generation reached 
adulthood in the political atmosphere of the 1970s and 1980s, an atmosphere 
affected by international solidarity towards liberation movements. In this 
period, as already mentioned in chapter two, solidarity groups and political 
organizations from the North started to co-finance PNGO-work on a solidarity 
basis. This solidarity-based international financial support from various 
organizations was generally paid to Non-Governmental Organizations and not 
to political parties. Therefore, if people - with or without party affiliation - 
wanted to raise money internationally for the struggle against occupation, one 
possible route was to establish a PNGO. Party members, when becoming active 
as founders of new PNGOs, would in general not emphasize a connection with 
their party, simply in order not to risk losing potential funding. 
Founding a PNGO could also mean independence from parties, their money 
and their hierarchical structures. A new PNGO could be used to develop 
alternatives and to strengthen those structures of civil society which the 
founder considered desirable. At the same time, through being member of 
parties, many founders were familiar with the structures and with the 
functioning of institutions and with professional work in general.  
 
For example, there are many PNGO founders who have a similar biography 
like Mustafa Barghouti. His political development can therefore serve as a 
paradigmatic example. 
Mustafa Barghouti was born in 1954 in Jerusalem and educated in the former 
Soviet Union as a physician. Later on, he earned a degree in management at 
Stanford University where he is a Sloan fellow. As a member of the 
Communist Party of Palestine (after the end of the Soviet Union, it changed its 
name to “the Palestinian People’s Party” or PPP) he established the “Union of 
Palestinian Medical Relief Committees” (UPMRC) in 1979 and later on the 
‘Health, Development, Information and Policy Institute” (HDIP) which is a 
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Palestinian think tank, mainly focusing on community health and supporting a 
network of PNGOs in health care.  
In 2001 he was one of the founders of “Grassroots International Protection for 
Palestinian People” (GIPP). This is an organization which struggles via 
peaceful resistance of international civilians for the protection of the 
Palestinian people. In 2002 he left the Palestinian Peoples Party and 
established, together with Haidar Abdel Shafi, Ibrahim Dakkak und Edward 
Said, the “Palestinian National Initiative” (Al Mubadara Al Wataniyya Al 
Filistiniyya – 	
ا !
ا ةرد%
ا ) 
After Arafat’s death, Barghouti ran in the presidential elections and achieved a 
surprise second place with an unexpected 19.8% of the votes. For the 
legislative elections in January 2006, he was the top candidate of the list 
“Independent Palestine”, also known as the “Third Way” – a coalition of 
independents and PNGO members. Their goal in the 2006 elections was to 
oppose the authoritarianism and corruption associated with the Fatah party and 
to reject the fundamentalism of Hamas. The list got 2.7% of the votes and 
Barghouti and one other member were elected as deputies to the Palestinian 
Legislative Council. During the Palestinian “Unity Government” from March 
until June 2007, he was minister of information. He refused to continue to be 
minister under the interim government of Salam Fayyad, because he 
considered this government to be illegal.  
 
Typical in his biography is his higher education, his activism in a political 
party, his founding of a PNGO in the late 70s, his taking part in the First and 
Second Intifada and later his linkage with politics at the parliamentary level. 
What is not representative for the  majority of PNGO founders of his age is that 
he left his party in 2002 and created another party, the “Palestinian National 
Initiative” (Al Mubadara Al Wataniyya Al Filistiniyya – !
ا ةرد%
ا 
	
ا ), together with Haidar Abdel Shafi, Ibrahim Dakkak und Edward 
Said which ran for election. That Mustafa Baghouti was able to garner good 
results has to do with the fact that the majority of PNGO employees (and I 
assume some other parts of the population) believed, "that NGO leaders are 
more close to the reality of the daily life than politicians". My quantitative 
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study shows that NGO employees think that NGO leaders have a better 
understanding of the reality of Palestinian life and practise democracy more 
than the average Palestinian. Also 53% of PNGO employees maintain that 
PNGO leaders should play a political role. 70% think that a representation in 
parliament of PNGO leaders is desirable and 53% believe that PNGO leaders 
have better chances for important political or parliamentary positions. 52% of 
PNGO employees are of the opinion that PNGO leaders have succeeded in this 
respect, see detailed chapter 3.6.6. 
 
Meanwhile PNGOs such as the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief 
Committees (UPMRC) and the Health, Development, Information and Policy 
Institute (HDIP) form part of national and international networks and have 
therefore become well known worldwide. Mustafa Barghouti is invited as a 
Palestinian speaker on an international level. 
Already in the 1970s a well-respected activist (with the General Union of 
Palestinian Students), Hanan Ashrawi developed in a similar direction. Having 
served on the Intifada Political Committee and as spokesperson for the 
Palestinian delegation to the Oslo peace process, she remains politically active, 
being both a member of parliament and of the PLO's executive committee, 
responsible for culture and information. Following her early activism, she also 
branched out into the NGO sector, founding the PNGO MIFTAH – The 
Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue & Democracy.  
 
 
4.2.1.2  Changing Donor reality: Distribution of aid in the pre-Oslo period 
to PNGOs and, following the Oslo Accords, to the new Palestinian 
Authority and to PNGOs  
 
In the post-Oslo years, donors started to transfer rents to the newly established 
PA which, based on the Oslo Accords, acted as and was institutionalized as a 
quasi-government. Until 1993, governments of donor countries had no 
government on the Palestinian side to which they could transfer political rents. 
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Before the Oslo Accords, donors could therefore officially distribute aid only 
to international NGOs, PNGOs and political parties in the OPTSs. 
 
The paradigm shift of the donors in the late 80s, i.e. from social development 
to mainly economical development and the start at the same time co-financing 
civil society autonomously parallel to target governments in order to support 
developmental goals under neoliberal order (see introduction 1.1) and the 
designation of the Occupied Territories as a "post conflict zone" resulted in 
profound changes in the funding of PNGOs: only if existing PNGOs and 
newly-created PNGOs adjusted to the agendas which donors proposed for a 
"post conflict zone" they could continue to receive funds. These new donor 
agendas are driven by the donors understanding of “good governance”, i.e. 
democratization, accountability, transparency, efficiency, fairness, 
participation, and ownership, as well as their support of human rights, women’s 
rights, peace education, civil education, advocacy functions and knowledge 
production. “Resistance” as well as any activities against the ongoing 
occupation did not qualify for donor funding. Donors emphasized the necessity 
of "building up a society". This was meant to lay the basis for a state with 
functioning institutions and a neoliberal socio-economic agenda.150 
Rema Hammami (1995) demonstrates how external donor funding played a 
key role in the transformation of parts of the mass movement into an NGO 
community and argues that it has to be understood as a complex process. 
“Foreign funding began to impose a new set of constraints on organizations, 
however. Long-term planning, measurable objectives, and reporting 
requirements meant that organizations had to develop skills in the language, 
                                               
150 understanding of good governance: World Bank, 1989: "Involving Nongovernmental 
Organizations in World Bank-Supported Activities".; World Bank, 1992: "Governance and 
development", Washington, DC: Bank, World.; World Bank, 1992: "Report of the ad hoc 
committee on Board Procedures", Washington, DC: Bank, World. And see also the analyzes of 
Woods, Ngaire, 2000: "The challenge of good governance for the IMF and the World Bank 
themselves", World Development 2000, 28, (No. 5), 823-841. 
And see also Ghandour-Demiri, Nada, 2012: "Disciplining Popular Resistance: The Case of 
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories", University of Bristol, 
http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.559472, p.198-221. 
see also Ghandour-Demiri, Nada, 2012: "Disciplining Popular Resistance: The Case of Israel 
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories," p.198-221. 
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culture, and methodologies of NGO projects. Most importantly, NGO activities 
had to meet developmental, rather than political, goals." 151 
 
 
4.2.1.3  Rent-seeking 
Receiving political rents engenders rent-seeking behavior and therefore 
dependency. This develops into a vicious circle which is hard to break, when 
there is on the one hand an elite – an aspiring middle class which profits in 
terms of wages, contracts and social status — and on the other hand, a precariat 
which is too weak and docile to resist. 
In the PNGO sector after Oslo, the increasing flow of foreign donor money led 
also to adroit PNGOs who succeeded in obtaining money from different donors 
for the same project. This led to a feeling among the donor community that 
they were being hoodwinked. In reaction they centralized their aid and sent it 
to a central Palestinian address, i.e. to the Palestinian Authority, hoping that aid 
money would thus be treated more carefully and distributed more fairly. 
As a reaction to these changes in the flows of donor money, two trends can be 
observed: First, PNGOs who ran out of money appealed to international NGOs 
for financial support, and second, donor states soon realized that the Palestinian 
Authority was not distributing aid in the balanced way they had hoped for. 
Meanwhile donors found ways to balance their aid spent between PA and 
PNGOs through developing different mechanisms of control.152 
 
One major question however, remains to be answered: How did PNGOs start 
enter in the first way the slippery slope to neoliberalism? I would agree with 
the analyses of Bebbington et al, that Neoliberalism adopted the terminology of 
NGOs (see chapter 2.1). I also like to stress that the majority of NGOs missed 
                                               
151 Hammami, Rema, 1996:"Palestinian NGOs Since Oslo. From NGO Politics to Social 
Movements?", in: Beinin, Joel and Stein, Rebecca L. (ed),86. This development can also be 
witnessed, both in South America and in Asia (which parts of Asia) 
 
152 This was discussed with Helga Baumgarten in a personal talk. See for example  the details 
of EU funding and their special funding mechanism since the Oslo Accords; as described in Le 
More, Anne, 2008: International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo. Political guilt, 
wasted money.  
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the opportunity to oppose the neoliberal economic and political mainstream, 
with its transformation of societal and economical changes into 'individual 
problems' which can logically only be solved on an individual level. This, 
however, is undermining a collective agency which used to be the approach of 
PNGOs before Oslo (see also 3.4.5.3). 
 
 
4.2.1.4  Political economy and the impact on PNGOs 
 
In retrospect, the shift in the political economy of Western aid to the PNGOs – 
analyzed and understood by Rema Hammami, Lisa Taraki, and Benoit 
Challand as a major external intervention and considered in my thesis as a 
paradigm change documented in chapter two and argued above in 4.2.1.2 – 
resulted in the development of new forms of internal social and political 
capital, coupled, however, with new forms of exclusion. Other civil society 
organizations such as charitable societies and grassroots organizations lost out 
and were subsequently marginalized. Other PNGOs had to compete for donor 
money in order to survive.153  
The current data in chapter three (3.3 -3.4.5) clearly demonstrate that PNGO 
employees can be characterized as clients of northern donors. The relationship 
between donors and aid recipients we witness demonstrates a classic patron-
client relationship (see chapter two, excursus). 
In this context, I can usefully employ Max Weber’s concept of the Idealtypus 
(ideal type) to distinguish between varying aspects of reality more clearly. This 
helps us to better understand the implications of empirically-described facts for 
society.154  
With my new data it is possible to sketch the characteristics of an ideal type of 
employee (or “client”) in externally-financed PNGOs determined by: 
                                               
153 see chapter 2.2.1 
154 Die „Objektivität“ sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis. In: Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, Bd. 19 = N.F. 1 (1904), S.22–87; source: 
http://de.wikisource.org/wiki/Max_Weber: 
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• age (71% of PNGO employees are between 17 and 37 years),  
• higher education,  
• professional skills, (90% have a higher education degree and 43% are 
improving skills and taking further courses),  
• motivation for working in the PNGO sector  
• involvement in voluntary work (to enter the NGO community it needs 
volunteer experience in several institutions or NGOs),  
• a tendency to use wasta to land a job (42%)  
• practicing NGO - Tracking to find a better job.  
• On the private level a tendency to later marriage, and to have fewer 
children who are more likely to be educated in private schools (a trend 
in the West Bank). 
 
 
 Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) and Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour 
(2011) describe the consequences of this process very convincingly. Sari 
Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) analyze the entry of local PNGOs into aid 
channels as “a process of new subject formation as well as changes in the 
conceptual and institutional foundations of NGOs.”155 This new development 
strongly influences the local context, especially concerning the developing 
relations between state and society. Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour (2011), in 
turn, analyze the role of NGOs in their article ‘Neoliberalism as Liberation’ 
very critically: “From the start of the Oslo process, they were among the first 
sectors in Palestinian society to embrace neoliberalism, and they have acted as 
an important conduit of its development paradigm. Moreover, the 
“development industry” and its local partners have acted – wittingly or 
otherwise – as an “anti-politics machine” that has depoliticized Palestinian 
society, sustained the occupation, and initiated a long march toward neoliberal 
hegemony that has found its most elaborate manifestation to date in the PA 
                                               
155 Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The 
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite, 26. 
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statehood plan.”156 (PA statehood plan refers to the plan presented by the PA 
and Salam Fayyad in August 2009 with the express aim of reaching a 
Palestinian state by mid 2012) 
The majority of externally funded PNGOs integrate these neo-liberal 
development goals into their agenda, explicitly or at least implicitly. Still, a 
differentiation is necessary. Some PNGOs (not the majority) develop critical 
capacities, especially if they are led by people from the left with a long 
tradition of resistance and organization and participation in resistance 
activities. Examples of such organizations include Badil, the Alternative 
Information Center (a joint Palestinian/Israeli NGO), and Stop the Wall.157  
 
The questions why and how some PNGOs resist and why others do not, why 
some accept the donors' programs or why they do not insist on their own 
programs, what kind of personal, ideological or socio-economical reasons play 
a role, was not a subject in my empirical study. I cannot therefore provide any 
data on this issue and I am not in a position to enter into this debate without 
new material.  
 
My fieldwork shows that the majority of PNGO employees, independent of 
their age, are college or university graduates. The institutionalization and 
professionalization of PNGOs has led PNGO leaders and administrators to 
require certain skills from their employees. In order to represent the 
organization as well as for the purpose of international networking, PNGOs are 
forced to hire people who are fluent in foreign languages and who are familiar 
                                               
156 Khalidi, Raja and Samour, Sobhi, 2011: "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood 
Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement"., chapter: Force, consent 
and persuasion. 
Statehood plan see: "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, establishing the State. Program of the 
Thirteenth Government, August 2009," (Ramallah: Palestinian National Authority, 2009): 
http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/palestine/shared/documents/Ending%20Occupation%20Es
tablishing%20the%20State%20%28August%202009%29.pdf, 
 
157 For example Badil which receives financial support from the same donors as other PNGOs. 
Their main focus is on the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. Their argumentation in 
fundraising is based on UN resolutions and international law. 
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with the key concepts and the jargon of funding. Such skills are obtained 
mostly through higher education and/or special training.158 
As shown above, the possibility of establishing a PNGO with external donor 
money also set in motion a process which made some PNGO leaders 
financially independent of the political parties to which they owed and perhaps 
continue to owe allegiance. This process led to a new situation in which it was 
no longer a political party but rather the donor agenda which determined how 
money was to be spent.  
Still, one benefit must clearly be pointed out, namely that external donor 
money has provided and provides regular salaries for people in need of jobs. 
This is obviously very important in an economy with very high unemployment 
rates and no significant development 159 
In general, however, the economic situation has not improved for the majority 
of the Palestinian population, and unemployment rates remain extremely high. 
Officially it is estimated in WB&GS 2013 at 23 to 30%, unofficially it is 
thought to have been around 40% in 2012.160 In such an environment, 
obviously working for an NGO, accepting the donor agenda and thus acquiring 
donor aid brings with it a job with a regular salary. 
                                               
158 For example; Birzeit University offers a BA in Public Administration with courses for 
example in NGO management, and in fundraising for NGOs. 
 
159 OXFAM is relying in its publication on a report from B'Tselem, July 2010: "While Israel's 
GNP has boomed, Palestine's has stagnated. Since 1993 the Israeli GNP per capita has risen 
from around US$ 13,800 to over US$ 32,000 today. At the same time the West Bank GNP per 
capita has gone from roughly US$ 2,000 in the early 1990s to US$ 2,093 today, while Gaza's 
has decreased from US$ 1,230 to US$ 1,074. If productivity had continued to increase at pre-
Oslo levels, real GNP per capita in the OPTS would be an estimated 88 percent higher." 
B'Tselem, By Hook and By Crook, 2010: "Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank"., 
and see also the critical article of  Khalidi, Raja, 2012: "After the Arab Spring in Palestine: 
Contesting the Neoliberal Narrative of Palestinian National Liberation". 
 
160 For more details and especially the differences between West Bank and Gaza, see chapter 
3.2. and Tables and Graphs: 1. Also see the regular reports from MAS, latest: MAS, 2013: 
"Economic and Social Monitor 34", MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 
Ramallah, http://www.mas.ps/2012/sites/default/files/executive%20summary_3.pdf . as well as 
Krieger, Helmut, 2013: Investitionen in den Konflikt. Die politische Ökonomie 
palästinensischer Staatsformierung, Wien: Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and 
Cooperation. 
 
  169 
Following the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, the Israeli military re-
occupied the major West Bank cities in Zone A (June 2002), without making 
any provision for the care of the occupied Palestinian population. Donor 
nations were forced to change development aid into short term humanitarian 
aid to support the basic needs of Palestinians.161 Even after Zone A was 
returned in April 2003 to partial Palestinian control, the Palestinian economy 
has not fully recovered and it is hard to expect it will under the dictate of the 
Protocol of Economic Relations (known as Paris Protocols) and the ongoing 
occupation by Israel.162  
 
 
4.2.2 A part of these clients expands the middle class and constitutes a 
 new elite.  
 The PNGO elite versus the PNGO precariat 
 
In argument one I was able to show that with professionalization and 
institutionalization of PNGOs in 1980s and 1990s, especially after Oslo, PNGO 
employees have become new clients of the North. My data document PNGO 
and PNGO employees as clients, the existence of a PNGO community, as well 
                                               
161 Also see Le More, Anne, 2006: "The Dilemma of Aid to the PA after the Victory of 
Hamas", International Spectator 2006, 41, (No. 2 April - June 2006), 87-95.; Challand, Benoit, 
2006: "Civil Society, Autonomy and Donors: International Aid to Palestinian NGOs", 
European University Institute, Florence. as Challand, Benoit, 2009: Palestinian Civil Society: 
Foreign donors and the power to promote and exclude. 
 
According to international law and the Geneva conventions, an occupying power is responsible 
for the wellbeing of an occupied population. Israel denies that occupation is covered by the 4th 
Geneva Convention. 
 
162 See the Paris Protocol which is an Appendix to the Oslo Accords, signed between Israel 
and the PLO on April 29, 1994.: http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Document/ParisPro.pdf 
and the critical analyzes of the UNCTAD (Unitid Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development) in 2011 about the outcome, "Rebuilding the Palestinian Tradable Goods Sector: 
Towards Economic Recovery and State Formation" 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/gdsapp2010d1_en.pdf; as the report of B'Tselem 
(updated September 2012): http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/paris_protocol, see 
also paper presented by Mohammad Mustafa, chairman and chief executive officer, Palestine 
Investment fund, in: United Nations Seminar on Assistance to the Palestinian People, in Rome 
27./2.2013 
http://www.un.org/depts/dpa/qpal/docs/2013Rome/P2%20MR.%20MOHAMMAD%20MUST
AFA%20EN.pdf 
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as structures of PNGO-internal labour hierarchies (chapter three, 3.3- 3.4.5.3). 
The results validate What kind of NGO employee landscape exists in Palestine? 
NGO workers have already been observed and analyzed in the literature as 
middle class, depoliticized and de-radicalized, forming a globalized NGO elite 
- and can characterize different types of PNGO employees. 163 As it validates 
question and hypothesis two: .Do external political rents establish and support 
a “globalized elite”? My new quantitative data can corroborate the thesis of 
Sari Hanafi and Linda Tabar (2005) of an emerging, globalized elite which has 
developed out of the PNGO sector and detached itself from the base of the 
Palestinian population.  
 
Working conditions, contracts and wages in a typical PNGO work-place have 
led to the creation of a PNGO precariat, a PNGO middle class and an PNGO 
elite. It can therefore be argued that the PNGO sector itself sets an PNGO elite 
and an aspiring middle class against an PNGO precariat in a neo-liberally 
restructured working sector (see results in chapter three, 3.4.5) 
 
In the following section, the focus will be on the different types of PNGO 
employees, the PNGO precariat, the PNGO middle class, and PNGO elite. The 
PNGO sector as a neo-liberally restructured working sector will be discussed 
further under argument three. 
                                               
163 See the critical literature of Brynen, Rex, 1995: "The Neopatrimonial Dimension of 
Palestine Politics"., Brynen, Rex, 1996: "Buying Peace? Critical Assessment of International 
Aid to the West Bank and Gaza".; Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International 
NGO's and Local NGO's: The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite., Khalidi, Raja and 
Samour, Sobhi, 2011: "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The Statehood Program and the Remaking 
of the Palestinian National Movement".; Kuttab, Eileen, 2008: "Palestinian Women's 
Organizations: Global Cooption and Local Contradiction".; Hammami, Rema, 1995: "NGOs: 
The Professionalization of Politics".; Nakhleh, Khalil, 2004: The Myth of Palestinian 
Development. Political Aid and Sustainable Deceit.; Nakhleh, Khalil, 2012: Globalized 
Palestine: The National Sell-Out of a Homeland.; Taraki, Lisa, 2008: "Urban Modernity on the 
Periphery. A New Middle Class Reinvents the Palestinian City".; Jad, Islah, 2004:"The 
"NGOization" of the Arab Women's Movement", in: Institute of Women's Studies, Birzeit 
University.; Bahmad, Leyla, 2007: "Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisations caught 
between Reality and Challenges." 
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Basic facts on the ground that allowed this development to took place: 
 
4.2.2.1 Requirements of making a career in a NGO community  
 
To enter the PNGO sector as an employee, PNGO employees go through a 
selection process. There is no difference between the different job offers or, 
subsequently, when a classification is undertaken into precariat, aspiring 
middle class, and elite. The criteria are (mainly) young, respectively high 
educational background with language skills, orientated towards professions 
and education skills and/or wasta. To successfully remain on a long term basis 
(under the short term contract system) in the NGO sector, the determining 
factor is the ability to move around in the community network and a 
willingness to undertake further training. 
Given their work, PNGOs are part of formal international and national 
networks. Informal networks accompany formal networks. The existence of 
mainly short term contracts (without job security) creates a special and 
separated community in the NGO sector. “People know each other,” in their 
community (FGs in WB&GS). This fact, -irrespective of the belonging to 
either the precariat, the middle class or the elite - as in any other sector, makes 
finding a new job easier. Looking for another job in the NGO sector, when “no 
extension of the ongoing contract is possible” (59%) or looking for a working 
place which offers better conditions such as a long-term contract, better 
payment, a pension, insurance etc., is target oriented. The motivation is the 
desire to improve one's personal situation through finding another, better 
working place and job security.  
 
The determining factor for making a career in terms of what kind of working 
position an employee can achieve, i.e. the possibility of being middle class or 
elite, is above all the know-how to raise funds and create jobs. However, we 
should not ignore the role of wasta or of "just having luck", i.e. being in the 
right place at the right time and meeting the right people. 
The use of the terms aspiring middle class and elite is not only confined to 
NGO leaders. Administrators in business, in finance and in project 
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management in PNGOs nowadays have the same knowledge as experience in 
fundraising as NGO directors.  
 
 
4.2.2.2 Types of PNGO employees: PNGO precariat, aspiring middle class     
             and elite 
 
Both the quantitative and the qualitative research show clearly that PNGO 
employees are not a homogeneous group. Here, a clear stratification of PNGO 
employees in West Bank and in Gaza can be observed and this substantiates 
my main research question: What kind of changes occur in society, when 
influential social actors such as Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations 
receive political rents? The study will clarify the influence of Western aid, 
which is transferred to certain PNGOs, not to the PA, and aims to analyze the 
impact on the individual level of NGO employees, but also the more general 
changes taking place in Palestinian society, - in the sense that this Western 
influence leads to a clear stratification of PNGO employees 
PNGO employees offer a differentiated picture depending on working 
conditions, contract level and wages. The following types of PNGO employees 
can be distinguished: 
 
1. Precariat, approximately 60% (casual workers, insecure and 
exploited, duration of working in an PNGOs up to five years, 
monthly wage below 500 US$).  
 
2. Aspiring middle class. approximately 30% (PNGO careerists: 
leading a middle class lifestyle or aspiring to this, i.e. through debt, 
status markers) have more security than those on a one to two year 
contract, they show a duration of work between six-fifteen years 
(25%, including the employment group of working four till five 
years in a PNGO would be 38%), monthly wage above 500 US$ up 
to 1500 US$ (50%).  
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3. PNGO elite, approximately 10% (PNGO careerists and also PNGO 
actors, the generation of the first Intifada who set up the NGOs. 
They have the most privileges (permanent contract 13%, duration of 
work in an PNGO: between sixteen and 35 years, monthly wage 
above 1500 US$) and retain a progressive self image and maybe 
even progressive norms despite the stratification and realities inside 
the NGOs.)164 
 
The borders between the precariat, aspiring middle class and elite are blurred. 
The numbers of 60% precariat, 30% aspiring middle class and 10% elite rely 
mainly on cross tabulation of Table & Graphs 20, 22, 25, 27 in chapter three. 
 
Talking about an elite always implies the question of power. The power tool of 
the PNGO elite is “job creation”. Statistics from MAS show, that 
approximately 10% of jobs are generated in the NGO sector (see for example 
also tables and graphs no. 14 in chapter three. NGO jobs are subsumed under 
"services and other branches"). In this sense, external Western aid creates a 
new interest group in the already existing middle class and concurrently a 
globalized elite, based on higher education and on work in NGOs. 165Apart 
from the elite, the new group of the Palestinian middle class, Western aid also 
creates a PNGO precariat. Pierre Bordieu (1998) developed the theory of the 
precarity in which he described a "new mode of dominance" resulting from 
restructuring of the economy that "forced workers into submission". The term 
precariat is replacing the traditional proletariat and defines a vulnerable and 
mobile labour pool (part-time, contract, seasonal as informal jobs). 
                                               
164 Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The 
Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized Elite., use the term "Palestinian globalized elite" for an 
NGO elite. They characterize them as actors who are informed by global agendas, with a very 
specific positioning in the Middle East peace process. They describe it as an urban elite, since 
donor funding is concentrated in Palestinian cities, with a high level of professionalization 
 
165 See Taraki, Lisa, 2008: "Urban Modernity on the Periphery. A New Middle Class 
Reinvents the Palestinian City". 
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Bourdieu argues that globalization and fragmentation of the labor market 
created a new, generalized and permanent state of insecurity among workers.166 
Guy Standing (2011) in his turn argues that workers in a precarious situation 
now "form a distinct social class with separate conditions and interests from 
other workers."167 Generally speaking, PNGO employees with long term 
contracts or permanent jobs enjoy better career chances and are able to achieve 
executive positions compared with employees with short term contracts and an 
income below US$500.  
 
This is also the result of long-term processes of institutionalization and 
professionalization with a high level of employment stratification in the NGO 
sector.  
The older, founding generation reaps the highest benefits in terms of income, 
job security and having “spare time” to undertake voluntary work outside their 
employment. The aspiring middle class make more money than the rest of the 
population but have more limited job security than the founding generation. 
The last group, the poorly paid precariat, is essentially an exploited labor caste 
– most of them are to be found in Gaza. Obviously the economic logic of 
PNGOs has become increasingly like the logic of any private sector business – 
where there is a growing gap between a small elite of privileged workers with 
full rights and benefits and a growing group of workers, flexible and compliant 
by necessity, with few if any benefits or rights. 
 
 
4.2.2.3 The PNGO elite and the PNGO middle class generate jobs for 
Palestinians. 
 
The ability of elites to generate employment is an important tool to regenerate 
their own jobs and thus to support and perpetuate the NGO middle class and 
                                               
166 Bordieu, Pierre, 1998: Gegenfeuer. Wortmeldungen im Dienste des Widerstandes gegen die 
neoliberale Invasion, Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz GmbH, p. 100. 
 
167 Standing, Guy, 2011: Precariat. The new dangerous class, London: Bloomsbury, see chapter 
one, The Precariat. 
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the NGO elite within the NGOs. This reflects the changing social and political 
ethos of PNGOs, and illustrates how economic dynamics have distanced them 
structurally from their stated goals of social justice and egalitarianism. 
 
 
4.2.3 NGO sector – a neo-liberally restructured working sector 
 
The developments described in argument one and two, make clear that the 
PNGO sector has become a neo-liberally-restructured working sector – just like 
any other sector of the market economy, offering jobs and careers to employees 
as well as services to the public.168  
 
As already mentioned in argument two, a clear hierarchy can be observed: at 
the bottom remains a large group of PNGO workers, typically low paid, with 
no job security, having a short term contract or no written contract at all; then 
comes a ‘middle class’, and finally an elite with long-term or permanent 
contracts and a level of income well above the Palestinian average. This 
indicates a neo-liberal transformation in the PNGO sector and shows that this 
sector is not immune to a globalized, neo-liberal restructuring process of the 
work force. These precarious working conditions push PNGO employees into 
NGO-tracking (see chapter three, 3.4.2.6: NGO tracking by force or by 
chance), mainly because of short term projects (WB 51% and GS 72%). NGO 
employees are forced to leave their jobs because their contracts end or for other 
reasons such as low remuneration (<500US$ in WB 28%, GS 62%). Contracts 
of this kind increase insecurity which demoralizes NGO workers who have to 
work in such an environment (see chapter three, 3.4.2.9 and argument two in 
this chapter). 
 
 
 
                                               
168 See chapter three: 3.4.2, NGO sector: working reality of NGO employees. Also compare 
with literature of Khalidi, Raja and Samour, Sobhi, 2011: "Neoliberalism as Liberation: The 
Statehood Program and the Remaking of the Palestinian National Movement". 
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4.2.3.1  “Neoliberal” Volunteering 
 
Social or political activism through (unsalaried) volunteering is replaced by 
“volunteering” for money or in order to increase the chances of finding a job 
(see chapter three, 3.4.4.). 
So voluntary work, also in internationally-funded NGOs, has to be seen in a 
neo-liberal context. Voluntary work is a chance for future employees to enter 
the job market. Quite often, prospective PNGO-employees go through 
seemingly endless volunteering experiences until they land a job. This explains 
why the answer to the question in the qualitative study “do any of you 
volunteer in addition to work?” was: “No, now we are employees.” (FG WB < 
30 years).  
This new and important result of my data indicates that the concept of 
voluntary work needs to be redefined in a different socio-political context.  
 
 
4.2.3.2  Preventing the bain drain …? 
 
28% of NGO employees with a Diploma, BA, MA, or PhD, stated they could 
find work only in the NGO sector (14%) or abroad (14%). At first sight, this 
appears positive: they are making a living in their home country and are not 
facing unemployment or emigration. So one might conclude that Western aid is 
preventing a wholesale brain drain of people with higher education.  
As the study shows, NGO staff is mainly educated in the humanities or social 
sciences and economics. This raises the following questions:  
 
• Do they find work because they are educated above the 
average in certain fields, or because the public and private sectors 
cannot provide jobs for them?  
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•  Do people decide to study certain specializations, because 
externally-funded NGOs in the country promise a career and a good 
income? 169  
• Do educated people and intellectuals in general prefer such 
work because the professionalization and institutionalization of NGOs 
has created positions associated with status, privilege, international 
exposure and power in society? 
• Do NGO employees really have the chance to emigrate? And 
if so, would they emigrate or would they be ready to take a lower paid 
job locally in a different sector?  
• Do educated people and intellectuals working in PNGOs see 
the possibility of providing a platform for Palestinians (through courses, 
seminars, workshops etc.) to bring about social change?  
 
It is difficult to reach a definite conclusion regarding NGOs’ roles in 
preventing or reducing the brain drain and to answer hypothesis 5: Are 
externally funded NGOs reducing the brain drain of academics by financing 
suitable jobs in the occupied territories? NGOs (international and Palestinian) 
in general offer jobs with good salaries, especially for fresh university 
graduates, comparing to other working sectors. The data will document the 
reason, why people are working in the NGO sector and can show, if the 
possibility of working in a NGO prohibits emigration. 
The study cannot provide any clear answers to these relevant questions. 
 
Some tentative conclusions could be drawn, however, from the data about 
motivation of working in an NGO/PNGO. Some 23% of PNGO employees 
chose the answer "wishing to contribute something to society." This agrees 
with the finding that 52% of PNGO employees believe seminars and 
workshops, (not the NGO per se), help the Palestinian population to improve 
their lives. Also the high percentage of women who work in the PNGO sector – 
                                               
169 Compare also with executive summary in World Bank, 2010: "Checkpoint and Barriers: 
Searching for Livelihoods in the West Bank and Gaza. Gender Dimensions of Economic 
Collapse"., p. xiv. 
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many of whom are unmarried –and the perceived egalitarian relationship 
between women and men inside the PNGO (see chapter three, 3.5.7). - These 
data suggests that the PNGO sector also tends to be a working sector for people 
who wish to see or bring about social change. This differs from the private 
sector with its focus on economic success and the public sector which seeks to 
develop structures for a functioning state.  
 
The development of clientelism (with new client patron relationships) and 
elitism (the creation of a new kind of elite) as well as the neoliberal 
transformation of the NGO sector have changed internal PNGO structures. 
This slow process has undermined the ethical principles of people leading 
NGOs or working in them. It remains unclear whether they are actually aware 
of this. At the same time, NGO people’s relationships to their own society, as 
well as the perception of the NGO sector in Palestinian society have clearly 
changed. These questions will be discussed in argument four. 
 
 
4.2.4  This neoliberal transformation of PNGOs changed the self-
 perception of PNGO and PNGO employees. The PNGO sector, 
 originally acting as part of civil society, was transformed into a 
 vehicle for the realization of individual interests, for example to 
 secure a job or advance a career. In this sense, many PNGOs have 
 lost touch with society and society has lost its trust and 
 appreciation of PNGOs. 
 
Basic facts on the ground that allowed this development to took place: 
 
4.2.4.1 Who sets the agenda for NGOs? 
Since the 1990s, the agenda of Palestinian NGOs has depended on donor 
money and therefore on donor agendas, which are seldom developed in a local 
context and in dialogue with the native population (result from FGs in West 
Bank and Gaza). One result is a growing distance between the people for 
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whose benefit the agenda was designed and the PNGOs and PNGO employees 
who transfer and implement the agenda on the ground.  
 
It is important to note here, that the majority of Palestinians, who have lived for 
decades under occupation, consider democratization, the respect of human 
rights, the empowerment of women and peace education as an essential part of 
state formation (FGs WB&G all ages.170 But as mentioned above, the context 
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict imposes a harsh daily reality on Palestinians. 
Normal life is severely restricted by the ongoing Israeli occupation, by their 
economic dependence on Israel and on foreign donors, by the geographical 
division between the West Bank and Gaza, by an unemployment rate close to 
30% and by the political weakness of the Palestinian Authority.171  
 
In such a context, when Western donors impose agendas Palestinians tend to 
look very critically if not cynically at their professed aims. This became more 
obvious in and after 2006, when Hamas won a democratically run election. The 
international community refused to accept the result and started a boycott of 
the Hamas-government. It seems for Palestinians (and not only for them), that 
international donors have double standards in their understanding of the 
concepts of active democracy, secure statehood and freedom of movement. If 
this is the case, the idea of “teaching” democracy degenerates into an empty 
phrase. This was an argument especially in focus groups with interviewees 
below 30 years and a 'bad contract' in West Bank and Gaza.  
This empirical result from my focus group interviews has led me to the 
conclusion that the implementation of PNGOs' agendas has led to their 
                                               
170 See for example polls from Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research: "88% support 
and 11% oppose a democratic system with the following characteristics: periodic elections, a 
president with a limited term in office, freedom to form political parties, free press without 
censorship, an independent judiciary, and respect for human rights"; 
http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p6a.html 
 
171 Newest unemployment statistic, see MAS, 2013: "Economic and Social Monitor 33", 
MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, Ramallah, 
http://www.mas.ps/2012/node/580#.Ulu_wFOa5Sp. See also the newest analyzes of Helga 
Baumgarten in: Baumgarten, Helga, 2013: Kampf um Palästina - Was wollen Hamas und 
Fatah, Freibug: Herder., as her lecture "The Oslo System", soon be published. 
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increasing isolation from the communities they were set up to serve. If they and 
their employees earn their money through implementing these “donor 
agendas”, but the agendas bring about no improvement on the political level, 
many ordinary Palestinians see PNGOs as no longer representing them. This 
negative perception extends to all PNGO people from the elite to the precariat.  
 
As indicated in the introduction, the World Bank estimated in 1993, that the 
political system in Palestine (Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank) would 
eventually develop into a capitalist system with democratic structures. Rapid 
implementation of the two-state solution, involving close economic 
cooperation with Israel (Paris Protocols 1994) was seen as a condition intended 
to guarantee this process. As Muriel Asseburg (2002), Martin Beck (2002), 
Rex Brynen (1996 and 2000), Mushtaq Husain Khan, George Giacaman and 
Inge Amundsen (2004) have shown, there is a fatal connection between too 
little progress in the peace process and the lack of economic development. 
Even if the World Bank, EU and USA are officially, to this day, committed to 
this development, they cling to their failed policies.172 
 
 
4.2.4.2 Object society 
 
The NGO-isation of a grassroots movement increases its dependency on donors 
with the outcomes as desired by these very donors.173 As already mentioned, 
this transforms the previous collective approach into an individual issue. Rema 
                                               
172 See the critical article by: Tartir, Alaa and Wildman, Jeremy, October 2012: "Persistent 
Failure: World Bank Policies For The Occupied Palestinian Territories", policy brief, http://al-
shabaka.org/sites/default/files/TartirWildeman_PolicyBrief_En_Oct_2012.pdf. , relying on the 
report: Word Bank, 2012: "West Bank and Gaza - Towards economic sustainability of a future 
Palestinian state : promoting private sector-led growth ", 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2012/04/16626213/west-bank-gaza-towards-
economic-sustainability-future-palestinian-state-promoting-private-sector-led-growth., and 
World Bank economic reports since the Oslo Agreement (see also bibliography) 
 
173 NGO-isation is a term first used by Michael Warschawski in an article in 
“newsfromwithin” in 1990. For an analysis about NGO-isation see also the PhD thesis of: 
Ghandour-Demiri, Nada, 2012: "Disciplining Popular Resistance: The Case of Israel and the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories." 
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Hammami diagnoses a changing focus in the work of PNGOs and uses for this 
kind of behavior the term ‘social engineering’.174  
A PNGO as a professionalized and institutionalized institution with a mandate 
that includes for example the teaching of democracy or the empowerment of 
women is responsible for achieving a positive outcome – otherwise the project 
with its employees will receive no further funds. In this context, it is hardly 
surprising that PNGO employees might view their clients as objects to be dealt 
with rather than seeing them as people under an occupation (like themselves) 
which denies them their rights, dignity and perspectives. 
The problem lies in the changed basic assumption that it is no longer 
appropriate to resist, fight and work collectively against occupation which is 
after all the main reason for most political and economical difficulties. 
“Normalization” where no normality exists skews the social context. In a 
political entity under occupation, where there is neither secure statehood, nor 
freedom of movement, and where genuine freedom of speech does not exist, 
the stage is set for elites to take advantage of the prevailing circumstances. 
Inevitably, those who will not or cannot join the neoliberal money-go-round 
are sidelined and lose political influence. 
 
 
4.2.4.3 Employer PNGO 
This growing split between PNGOs and society at large feeds the 
disillusionment of people with the PNGO sector. Many PNGOs grew out of the 
grassroots movement in the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, forming an 
important part of civil society and trying to offer an alternative way of 
practicing politics. But since the 1990s, Palestinian society has come to see 
PNGOs increasingly and almost exclusively as employers.  
Some members of society benefit significantly from this change, a change that 
is limited to individual success, with this success in turn tied to a certain world 
                                               
174 Rema Hammami used this expression in a personal conversation with the author in 2009, 
making use of the expression originally used by Karl Popper. PNGOs are engaging in social 
engineering - sometimes in the place of state actors. There endeavors are goal oriented and take 
place in a technocratic framework  
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-view. A minority of PNGO employees gain clear material advantage, when 
becoming part of the elite or the middle class. Their income is above average, 
as are their status in the organization (they are often issued with a special pass 
to travel abroad) and their social status. But most importantly, they have the 
power of job creation. Since Oslo, the PNGO sector has been able to create 
jobs only if their elite and middle class agree to operate under the new political 
hegemony, as will be shown in argument five. 
 
 
4.2.5 The creation of jobs in the mainly externally funded PNGO sector 
 is possible, when social actors – willingly or unwillingly – accept, 
 operate and position  themselves within the existing political system. 
 
This results mainly in jobs for young, highly-educated people and perpetuates a 
long term dependency on external aid. The main reason for dependency is the 
simple fact that donors focus mainly on short term aid. Furthermore, aid flows 
to a large extent into civil society – a non-productive sector rather than into 
productive areas such as the industrial, agricultural or private sectors. To help 
Palestinians become independent from external donors in the future, a rejection 
of short-terminism is needed. A balanced and sustainable external aid supply to 
all sectors, as well as fair economic- and tax agreements with Israel, would 
help significantly. Last but not least, donors are needed who offer not only 
financial but also political support through diplomacy by treating the 
Palestinian government as equal to the Israeli government, obviously a very 
idealistic idea at this point in time and in the context of a highly asymmetric 
conflict configuration  
 
 
4.2.5.1 Capturing ‘human capital’ and long term dependency 
 
Eighty per cent of NGO employees in the study asserted that it would be more 
effective to support productive sectors such as agriculture, industry and 
sustainable development projects and education rather than the NGO sector. 
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If the majority of PNGOs and the PA obey the dictates of the donors, external 
aid will in the long run capture human capital. Higher wages in the civil society 
sector will encourage educated individuals not to work in community of 
municipal work centers or in other working sectors. Dependency on political 
rents generates rent seeking behaviour. As already mentioned, this is a vicious 
circle difficult if not impossible to break. It leads to a long term dependency on 
aid with serious consequences such as a poorly functioning economical system 
and political deadlock in a neo-patrimonial rentier state which is required by 
donors to adopt neoliberal strategies for running state and society.  
 
Following this argument, the question arises, why the majority of professional 
PNGO employees do not use their knowledge and experience on the ground – 
their formal and informal networks and their ability to raise funds – to signal or 
force donors to support productive sectors of the Palestinian economy, or to 
develop alternative models with the aim of becoming independent of external 
aid? There are some organizations which have started to change their financial 
models to build more on community support and their members. To probe this 
question further, however, more empirical research is needed.  
 
The academic education of PNGO employees generally does not match the 
type of work they do. Private sector, industry, agriculture and universities do 
offer jobs but they do not offer such good salaries as PNGOs.175 Recently 
(2012) the private sector has started a campaign in universities to introduce the 
needed skills for new types of jobs, based on the current reality where 
university education teaches theory but most often not the skills required for 
employment.  
The NGO sector (Palestinian and international) is, however, not only attractive 
because of higher wages. It also offers the possibility of (mainly) free training 
                                               
175 MAS published a study in 2007 dealing with “Wage Differentials in a Fast-Changing 
Environment: A Sectoral Analysis.” The results show higher wages in the NGO sector than in 
the private sector and a higher payment in the private sector than in the public sector. MAS 
appeal to the NGO sector was to understand the impact of driving wage inflation and to point 
out for all sectors, to reach a greater responsibility of “balanced financial incentives” across all 
sectors of the economy. MAS, 2007: "Wage Differentials in a Fast-Changing Environment: A 
Sectoral Analysis", MAS, Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, Ramallah, 
http://www.mas.ps/2012/search/node/Wage%20Differentials., p. xiv. 
  184 
courses to improve the professionalism of their employees. Finally, the 
existence of a NGO community, along with the existence of official and 
inofficial networks and NGO tracking for a better job, keep people in the NGO 
sector. 
So what would happen to those 41% of graduates, mainly educated in 
humanities, if the PNGO sector was not able to offer well-paid jobs? After all, 
these people are not educated for productive work in other sectors. As stated in 
the survey, they would face unemployment or emigration – or a less well paid 
job. The idea of emigration is raised, but it might be assumed that this is not a 
realistic option (see chapter 4.2.3.2). The 72% of PNGO employees who stated 
they would be able to find work in the governmental, public or private sectors 
have chosen to work in the PNGO sector because of the higher wages. 
The ability of the ‘aspiring middle class’ and the PNGO elite to generate 
employment means not only the creation of new jobs for the Palestinian 
population. It is also a tool to re-generate their own jobs and thus to support 
and perpetuate the PNGO middle class and the PNGO elite itself.  
 
 
4.2.5.2 Donor policy and the input for the Palestinian Authority 
 
Donor countries encourage Fatah and the Palestinian Authority to engage with 
Israel, particularly by means of aid. Anne Le More (2008) proposed that, in the 
Palestinian case, major structural defects are embedded in the peace process 
itself. The consequence of the aid dependency of the PA and the donors’ use of 
aid as a substitute for politics, without having any serious political strategy for 
ending the conflict, is that the transformative impact of aid is close to zero.176 
She argues: “Aid has performed a critical emergency relief function and 
temporarily acted as a social and political valve. But by sustaining such high 
level of funds over such a long period, donors also bankrolled a poorly run and 
increasingly disliked regime, subsidized Israeli military occupation, and 
                                               
176 Le More, Anne, 2008: International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo. Political guilt, 
wasted money, 174. 
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indirectly encouraged the continuing colonization and fragmentation of the oPt, 
as well as the broader process of Palestinian dispossession.”177  
I agree with Anne Le More in her analyses which are also relevant for the 
PNGO sector. A substantial amount of aid for the WB&G has been channeled 
through PNGOs. The formation of the externally financed PNGO sector as a 
client of the North, its  transformation into a neo-liberally restructured working 
sector and the existence of a precariat, aspiring middle class and an PNGO elite 
lead me to conclude, in agreement with Anne Le More, that since the end of 
the 1990s, the neo-liberal agenda promoted by donors in the PNGO sector, has 
led to the stabilization of both the repressive Israeli system of occupation and 
the coercive rule of the Palestinian Authority. The stabilization of the PA will 
be analyzed in more depth in the following argument six. 
 
 
4.2.6 In post-Oslo Palestine this process has also led to stabilization of 
 both the ruling system, represented by the Palestinian Authority 
 and of  the ongoing Israeli occupation. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the reality in the occupied Palestinian territories 
(as in many other developing countries) is that political rents are paid by 
donors to the recognized Fatah- Palestinian Authority, while additional 
financial support is given independently to the PNGO sector. Political rents 
enjoyed by the PA enables it to co-opt their own political clients (to discuss the 
conflict between Fatah and Salam Fayyad is beyond the scope of this thesis).178 
As previously mentioned, the PNGO sector co-opts academics, creating a 
globalized PNGO elite and an aspiring middle class alongside a precariat. In 
fact, all groups in the PNGO sector benefit from the political status quo, being 
part of a client group receiving rents which lead to relatively "stable 
                                               
177 Le More, Anne, 2008: International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo. Political guilt, 
wasted money, 173. 
 
178 see further details Brown, Nathan J., 2010: "Fayyad Is Not the Problem, but Fayyadism Is 
Not the Solution to Palestine’s Political Crisis ", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/fayyad_not_problem_2.pdf. and 
Brown, Nathan J., 2010: "Are Palestinians Building a State?", Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/palestinian_state1.pdf. 
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employment" through the acceptance of depoliticizing preconditions. This 
simple socio-economic equation helps stabilize the political system of the PA 
and supports question and hypothesis four. Do subsidies in the PNGO sector 
engender a pro-western client group which supports PLO / Mahmoud Abbas 
politics? External western funded PNGOs are seen in public as influenced by 
western cultures and policies. My analyses based on the new data collection 
can shed light on this fact and can show if PNGOs still can be seen as a free 
counterpart to the government of the PA. 
 
The explanation is straightforward.  
The payment and receipt of political rents is explicitly linked to donor policies 
for civil society and these are linked to the general donor policy of supporting 
the Middle East peace process based on the Oslo Accords and the two-state 
solution. In this process, the security of Israel has priority. The Fatah/PA 
receives political rents if they act within the constraints of donor policies. 
PNGOs, as part of civil society and seen as playing an active part in 
establishing a future Palestinian state, receive political rents from the same 
donors. These rents are obviously conditional on their accepting and 
implementing donor policies and adopting the donors' perception of Palestine 
as a post-conflict zone. It is also expected that PNGO actors will support the 
political positions of Fatah regarding the desirability of a two state solution and 
go along with their neoliberal economic policies. 
 
The new data collected in my field-work in Palestine, confirm the usefulness of 
my approach based on the traditional rent paradigm. I assume that in the 
occupied Palestinian territories there are two groups which political rents with 
clear preconditions. On the state level there is the PA and on the civil society 
sector level the PNGOs which have been transformed into a PNGO-client 
group. By receiving political rents and accepting them under the same pre-
conditions as the Palestinian Authority, the PNGO stabilizes the ruling political 
system and thus leads to the stabilization of the continuing Israeli occupation. 
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4.3 Final remarks: the consequences of external political 
rents paid to  social actors 
 
4.3.1 A commercialization of the PNGO sector 
 
Several external and internal facts, which all have been analyzed in this thesis, 
lead not only to a stabilization of a neopatrimonially ruled semi-rentier state; 
they also lead to the commercialization of the PNGO sector.  
In retrospect, a major external intervention impacting PNGOs was the shift in 
the political economy of western aid from the end of the 1980s, especially after 
1993. 
 
The financial reality and the need to ensure the professional and 
institutionalized survival of PNGOs engender rent-seeking behavior by 
PNGOs. This can be characterized as “the aid business as usual”179: 
dependency, compromise of principles and de-politicization. On the positive 
side, however, it can be argued that PNGOs' through accepting the pre-defined 
donor agendas  can secure a remarkable 10% of the job market in return - and 
this in a country where 31% of the working population is unemployed.180  
Focusing on argument four in this chapter and on my data results concerning 
employment structure and hierarchies, we can see a re-organization of the 
social fabric into a precariat, an aspiring middle class and elite dependent on 
foreign donors and their policies. This neoliberal development has turned the 
externally western funded PNGO sector in a “free market model without 
                                               
179 "aid business as usual", see Le More, Anne, 2008: International Assistance to the 
Palestinians After Oslo. Political guilt, wasted money.; Hanafi, Sari and Tabar, Linda, 2005: 
Donors, International NGO's and Local NGO's: The Emergence of a Palestinian Globalized 
Elite. and concerning rent-seeking see Beck, Martin, 2002: Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten. 
Rationalität, Kooperation und Politische Rente im Vorderen Orient. 
 
180 See newest data in OCHA Atlas 2012 
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accompanying social provision.”181 Political rents reinforce a commer-
cialization of the externally-funded PNGO sector.182  
This neoliberal development of the PNGO sector has involved the suppression 
of the ethical principles of civil society, which saw itself traditionally as being 
independent and a free counterpart to the ruling system. After all, this sector 
was originally focused on social justice, the respect for human rights, dignity, 
democracy and tolerance.183  
 
In question and hypothesis six I had asked: Does the thesis of Anne Le More 
(2005, 2008) regarding impacts in the political sector also hold true for the 
NGO sector? Does this imply that external western donors’ decision to 
extensively support the NGO sector does not strengthen but rather debilitate 
civil society? My data analyzes, as referring on other research results can verify 
this question. The analysis of my data shows that a weakening of civil society 
has certainly taken place. 
 
My data indicate the existence of a PNGO precariat, an aspiring middle class 
and an elite. In such an environment, it is obvious that “class matters”.184 A 
PNGO elite is playing a leading role in civil society, not only influencing 
attitudes within civil society – they also, as third sector actors, affect and 
                                               
181 The expression "free market model without accompanying social provision" was used by 
Oliver Schlumberger in discussion with me. 
 
182 The term commercialization describes the propagation of the market and an economic logic 
of action in other areas of society. 
This framing as commercialization was the result of a discussion with Oliver Schlumberger. 
This fact is documented in my thesis with data material from Palestine. It is expected that 
similar data material will be found in other development countries. Therefore should this 
theoretical approach more studied in a comparative study across different regions of the world. 
Also this development has to be seen in context of donor countries politics towards 
development countries. Donor countries are imposing and forcing development countries to 
implement structural adjustment programs. This forces these countries into: deregulation, 
currency depreciation, privatization of state owned enterprises, cancellation of subventions, 
promotion of production for export etc. The commercialization of civil society shown in this 
thesis can be seen as one consequence of such structural adjustment programs. 
 
183 see for example the vision and mission of the Palestinian Non-Governmental Network: 
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organization Network. It is a Network where ca. 130 
developmental NGOs belong to. 
 
184 Citation from Joe Beilin at the MESA's 46. Annual Meeting 2012 in Denver, Colorado 
during a discussion about the ongoing changes in the Arab world. 
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change the structure of society itself. I propose that the new data, together with 
data from other fields could form the first step towards a class analysis of 
Palestinian society. Although it would be interesting to discuss and elaborate a 
theoretical framework for a solid class analysis, but this would be beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
Members of focus groups stressed in their discussions the problems resulting 
from short term projects and the consequences of short term contracts which 
can be interpreted as one reason for the development of a class system in the 
PNGO sector. Focus groups were not asked what kind of latitude directors 
(who belong to the elite) have to react to such a development. Do they 
implement donors' demands without questioning or do they develop and 
practice alternatives?  
Neither did the question whether any progressive, solidarity-based alternative 
is in sight form part of focus group discussions which were aimed mainly at 
determining the current situation and its ramifications. Some PNGOs have 
attempted to play the system. There is for example a PNGO in Gaza which 
quite openly divides a full-time job into two part-time jobs, so two people can 
be employed. On the other hand, in discussions in focus groups about the 
misery of part-time jobs (which are often taken since there is no alternative), 
one focus group in Gaza, comprising men over 40 years, mainly in director 
positions, denied the existence of part-time jobs in Gaza. This is in stark 
contrast to the other eleven focus groups in the West Bank and Gaza. It was not 
possible to determine why these men denied the existence of part-time jobs, 
even though such jobs exist in their PNGOs and despite their being aware of 
the quantitative results of the study (53% of part time and 47% full time jobs in 
Gaza – see Table and Graphs 17). 
The question remains, how does a PNGO elite act and react in implementing 
imposed labor conditions?  
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4.3.2 Commercialization and the possibility of strengthening civil 
 society? 
 
As I have argued in chapter two, society has to be understood as a work in 
process. PNGOs as part of civil society must be seen in a constant process of 
change. The development described above contradicts the general perception of 
civil society. Here it seems we reach a basic contradiction between the 
discourse espoused by donors and by PNGOs on the ground.185  
It would be too easy to fall into the trap of an argument of either “black” or 
“white”. 
 
On one hand, externally-funded PNGOs stabilize the political system of a neo-
patrimonial semi-rentier state while they themselves are undergoing a 
neoliberal process of commercialization which contradicts the self 
understanding and ethic principles of NGOs. On the other hand, given the 
nature of the semi-rentier state in which they operate, PNGOs offer through 
their programs, seminars, and workshops some scope for development to their 
people on the ground. In a neo-patrimonial rentier or semi-rentier state this free 
space normally does not exist. It would not be so freely available in Palestine 
in this form if donors were not to support civil society separately from the 
government (with all the negative impacts discussed in this thesis).  
Therefore it should also not be ignored that PNGOs in various spheres such as 
human rights, women's rights, democratization, and agriculture provide an 
opportunity through their meetings, training sessions and workshops to support 
the development of political and social awareness among Palestinians. This 
                                               
185 The efforts of the European Union offer a good example. See Al -Fattal, Rouba, 2010: 
European Union Foreign Policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jerusalem: PASSIA 
Publication, 72-142., as Krieger, Helmut, 2013: Investitionen in den Konflikt. Die politische 
Ökonomie palästinensischer Staatsformierung, 14. Compare also with EC documents, reports 
listed in the bibliography-  
for example see EC policy towards Palestine: European Commission, "European 
Neighbourhood Policy. Country Report. Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip," http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/pa_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf. and for 
example: European Commission, "Implementing the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
Palestine. Progress in 2012 and recommendations for action," 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/documents/eu_westbank/2012_enp_progress_report
_palestine_en.pdf. 
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happens despite the fact that PNGO-agendas are predetermined by donors. 
Preconditions for a widening scope for this potentially positive impact would 
be that such sessions should be open for all and located wherever the average 
Palestinian has access to them.  
This obviously leads me in my argumentation to the central problem: a 
Palestinian citizen, responsible and informed and coping with living in the 
occupied Palestinian territories well understands the contradiction between the 
social and political content which PNGOs have traditionally espoused and the 
reality of their being part of the aid system and hence the ruling political 
system. Informed citizens are also aware of the effects of this paradox on 
PNGO employees and on society as a whole.  
 
How this influences the opinions or behavior of individuals remains unclear 
and is definitely not under the control of donors or PNGOs (even if they 
wished to exercise influence).186 This moment of liberty might provide space 
for the development of new groups, including groups of former PNGO 
employees acting beyond the PNGO sector who refuse further to conform to 
prevailing neoliberal ideology. Emerging, independent social movements can 
already be observed in the growing numbers of non-violent popular resistance 
groups. For example, the settlement of Bab Al-Shams by Palestinian activists 
in early 2013 in reaction to the illegal Israeli expansion into the E1 sector 
showed a willingness to think out of the box in opposing occupation and 
                                               
186 See Ghandour-Demiri, Nada, 2012: "Disciplining Popular Resistance: The Case of Israel 
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories," 228-229. 
She analyses various way of disciplining popular resistance. And one way of disciplinary 
process is carried out by Palestinian NGOs and foreign donors. "This form of disciplining 
dissent, although separate from the previous ones, is important in the way nonviolent resistance 
against the Israeli occupation is being practiced, controlled and perceived. The NGO-ization 
that took place in the post-Oslo period led to the mushrooming of many advocacy NGOs in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. Some of these NGOs focused on the promotion of 
nonviolence. In this context, however, nonviolence was to be promoted, based on donors’ 
guidelines, as a value that needs to be taught to Palestinians as part of an effort to develop and 
empower Palestinian society, rather than as a strategy to resist the occupation. This 
understanding and promotion of nonviolence by NGOs ended up disciplining popular 
resistance in two ways: first, nonviolence was to be performed and articulated in very selective 
and conditional ways based on foreign donors’ political agendas; second, it led to the 
fragmentation of Palestinian activism by dividing it into those working in the NGO industry 
and promoting this version of nonviolence and those working in grassroots groups and who use 
nonviolence explicitly as a strategy of resistance and their main aim is not internal 
empowerment but the end of the occupation." 
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encouraging resistance. The varied and inventive strategies of resistance to 
forced relocation by the villagers of Al Araqib in the Negev also show how 
political life beyond the dictate of the western donors' club can change local 
and international opinion. In 2014, the attempts by ousted Palestinians to 
repopulate their villages in the Jordan valley in the face of considerable odds, 
show how a reserve of resistance to occupation exists after decades of 
continuous Western financial pressure aimed at snuffing out rebellion.  
 
Here is another field where in-depth research is needed into the composition 
and aims of such organizations. PNGOs can provide space for the growth of 
awareness, resulting in a change of perspective. In this sense, donors (through 
their funding) and PNGOs (through their social awareness) could in time bring 
about a positive outcome, enabling positive developments in civil society. 
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 ﺕ- او ﺕ6ری%
 ﻥ-Q  .1
      N  .2
 
 1_01P
 ﺕQ دI Mریu 
 ا
%ﻥt ا
6ری% او
 ا
-
 . ﺡﺏ ا
9eM  .1
  ﺡب ا
cﺱ ا
 ا1   .2
 .I7
   ﺡب v'   .3
 ........................... ي/ﺡ6د 
 
 2_01P
 اذا آﻥ) اﺏ ﻥ-Q .
 ﺡ6د ا
%ﻥt   ،01P I
 
 
 
 
 11P
 ا


 :اN
 . ة/dوج  .1
 . dﺏء/ اdب   .2
 . ة/:  .3
  . ة/ار1  .4
  ة/	M1  .5
 
  ،  21P  اNﺱa  ة، ار اNﺏ/اذا آ) dوج 
 )1W(  dﺏء، أر اNﻥ.ل ا
? ا
.Q ا
fﻥ /إذا آ) أdﺏ 
 21P
  ة/ه1 ﺵیU
 /ﺡﺕU ی-1
 ﺕ-1 ای]؟ 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N   .2
 
 1_21P
 اذا آن ا
اب
 : 21P ﻥ-Q I 
 : ي ای /ﺡ6د 
 OGN ا
ـ   .1
 ا
.ع ا
  .2
 ا
.ع ا
eص   .3
 
 31P
  ة/إذا آ) dوج 
 أو ﺱ%: 
U 
 ا
dواج، ه1 
6یU
  أوNد
 ﻥ-Q  .1
     N  .2
 
 71P_31P  ي أوNد IK8  اOﺱa /اذا آن 
6یU
 )1W( ي إ
? ا
.Q ا
fﻥ /وإذا N ی6 أوNد اﻥ.1 
   6د اOوNد 1_31P
  اOوNد I ﺱ اL1  ﺱ ا
<هب إ
?   .1 ? اO8، أی  41P
  422 
 ﺕ.? أو ی.?
 أوNدك ا
-Q
 ا
6رﺱ ؟
  
 ا
6رﺱ
   6ارس 'ﺹ   .2
  6ارس ﺡ   .3
 6ارس ا
آ
   .4
 51P
 /6د اNوNد ا
<ی  ی6رﺱن 
 درﺱا  I ا
-ت 
 ا
	
 I ﺡ
 6م ود أوNد (
 ی6رﺱن او درﺱا I 
 ا
-، ا
ء وP ا
d
 )001
  
 61P
 / 6د اNوNد ا
<ی ی6رﺱن 
 درﺱا  I  - 'رج 
 I
 I ﺡ
 6م ود أوNد (
 ی6رﺱن او درﺱا I 
 وP ا
d ا
-، ا
ء 
 )001
  ..............................................
 1_61P
  ا
6ول، ا
 /  ا
6و

  ات/ﺕ6 ﺏ7 ا
- 
 'رج I 
  
  ﻡ"0ﻡت % ا"! : ا  ا5ﻥ 
 :!%- ا
[	   1W
  .و[	 آ  .1
   .dB  .2
 .9ر  .3
 
 1-1W
 6ة .6 ا
-1 ا
eص 
  ) ﺏ
ات)ﺏU 
 واذا N ی6 .ان و6(
  ي ا
d/.6 P 
 )201
  
 :!%- ا
-1 2W
 .اداري  .1
 . ة 8/[u  .2
  ة/او 9ف/ ة/6رب  .3
 .'6ت  .4
 . ة/:  .5
  ة/ﺏﺡA  .6
 ......................... ي/ﺡ6د / ا'ى   .7
 
 
 3W
  ه<;  6ة ا
-1 I
 ا
cﺱ  
 )OGN  ال)ا
 
  اذا آﻥ). )ﺏ
ات
 ا
6ة اL1  ﺱ 
 )1  ي/P
 
 
 
 4W
 ه1 ) I cﺱت 
 ا'ى L%1 ا


 آ1    ي/ا'ر (
 )ی%:
 ﻥ-Q ﺡ   .1
 ﻥ-Q 'ﺹ  .2
  )sOGN( ﻥ-Q ت  ﺡ   .3
 .ه<; اول cﺱ ا1 I7   .4
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 2_4W ،1_4W ﻥ-Q ، ا
ء اNﺏ   4W إذا آﻥ) اﺏ I
 1_4W
 I آQ cﺱ )  .
 ر ا

؟ 
  
   ا
M   .1
    ا
dرا  .2
    ا
6ی.ا! وﺡ.ق اNﻥن   .3
   رأةا
Q  .4
   ا
9%ب   .5
 2_4W
 I أي Lت آن 1
 ا
ت 
 ) sOGN ال)ا
 
 ا
 ) ﺏ7 
  ي آ1  /ا'ر) ﺱﺏ.؟ 
 cﺱ ﺕ6ری8 ى
pم   .6 )ی%:
 .وا
-ی\ 
 
 3_4W
 و
ذا ﺕآ) ا
-1  
 ا
  ا

  ا
ﺏ.؟ )OGN ا
ـ(
   اﻥ7ء ا
-.6  .1
  اﻥ7ء ا
9وع   .2
 ﺡM) ? Iﺹ اI]1   .3
  اpق ا
cﺱ ا
ﺏ.   .4
 ..............  ي/ﺡ6د / اﺱ%ب ا'ى   .5
 
 
 5W 
  ه ﺱ%8 ا'رك
 
-1 I ا
ت 
  ا
ـ) ا
 
 ﺏ91 م؟  )sOGN
  اﺱ%ب3ي  /ا'ر ( 
 ورﺕ%7Q  اNهQ ا
? 
 اNL1 اه ﺏP 
 I ا
ﺏ-ت  اNرLم
 )3،2،1
  د'1 ا?   .1
 .L و[	 أI]1  .2
 .اﺵ- ﺏﺱ.p
 أI]1   .3
 اﺵ- أﻥ ه اﺱ ﺕF   .4
     ﺵء 
M
g ا

        .ا
.ب  ن اL   .5
   .اNزات وا
اId أI]1   .6
  
-6م ﺡM
 ? 1 ا'  .7
 ........................ ي/ﺡ6د / اﺱ%ب أ'ى   .8
 
  .N ی6 ﺡاId  .0
   راﺕ8 6  .1
  ﺕ-یE  .2
  اﺕ-ب ﻥ7ی ا
e6  .3
   ﺕK ﺹ   .4
 6W
 اNزات او  ه 
 ا
 ﺕ.67  ا
اId
 ا
cﺱ ا
 
  ی I7/ﺕ-1
  ي آ1  /ا'ر (ﺡ
؟
 )ی%:
   ي/ﺡ6د / ا'ى  اﺱ%ب  .5 
 7W
 آu ﺡM) ? 
  و[	U؟
 
7 و
Hا
Mل ع(
 )ا
ع 7 
  !ی: pLﺕU I U   .1
   ا
ﺏ:
 . !ی: اﺹ6Lء   .2
  . !ی: اLﺏء   .3
  /!ق ا'ى  .4
 .......................... ي/ﺡ6د          
 
 8W
  ن I/آQ ﺱ ﺕ] 
 ﺱا
-1 I ا
c 
 اﺱ%
  
 9W
  ی ﺏ-1 /ه1 ﺕ.م
 ﺕ I cﺱ 
 ا'ى؟ 
  ﻥ-Q  .1
     N  .2
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 1_9W 
 إذا آﻥ) اNﺏ ﻥ-Q 
 I ا
cال
  ي/ﺡ6د  ،)9W(ا
ﺏ:
 اهQ Jpث 'رات
 ﺕ% ﺡ8 اNه 
 ﺏﺱe6ام ﺕLQ
  ؟3،2،1
 I وﺕﻥ9!ت ﺕf.    .1
 ﻥ9!ت ﺕ6ری%  .2
 ﺕ.6یQ 6ات ﺕ.  .3
 .ﺕ.6یQ ا
6Q ا
دي واNﺱ9ري   .4
 ..6 دورات eMM   .5
 .ا6اد دراﺱت واﺏث   .6
 .ا6اد ا
9ری   .7
 .اNﺵاف ? ﺕی 9ری   .8
 .I ت 'ی   .9
  ...................................... ي/ﺡ6د / ا'ى   01
 
 
 01W
   ا
6 : ﺏ91 م 
 I ا
-1 
6ى
 ا
ت 
  cﺱت)ا
 
  ي اهQ/ﺡ6د )؟ )sOGN ا
ـ
 Jpث 'رات ﺕ% 
 ﺡ8 اNه
 ﺏﺱe6ام ﺕLQ
 ) ؟3،2،1
  .1 دQ ا
 ا
6ﻥ  
  .2 Iﺹ 
	 إ
? ا
eرج  
  .3 .ا
Mل ? 1 
  .4 ا
Mل ? د'1 أI]1  
  .5   ا
-1  أﺵeص v'ون  
 اﺵ- ﺏKن و[	 أآf  ا
.ع  
  .6 ا
eص
 اﺵ- ﺏKن و[	 أآf  ا
.ع   .7
 .ا

 /أ'ى   .8
 ......................................... ي/ﺡ6د 
 
  .0 .N ی6 ﺱ%ت  
  .1 6م ا
Mل ? و[	 داB .
  .2 9ری LMة  .
 ا
ی. ا
 ﺕ-1  'p
7 ه<;   .3
 ا
cﺱت N ﺕe6م   ی> ا
9-8 
 ارض ا
اL ا
	 ? 
 11W 
  ه ﺱ%ت ا
-1
 I f1 ه<; 
  ي/ا'ر (ا
cﺱت؟
 )آ1  ی%:
  
 /أ'ى  
. ................................................. ي/ﺡ6د 
  .4
 
 21W
  ي p I/إذا 
Q ﺕ6
 ا
ت 
  Lع)ا
 
 I أي Lع ،)OGN
 ﺕ	]1 ان ﺕ-1؟ 
 p ؟ 
 ا
.ع ا
eص I I   .1
 ا
.ع ا
  .2
 I ا
eرج  .3
ه ا
.ع ا
ﺡ6 ا
<ي ی ان  OGN ا
ـ  .4 
 .ا6 pً  I>
 
  ﻡى ا"16 : ا  ا5' 
   :ن ﺱU  1SL
 dل .1   .1
   ﺵ.  ..2
   ا
-B أ\  .3
   ایر  .4
 
 : ه ا
% ا
 ﺕdم  راﺕ%U ا
97ي 
6اد ا

 
 )% 0ي ا
% /اذا آن N ی%: P  ( 
   % أة ﺵ. 1-1SL
   % أة dل  2-1SL
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   دI Lq ا
9. 3-1SL
   دI Lq ا
dل  4-1SL
 اB+ ﺏ1%  ا6Aي ﺏ?  راﺕ)>  +%/آ1; ﺕزع  2SL
   دI Lq ا
رة  1-2SL
   دI Lوض ﺵeM  2-2SL
   
K ا
M  3-2SL
   MوIت ا
Kآ1 4-2SL
   MوIت ا
%H  5-2SL
   Iاﺕ ا
7ﺏ وا
ء  6-2SL
  ي/ﺡ6د :  MوIت ا'ى 7-2SL
 ا
%
  
  ﺕC1; ا/و/د 3SL
   ا
6ارس  1-3SL
   ا
-ت 2-3SL
   ا
وP 3-3SL
   ا
]ﻥ 4-3SL
   اﺹpت 5-3SL
   اد'ر 6-3SL
   'د 7-3SL
 4SL
 راﺕ%U ا
97ي آI  
 
-9
 
 .آI وی اNد'ر   .1
 .آI وN ی اNد'ر   .2
 .ﺏ
د ی	  .3
 .آI   .4
  آI 
I ا
ت   .5
 اNﺱﺱ
 
 ه1 
6یU Mدر د'1  5SL
 ا'ى 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
  ﺕ6ك/ه1 ی6ك  6SL
  زوU I /زوU 
 ﺕF ه<; ا
MوIت 
   ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 ) ة/ dوج)N ی%:   .3
 
 ه1 ی6ك ﺵer ا'  7SL
 I ﺕF ه<; 
 ا
MوIت 
  زوU؟/زوU 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 6SL إذا آن اب ا
cال  1-7SL
 . ي ؟/ﻥ-Q، ﺡ6د 
  
  راﺕ%U  ا
97ي  8SL
  دوNر005اL1    .1
 0001-105  .2
 0051_1001  .3
 0002_1051 .4
 0052_1002 .5
 0003_1052 .6
 0053_1003 .7
 0004_1053 .8
  0004أآf    .9
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 9SL 
 ن، I ه ي/إذا آ) ﺕ6' 
  ي/ا'ر) ه6ف اNد'ر؟ 
  اﺱ%ب ورﺕ%7Q3ا? 
  اNهQ ا
? اNL1 اه 
 ﺏP اNرLم I 
 ) 3،2،1ا
ﺏ-ت 
 .N اد' ﺵa   .0
 .إﻥ9ء 9وع 'ص   .1
 .ﺏء ﺏ)  .2
 .ﺕ-Q اOوNد  .3
 .اآل ﺕ-   .4
  .ا
dواج  .5
 .L]ء ازات I ا
eرج   .6
  ا1 ﺵاء ﺱرة   .7
 ﺕ6ی6 اJث ا
%)   .8
 ................ ي/ﺡ6د / ﺵء ا'  .9
 
 01SL
 ی/آu ﺕMu
 اك  ا
-9
 6 6ا   .1
  6  .2
  ﺱq  .3
 ﺱء  .4
 ﺱء 6ا  .5
 
 11SL
  ی   /ه1 أﻥ) راض 
  ی >  /ﺕM1
 راﺕ8 وﺡاId وازات 
  ا
cﺱ ا
? 
  ی I7 /ﺕ-1
 .راض 6ا   .1
 راِض  .2
 . ﻥ   .3
 . راِض  .4
  راض ﺏﺕ   .5
 
 21SL
  ی ان وP/ه1 ﺕ-.6 
 -9U اI]1 
 آf 
 ا
	 ﺏ%8 
 U I ا
ت  
 ؟)OGN  ا
ـ)ا
 
 .اواI: ﺏ96ة   .1
 .اواI:  .2
 .N اف  .3
 .N اواI:  .4
 .N اواI: ﺏ96ة  .5
 
 31SL
 ا
<ی ی-ن I 
 یMن ? sOGN
 راﺕ8 6
 .اواI: ﺏ96ة   .1
 .اواI:  .2
 .N اف  .3
 .N اواI:  .4
 .N اواI: ﺏ96ة  .5
 
 41SL
  ی ان ا
<ی/ه1 ﺕ-.6 
 یMن ? راﺕ8 
  ' vNف دوNر اوأآf 
  ی.ﻥ>   .1
 ﺏ
% 
ﺱq یﺕ   .2
 .ی9 I I 
 6ا ا

 
  اﺕEهت 4.1 : ا  ااﺏD 
 1AP
 ? ﺏ6أت ا
-1 I 
  ﺏ91 م ؟  OGN
 Iة ز (
 )ﺏ
ات
  
 
 2AP 
 ذا آن ه6IU  ا
-1 
 I ا
ت  
   ا
ـ)ا
 
  ي اهQ/ا'ر) ؟ )OGN
 Jpث 'رات ﺕ% 
 ﺡ8 اNه ﺏﺱe6ام 
 ) ؟3،2،1ﺕLQ 
 دQ ا
 ا
6ﻥ   .1
 ا
6ة I ﺏء دو
   .2
 .I دی.ا! 
 .ا
ر  اNﺡpل   .3
 .ا
Mل ? ا
ل   .4
 ا
Mل ? '%ات و7رات   .5
 . و6ة 
  ا
6ة I ﺕF ا
   .6
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 3AP
  ة I/ه1 آ) ﻥg 
 ﺕ.: ه6IU  'pل
 ا
-1 I ا
ت  
 ؟)OGN  ا
ـ)ا
 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 1-3AP
 ،N 3AP إذا آﻥ) اﺏ
  ي 
ذا؟/وPg
 
 .ا
L) 
Q ی آI   .1
  ون 
Q ﺕ6 I/ ﺱﺱ ا
ل  .2
 .ذ
U
 ﺱﺱ ا
cﺱ ا
 ا1 ﺏ7  .3
 .
Q ﺕ6ﻥ
 ا
P ا
ﺱ I ا
%6 
Q   .4
 .ی6ﻥ ? ذ
U
  دا'1 )9آ1 اNﺕMل ا
6ا'   .5
 . 
Q ﺕ6ﻥ( ا
cﺱ
 /ا'ى   .6
 .......................................... ي/ﺡ6د 
 
 4AP
  ا
<ي
  ﺕ.ﺡ>/ﺕ.ﺡ>
 ﺡ? ین ﺕ.: 
 ه6IU ؟ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5AP
 ﺏأیU، ه1 ا
[	 I 
 ا
ت  ا
 
 ه 
-1   )sOGN ا
ـ(
 ا1 ا
ر 
 اNﺡpل؟
 .ﺵ6ةاواI: ب  .1
 .اواI:  .2
 .N اف  .3
 .N اواI:  .4
 .N اواI: ﺏ96ة  .5
 
 6AP
  ی ﺡ1 ا
6و
؟ /ه1 ﺕcی6 
 دو
 I ودو
 (
 )إﺱاB
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 7AP
 ن ﺡ1 ا
6و
  ي/ه1 ﺕcی6
 ا
اﺡ6ة؟
 دو
 واﺡ6 
9-%(
 ا
	 واﺱاB 
 )ﺏ}دارة إﺱاB
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 8AP
  ی أن آ1 ه<; /ه1 ﺕ-.6 
 ا
%اt، ا
6ری8، ورﺵت 
 ا
-1، وا
6ی.ا! وا
Q 
 ا
M
g وا
9%ت، ا

 ﺕ-1 ﺏ7 ه<; ا
cﺱت  
 ﺕ6 )sOGN( ا

 I ':  اآf 
 دی.ا!؟
  ﺡ :  ا
6ی.ا! ( 
 ،e%  ا
9-8 
 اﻥeﺏت ﺡة وﻥdی7 
 ودوری، ﺡ: اN% 
 ،ا
ﺏ I ا
Q 
 ،ا
واة، ا
ی ا
6ی 
 )ﺡی ا
أي ا
MI
 .اواI: ﺏ96ة   .1
 .اواI:  .2
 .N اف  .3
 .N اواI:  .4
 .N اواI: ﺏ96ة  .5
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 9AP
  ی ان آ1 ه<; /ه1 ﺕ-.6 
 ا
%اt، ا
6ری8، ورﺵت 
 ا
-1، وا
6ی.ا! وا
Q 
 ا
M
g وا
9%ت 
7 
 ﺕKJ ایﺏ I ﺕی 
 I؟
 .اواI: ﺏ96ة   .1
 .اواI:  .2
 .N اف  .3
 .N اواI:  .4
 .N اواI: ﺏ96ة  .5
 
 01AP
  ی ان ا
cﺱ/ه1 ﺕ-.6
  ی I7 ه /ا
 ﺕ-1 
 cﺱ دی.ا!؟
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 11AP
  ی ان ا
<ی/ﺕ.6  ه1 ﺕ 
 
6ی7Q sOGN ی-ن I 
 Iﺹ أI]1 I د'ل 
 ا
%
ن او ا
Mل ?
 اآd ﺱﺱ 7؟ 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 21AP
  ی ﺏKﻥ> ی8 /ه1 ﺕ-.6 
 
-8 OGN ? cو
 ا
ـ 
 دور ﺱﺱ؟
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 1-21AP
 ﻥ-Q 21AP اذا آﻥ) اﺏ 
  ي 
ذا؟/وPg
  
 31AP
 OGN ه1 د'ل cو
 ال 
 
%
ن .%ل؟ 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 41AP
  ی  ان c
/ه1 ﺕ-.6
 ﻥا I د'ل  sOGNا
ـ
 ا
%
ن او ا
Mل ?
 ﺹ8 ﺡ؟ 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 51AP
 ه1 اﻥ)  ا
أي ا
<ي ی.ل 
 ﺏKن 1 ا
ت  
 ا
 یe6م ﺏMرة او 
 ﺏK'ى اNﺡpل 
 اNﺱاB  ﻥﺡ ان 
 ا
e6ت ا
 ﺕ.67 ه<; 
 ا
ت ﺕe	u  -ﻥة 
 ا
 ا
	
 و]%7Q وI ﻥ	H ا
L) 
  ﺕ6Q ﺱﺱ اNﺡpل؟ 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 
 61AP
  ی اﻥ>  اO6ى /ه1 ﺕ-.6 
 دQ Lت إﻥ أ'ى 
 آ
dرااو ا
M أو 
 9وت ا
 ا
6ا
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 1-61AP
 61AP إذا آن اب ا
cال 
  ي ا
.ت اNآf/ﻥ-Q، ﺡ6د 
 اه 
  
 71AP
  ﺕﻥ ]ا/  اذا 
Q ﺕ
 ،I اﺡ6 اNﺡdاب ا
ﺱ 
  ی ان ﺱﺱ>/ ﺕ-.6
 ه اNI]1 
ی 
 I
 
 Ig  .1
 ﺡس  .2
 ا
%7 ا
9-%  .3
 ا
%7 ا
6ی.ا!  .4
 !ا
%درة ا
   .5
 ﺡdب ا
ی   .6
 
  132 
 ا
7د اNﺱp   .7
 /ﺡdب ا'   .8
 
 ............................................... ي/ﺡ6د 
 
 N اﺡ6  .9
 81AP
 ه1 آ) ]ا I اﺡ6 
 اNﺡdاب ا
ﺱ 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 91AP
 ه1 أﻥ) ] اNن I ﺡdب 
 ﺱﺱ
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
 02AP
 ه1 أﻥ) ] ﻥ9q I 
 ا
dب؟
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
  
) ]ا I )N ی%:   .3
 )ﺡdب ﺱﺱ 
 
 ه1 ﺕآ) ا
dب؟ 12AP
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
  
Q أآ ]ا I )N ی%:   .3
 )ﺡdب ﺱﺱ 
 
  ة 
dب/ه1  ز
) ا
 22AP
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
  
Q اآ ]ا I )N ی%:   .3
 )ﺡdب ﺱﺱ 
 
-22AP
 1
    ي/ ﺡ6د / اي ﺡdب 
 32AP
 ه1 L) ﺏNﻥeب  I 
 . 6002اﻥeﺏت 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
-32AP
 1
 إذا آن اب ا
cال 
 ا
ﺏ: ﻥ-Q، Oي ﺡdب آن 
  ﺕMیU؟
  
-32AP
 2
  ی ة ا'ى /ه1 ﺱMت
 
dب؟ 
 ﻥ-Q  .1
  N  .2
 
   
   
 اﻥ7?
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